

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

Nos. 5, 6 & 7.

AUG., SEPT., OCT. 1931.

VOL. XXI.

EDITORIAL

THE papers published in this number of the *Modern Churchman* were read at the Eighteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen held in Oxford, September 7th to 12th, 1931.

The theme of the Conference was *Man, His Nature, Civilization, and Prospects*. The programme was arranged as follows : The Conference opened with the Presidential Address by the Dean of St. Paul's on *Humanism, Pagan and Christian*. This was followed by three papers on the nature of man.

(1) *The Nature of Man*—dealing with his biological status in relation to other forms of terrestrial life, by Professor Sir J. Arthur Thomson.

(2) *Man's Conflict with, Control of, and Adaptation to, External Nature*, by M. C. Burkitt, M.A., F.S.A., F.G.S., Lecturer in Anthropology in the University of Cambridge.

(3) *Man's Progress in the Understanding, Expression, and Control of his own Nature*, by Dr. William Brown, Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford.

The next three papers deal with aspects of human nature which, at least in their developed forms, are distinctively human.

(1) *The Root of Religion*, by Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E., D.Sc., the well-known Oriental explorer and student of religion.

(2) *The Root of Morals*, by the Reverend C. F. Russell, M.A., sometime Smith's Prizeman, Fellow of Pembroke College, and Hulsean Lecturer in the University of Cambridge.

(3) *The Nature of Grace*, by Chancellor A. L. Lilley, M.A., the author of a number of deeply interesting modern theological works.

The next three papers deal with aspects of civilization and its problems.

(1) *The Epic and the Tragedies of Civilization*, by Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.M.G., the historian of British Administration in Mesopotamia, and the Chairman of the recent Persian Exhibition.

(2) *The Rôle of Religion in Civilization*, by the Reverend H. D. A. Major, D.D., F.S.A., Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

(3) *The Crisis of Modern Civilization*, by the Reverend Canon Raven, D.D., an authority in dogmatic theology, and a moving spirit in the Jerusalem Missionary Conference.

The next three papers deal with man and his future.

(1) *The Terrestrial Prospects of Man*, by J. A. Fraser Roberts, M.A., B.Sc., F.R.S.E., of the Genetics Department of the University of Edinburgh.

(2) *The Evidence for Human Survival of Physical Death*, from the point of view of psychical research, by Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S.

(3) *Human Immortality and Eternal Life*, by the Reverend J. S. Bezzant, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

The concluding paper deals with *The Challenge of Life*, and the difficulties of a right decision, by the Reverend J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., the widely-read religious publicist.

'The proper study of mankind is man,' yet what study is more complex and difficult at the present time amid the Babel of competing schools and rival philosophies? The motto *Know thyself* inscribed on Apollo's Temple at Delphi was rightly regarded by the ancient Greeks as the best advice that could be given to any man seeking help from that ancient source of wisdom, and although the cynic may comment on it in the words of the oracle of Oedipus: *Mayst thou never know the truth of what thou art*, yet mankind is not likely to be deterred by such a threat. We are resolved to know, if know we can, even though the knowledge gained be pain and grief to us. Ignorance is not bliss except for children and fools. The papers here published will, we hope, provide sound and practical assistance to those who study them with this purpose in view.

HUMANISM, PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN

By the Very Reverend W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., Dean of St. Paul's,
President of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

WHAT is Humanism? The word has been used in many senses, some of which we may put aside as either incorrect or irrelevant to our present subject. We do not mean by Humanism belief in the mere humanity of Christ, belief that Christ was *ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος*. Coleridge uses the word in this sense; but the heresy so indicated is more often called humanitarianism.

Nor do we mean the literary culture of the Humanists, consisting chiefly of classical scholarship. This is a correct use of the word, but it is not the sense in which I am using it to-day.

Nor, thirdly, do I use the word in the sense which Dr. Schiller has given to it, as the name of his own philosophy. This eminent Oxford philosopher has attempted to justify his appropriation of the term by tracing a connexion between his theories and the older use of the word. Humanism in philosophy, he says, is opposed to Naturalism and Absolutism. It is the philosophic attitude which regards the interpretation of human experience as the primary concern of all philosophizing, and asserts the adequacy of human knowledge for this purpose. Literary Humanism, which was an attempt to emancipate thought from the scholastic routine of the Middle Ages by appealing to the civilizing mission of the 'humaner letters,' which meant especially Greek literature, is one of the manifestations of philosophic Humanism. Modern 'Humanism,' in Dr. Schiller's sense, is avowedly a revival of the critical relativism of Protagoras, which taught that 'man is the measure of all things.' It is a denial of transcendentalism and of every form of absolutism. At the same time, Dr. Schiller says, it is not a form of scepticism. It holds that truth and reality, in so far as they are sufficient for man, are attainable by man. We have enough light to walk by. Nor is it the same as Positivism, since it admits every hypothesis as worth trying, bringing it to the bar of 'human needs.' Even Absolu-

tism it would allow to plead its case, if it really answered any reasonable demand.

Dr. Schiller's 'Humanism' is practically identical with Pragmatism, except that Pragmatism is a theory of knowledge, while Humanism is a more general philosophic attitude. It assumes that all truths should be related to human purposes. It holds that metaphysical systems are individual creations relative to the idiosyncrasies of their authors, and destitute of any 'absolute' value.

But this is not the accepted meaning of Humanism, and nothing but confusion can result from using such a well-established term in a new sense. It is not natural to us to contrast Humanism either with Absolutism or with Naturalism.

There remains the use of the word which almost identifies it with *Positivism*, or more generally, any point of view which studies man in society apart from transcendental aspects of life such as are emphasized in the higher religions. It excludes theocratic systems like Judaism and other eastern religions. It excludes that kind of other-worldliness which deprives the present life with its interests of all value. And it excludes mysticism, in so far as this treats earth as but a shadow of heaven.

It is nearly equivalent to *Secularism*, in that it confines its interests to the affairs of what the New Testament calls 'the world'; but its association with the 'Humanists' seems to include in its scope respect for art and culture, ideas which do not necessarily belong to Secularism. But what is the relation of Humanism to Science? We sometimes classify the subjects of education as Humanism on the one side and Science on the other, a usage which evidently points back to the Renaissance Humanists. This again is not the sense in which we are to use the word. Rather, we sometimes speak of Scientific Humanism, as an appropriate name for the point of view of such writers as Santayana, Lippmann, and Julian Huxley. When we speak of Scientific Humanism, we have dropped the association of the word with classicism, except for the notion that the Greeks were perhaps the most perfect exponents of the attitude of mind which writers of this school wish us to imitate. By Scientific Humanism we mean the pursuit or advocacy of a type of civilization regulated by scientific knowledge.

The mention of 'the world,' in the New Testament sense, may be helpful. Bishop Gore defines the world as 'human society as it organizes itself apart from God.' Humanism will then be a practical philosophy of social life, emancipated from taboos, superstitions, and ancestral traditions, and based on purely secular standards of good and evil. The Humanist will perhaps like to borrow Santayana's title, and call his ideal polity the Life of Reason.

All this is very vague; but 'Humanism' is vague. Its values are not well defined, and we are left in doubt how far the standards to which everything is referred are hedonistic or something different. On the whole, our scientific humanists recognize Truth as an absolute value—which separates them sharply from Dr. Schiller's Pragmatism, but they lean to the 'greatest happiness' test in appraising human actions and institutions.

It is a little difficult for me to avoid repeating myself, because only last year in my presidential address to this Conference I gave some time to this very subject—Scientific Humanism. I said then that Scientific Humanism rests on the conviction that applied science may gradually make the human race not only happier and wiser, but intrinsically better than it is now. 'This conviction might be described as faith in progress by rational and organized effort.' It is evolutionary optimism, no longer based on an assumed law of progress, which does not exist, but by belief in the power of knowledge and organized endeavour. I then considered the very question which I have been asked to discuss to-day, whether there is really any difference of principle between Scientific Humanism and the faith of Modern Churchmen. I quoted Amiel's words: 'Christianity brings and preaches salvation by the conversion of the will, Humanism by the emancipation of the mind. The one wishes to enlighten by making better, the other to make better by enlightening.' This is no doubt open to the old objections brought against the 'faculty-psychology.' We cannot set the will and the mind against each other so sharply as this. I proceeded, as some of you may remember, to bring out the differences which must arise owing to the repudiation of the Christian belief in a future life by the majority of humanists, and the dangers, emphasized so strongly by J. B. Mozley and Bernard Bosanquet, of throwing all our

ideals into an anticipated earthly future. I then went into detail, mentioning some of the chief ethical problems which we were to discuss last year, laying special stress on the different attitude of Humanism and of Christianity towards self-denial and what psycho-analysts call repression. In these questions, evolutionary utilitarianism or hedonism comes into conflict with traditional Christian ethics.

I will make this conflict more plain by summarizing the argument of Lippmann's well-known *Preface to Morals*, which is a typical Humanist manifesto.

'The young are asking—Is there any *standard* which I can really believe in? The nineteenth century thought it had found one—freedom, emancipation. We are now discovering that a man's worst difficulties begin when he can do what he likes. We want something solid to believe, and there is nothing. The dissolution of belief has gone much deeper than ever before. Orthodoxy, whether Catholic or Protestant, gave us something solid to believe—a body of revealed facts which were true in the same sense as it is true that the sun rose this morning. Christianity is not a picture of ideal values; it is a narrative of historical events. If these events did not occur, there is nothing left except to make God the sum of ideal values, and immortality life on a higher plane, which being timeless is indestructible. This is not what Christianity has hitherto meant, and it has no meaning for the average man. The old ideas of God were mostly based on familiar politics. The Oriental God is a sultan or maharajah, the God of the Middle Ages was a feudal overlord, the God of the eighteenth century was the figure-head of a constitutional monarchy, the God of our time is—what? Vortex is king, *δῖνος βασιλεύει*. Church authority, except in the Roman communion, is gone. Religion no longer regulates our civil duties, nor our economic activities, nor our family life, nor our opinions. Church authority is now being driven from its last entrenchments in the relations of the sexes. There is now no single standard to which we may bring competing ideals. We do not know which is the best to pursue. Instead of theocracy we have humanitarianism. But the teachers of humanitarianism have no credentials. They can only inquire, argue, and persuade. And yet we *must* turn to humanitarianism now that the old authority is gone.

Humanism is the philosophy and ethics of maturity. Men can enter into the realm of the Spirit when they have outgrown all childishness. Instead of rewards and punishments, humanistic religion emphasizes the education and discipline of the will. It is, as Whitehead says, the art and theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things. In a sense it may be called an aristocratic religion, since only a few will follow it. Popular religion, on the other hand, is suited to the capacities of the unconverted. The great Churches are occupied with the regulation of the unregenerate appetites of mankind. Then, when the Church became great and powerful, the genuinely religious fled from the world, and tried to conquer their lower appetites by destroying them. This experience was not quite a success. Meanwhile, the rest lived by custom and authority, till "the acids of modernity" wrecked this ancestral order. The principle of Humanism is detachment, understanding, and disinterestedness in the presence of reality itself. Our distrust of authority is because we do not believe in it—the authority is no longer real to us. Pure science is high religion incarnate. Scientific discipline is the creative element in modern civilization.'

Well, this is a programme of scientific Humanism. We may, as Christians, agree with a great deal of it, especially with its emphasis on *disinterestedness* as the essential thing in all real progress. We respect men of science because as a rule they are disinterested; a fine, cold, thin air blows about the difficult summits which they attempt to scale.

I also agree that an authoritative code of morals is suited only to a settled society. Our society is profoundly unsettled, and cannot follow those who in the name of authority defend the prejudices of the old and disregard the ideals of the young. There is, as Sabatier argued, a sustained conflict between the religion of authority, the name of which, ultimately, is *Rome*, and the religion of the spirit.

But of course I do not agree with him when he proclaims the bankruptcy of Christianity. He takes us back to the old question: What is the seat of authority in religion? The fundamentalist attacks Liberal theology for 'the weasel method of sucking the meaning out of words, and then presenting the

empty shells and palming them off as giving the Christian faith a new interpretation.' We need solid and certain authority, and we find it, if not in the Church, then in the Bible. Say the farmers of Tennessee and the late Mr. Bryan, 'we will make no accommodation with science or criticism; take it all or leave it all.' We can imagine a Jesuit apologist saying, 'Yes, you have disposed of the Liberal Protestant easily enough. But who gave Scripture its authority? The Church. And instead of the dead hand we give you a living authority.'

Of course we may reject the infallible Church as well as the infallible book. But then, according to Lippmann, all authority is gone? Is it?

When Christianity was fresh from the mint, there was no Church and no Christian Bible. But there was the indwelling Spirit of God, which St. Paul identified with the Spirit of Christ. It was this inspiration which created the Church which chose the Bible which forms, as Chillingworth said, the religion of Protestants.

Following the inner light means finding out God's will and doing it. It does not make us infallible—infallibility is a category which man cannot use. It is not individualism run mad. It accepts guidance from Church, Scripture, and human wisdom. But it does not contradict—rather it asserts—our responsibility of judging for ourselves.

Now it is this inner conviction which, working, as such convictions always work, through the poetic imagination, created the dogmas which Lippmann thinks are the foundation of the whole edifice. They are not and cannot be its foundation, though of course many theologians agree with Lippmann in saying that they are. In theological architecture the 'foundations' are always ingeniously supported by the superstructure.

Lippmann does not think that the religious sense, which affirms the reality of values, can guarantee anything more than the validity of ideals. This is really the fundamental presupposition of Humanism. It rejects the claim of the religious consciousness to reveal factual truth of any kind. I can illustrate this best from Santayana, whose disciple I think Lippmann is. You have probably read Santayana's *Reason in Religion*,

one of the most brilliant and stimulating books that I know, but quite distinctly on the side of non-Christian Humanism.

In speaking of Protestant theologians, Santayana says that 'while they write books to disprove naturalism in natural philosophy where it belongs, in morals, where naturalism is treason, they are themselves naturalists of the most uncritical description, forgetting that only the interests of the finite soul introduce such a thing as good and evil into the world, and that nature and society are so far from being authoritative and divine that they have no value whatever save by the services they may render to each spirit in its specific and genuine ambitions.' This he calls 'a subordination of conscience to what happens to exist,' an 'optimism annulling every human ideal.' 'The spiritual man should be quite at home in a world meant to be used.' 'The value of existences is wholly borrowed from their ideality, while the existence of ideals is wholly determined by natural forces. Existence and ideal value can therefore be observed apart. Every creature lends potential values to a world in which it can satisfy some at least of its demands, and learn perhaps to modify the others.' 'Rational religion has two phases—piety, or loyalty to necessary conditions, and spirituality, or devotion to ideal ends.'

There is much more to the same effect. If I understand him rightly, we can be happy and do our duty by setting before us certain ideals, which do not correspond to anything actually real. Apart from these ideals there is no God and no spiritual world—nature is 'a blameless giant' with no purposes good or bad.

I find the philosophy of this difficult to follow. Of course Alexander and others have conceived of God as gradually revealed in evolution—something yet to be, but not yet actual. But they do what Bosanquet says we must not do—they project their ideals into the future, and so give them a *prospective* factual actuality. This is in truth the way in which the naturalism of the nineteenth century found room for an idealism which the presuppositions of naturalism do not warrant. The law of progress, which they illegitimately found in the unanalysed conception of evolution, gave a material substance, not now but some day, to things hoped for, and evidence for things not yet

to be seen in the world of experience. But Santayana is too clear-headed and too sceptical to share this illusion. His ideal world is not something which will be, but something which ought to be; and in this realm of imagined perfection the human spirit is to find its home and its practical guide.

Observe that this idealism is based on a philosophy of relativism and on the acceptance of naturalism as alone valid for the world of fact. Does not this attitude—and I should say much the same of Höffding's philosophy—point to a merely aesthetic and subjective refuge from the blind operations of the 'blameless giant'? There are some thinkers, like Bertrand Russell, whom the same acceptance of the world as envisaged by naturalism has led to a Promethean defiance—the 'free man's worship' of ideals to which reality gives no encouragement. I find in Santayana an attitude less heroic, and at bottom less serious. We are to choose the most elevating thoughts, and make them the inspiration of our lives. He makes great use of the words 'idea' and 'ideal'; but it is abundantly plain that he does not believe, with Plato, that the world of forms has a higher and fuller actuality than the world revealed to the senses. Nor does he believe in the God of theism, in whom, as the *valor valorum*, all the eternal values are always and everywhere present and active. His ideal world seems to be unreal, unless with Douglas Fawcett we make the imagination constitutive of reality. And I cannot help thinking that in practice the solid reality which he attributes to the universe of naturalism will have more weight than the beautiful thoughts which, as he says, can bring us 'happiness.'

Santayana finds certain advantages in his standpoint as compared with Platonism and Christianity. Relativism is sympathetic; it can reject myth and legend and metaphysics and dogmatisms of every kind, while still acknowledging the respectable motives and high aspirations which have found so unfortunate an embodiment. The morality of the humanist is charitable and understanding; the morality of the absolutist is fanatical and ruthless. Take for example Plato's Republic. An end is assumed, which involves radical injustice to every interest not included in it. Then an organism is developed or conceived

that shall subserve that end, and political justice is defined as the harmonious adjustment of powers and functions within that organism. The chosen end, however, is arbitrary and perverse; for to maintain a conventional city with stable institutions and military efficiency would not secure human happiness, nor would the prescribed discipline unfold the potentialities of the human spirit. He thinks that the violence which such an ideal does to humanity appeared in the sequel, when Platonism took refuge in the supernatural. It ended in flight from a world which was no true home for a free man.

I am not concerned to defend Plato's State-socialism, a type of government of which Herbert Spencer said that 'it would mean slavery, and the slavery would not be mild.' It looks as if Stalin meant to give us a lurid illustration of this warning. But Socrates and Plato from the first insisted that their ideal city was only an imperfect copy of the perfect city, whose type is laid up in heaven, and of which the good man is primarily a citizen. A conviction that our citizenship is in heaven does not logically imply either State-socialism or fanatical ecclesiasticism.

His indictment of Christian charity is rather different. It has, he says, two parts; it hastens to relieve the body, then, forgetting physical economy altogether, it proceeds to redeem the soul. 'Christianity covers the world with hospitals and orphanages; but its only positive labours go on in churches and convents, nor will it found schools, if left to itself, to teach anything except religion.'

This criticism goes home. It is true that the Church has been too much occupied with cure and too little with prevention. It is true that it has been blind to the possibilities of social reform brought about by concerted effort. It is true that it has separated the other world too much from this, and that by representing the future life too much as a compensation in kind for the injustices of earth it has deadened the sensibility of conscience to the perpetuation of remediable evils. Most gladly we admit that Humanism has its legitimate protest to make on these heads. We Liberal Churchmen, at any rate, are ready to learn and eager to try experiments. We do not want the Church to be a drag upon the improvement of social conditions. But we return to the

fundamental questions of the relation of values to reality, and of the hierarchy of values. On the former question we do not get any clear guidance from Humanism, and on the latter we think that too much is hoped for from evolutionary utilitarianism. As Lippmann says, the new morality does not satisfy those who are trying to practise it. There is after all a true other-worldliness, which alone can transform this world.

I have not forgotten that the title chosen for me is Humanism, Pagan and Christian. What do we mean by Pagan? Something, I suppose, which is still alive, for we do not want a mere comparison of ancient and modern civilization. Nor, I think, do we want a discussion of the Pagan survivals in Christianity, for example in the Roman Catholic Church. For these survivals are hardly humanistic in our sense.

When we say Pagan in this connexion, we mean Greek. The Romans were Pagans, but they were not humanists. What is in our minds is the civilization of Greece when Greece was still living Greece. Can we speak of ancient Greek Humanism as a possible alternative to Christian Humanism?

I have already (in my essay in *The Legacy of Greece*) given a warning against the fallacy of *racialism*. The Greeks, I said, were a race of splendid mongrels, made up of the same elements, differently mixed, as ourselves. They were not at all homogeneous. The Spartiates were almost pure Nordics, the Athenians prided themselves on being Pelasgians, akin, I suppose, to the Minoans, and predominantly Mediterraneans. The early colonists, to whom Greek culture owed so much, cannot have kept their blood pure. There was never a civilization common to all the Hellenes. Arcadia was bucolic, Aetolia barbarous, Boeotia stolid, Macedon half outside the pale. Not to labour a point so easily proved, we must agree with Isocrates that Hellenism is the name not of a race but of a culture (οὐ τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας). Greece, or Pagan Humanism, means for us an attitude towards life which we can find in Homer, and in the Ionic philosophers, and which persists, with its centre at Athens, till its total eclipse in the sixth century after Christ, when Justinian closed the Athenian philosophical schools. For nearly a thousand years after this, Greek literature, and the Greek view

of life, were lost to the West, though not to the East. Aristotle continued to be read, though hardly to be understood; not very much Hellenism filtered through by means of Vergil and Statius.

If Greece is the name of a culture, we shall have no scruple in admitting to our roll of honour not only the great Stoics, none of whom were natives of Greece proper, but Marcus Aurelius the Romanized Spaniard, Plotinus the Egyptian, Porphyry and Lucian the Syrians, and the author of the Fourth Gospel, a Jew. And if these were Greeks, how shall we deny the name to Raphael and Michael Angelo, to Spenser and Sidney, to Keats, Shelley, and Wordsworth?

But we are asked to explain *Pagan* Humanism. What was the attitude towards life which this phrase suggests? In answering this question I shall make some use of Livingstone's excellent book on the Greek Genius.

The Greeks, as compared with the Jews and Christians, had not much sense of sin. They spoke of *sins* as shortcomings, as *ἀμαρτίαι*, 'bad shots.' Morality was not for them, as for Matthew Arnold, three-fourths of life. Or perhaps, like the Italians of the Renaissance, who so closely resembled them, they meant by *ἀρετή*, or *virtù*, something different from what the Old Testament means by righteousness, and Christianity by the love of God and our neighbour. A French mother will often say to her child, 'Soyez raisonnable'; this is Greek. So is Fontenelle's 'Voilà l'homme qui a mal calculé,' when he saw a criminal led to execution.

But let us turn to the positive 'notes' of the Greek spirit. We all think first of the note of *Beauty*; and perhaps we know what that brilliant pioneer Winckelmann made of it. The Greeks exercised naked; they gave prizes for beauty; they honoured even a beautiful courtesan; their art expresses a tranquil passionless perfection of form, and we may fancy the Athenians lost in contemplation of the Parthenon friezes. That is not at all the impression we get from Greek literature—from Thucydides for example, or from the epitaph which Aeschylus wrote for himself, mentioning only his prowess at Marathon. Socrates says (in Xenophon), 'I had rather hear about a living woman than see a beauty painted by Zeuxis.' As an American said in the Vatican

galleries, 'I can't enthuse about these stone girls.' All that is said about Greek art is true, but the Greeks were not conscious aesthetes. All that they made happened to be artistically right, like the work of the medieval Italians. Most of the things which *we* make, with far more thought and study, are just wrong. I do not know why, in either case. The wind bloweth where it listeth. But our experiments in aestheticism have not been encouraging.

Then there is the note of *Freedom*: Matthew Arnold calls it 'Unclouded clearness of mind.' It is perfectly true that between the Ionians and Proclus the human race enjoyed by far the longest period of almost unfettered speculation which it has yet been permitted to use. It was a grand piece of good fortune; neither religion nor politics prevented the Greek from seeing things as they are. (Of course that is much too sweeping; but it contains an important truth.) Anthropomorphic religions are generally plastic, and polytheistic religions are generally tolerant. They pay for these virtues by having comparatively little influence on conduct. Moreover, the Eastern deities are glorified despots; compare the abasement of Job with the bold defiance of Prometheus. However we may account for it, the Greek had *παρρησία*, the right of free speech, and this is part of Humanism as we understand it.

Livingstone next names the note of *Directness*. He contrasts it with the romanticism and sentiment of much modern poetry. Greek thought is direct, simple, and matter of fact, so that to modern taste it often seems bare and sometimes almost brutal. Love, for example, is a natural passion to be taken at its face value. In the great period love-poetry is never prurient or cynical; it is generally remarkably pure, and when, as in the Old Comedy, the *operis lex* demands shamelessness, it is frankly Rabelaisian. Similarly, the Greek is not ashamed of being frightened in danger, or of weeping freely when he is moved. There is no mincing of words, no shrinking from facts. Some modern humanists would like to recapture this attitude; but it is unnatural to us; we cannot be unsophisticated at will. But we dislike unreal rhetoric, as the Greeks did.

The next chapter is called the note of *Humanism*, which is therefore used in a more restricted sense than we have been giving it. Livingstone says that the Greeks did not interpret the

world in a materialistic way, seeing in a human being only a collection of atoms. Nor did they interpret it in a spiritual way; there were no infinite possibilities in the sky above them or in the human beings around them. (We are startled, until we find that Plato is classified as an exception—not a typical Greek at all! This really will not do. It would be an exception which disproves, not tests, the rule.) What he means by Humanism is something like the maxim of Protagoras, that ‘man is the measure of all things.’ The Greek humanized God in his myths, Nature in his legends, and man in all the relations of his life. We may quote from Livingstone three typically Greek definitions of happiness. Pindar: ‘To have good success and win fair fame.’ Solon in Herodotus: ‘If a man is sound in limb, free from disease, free from misfortune, happy in his children, and handsome, and if he ends his life well, he may be called happy.’ Aristotle: ‘Happiness may be defined as prosperity conjoined with virtue, or as independence of life, or as the pleasantest life conjoined with safety, or as an abundance of goods and slaves with the ability to keep them and use them; it would be pretty generally admitted that happiness is one or more of these things. It follows that the constituent parts of happiness are nobility, the possession of many and good friends, wealth, a goodly and numerous family and a happy old age; also, health, beauty, stature, athletic powers, and finally fame, honour, good fortune, and virtue.’ A Christian, as Livingstone says, would draw up a rather different list.

Livingstone, in order to compare Greek with modern values, asked a lecture-class to write down four wishes in order of preference. (The famous Greek skolion, as most of you will remember, chooses (1) health, (2) good looks, (3) wealth honestly come by, (4) ‘to be young with one’s friends.’) Well, the modern class chose, in order of plurality of votes, (1) health, (2) spiritual or moral excellence, (3) friendship or domestic happiness, (4) intellectual excellence, (5) contentment, (6) artistic pleasures, (7) physical excellence, (8) success, (9) hard work, (10) travel, (11) wealth. The low position of wealth sounds juvenile or insincere; but in the comparative indifference to good looks we have a genuine difference from the Greeks. (But would a class of girls have voted so?) Among the worst evils any Greek would

have named old-age. Augustine perhaps hit the mark when he says after reading Plato, '*Nemo ibi audit vocantem Venite ad me qui laboratis.*'

Sanity and *Many-sidedness* complete the list of 'notes.'

Well, we have here a rather pleasing picture of a happy, healthy, human being, with both feet planted firmly on the earth, with few illusions and a clear, sane intellect, content to make the best of the life that is ours to live on this earth, full of curiosity and most happily endowed with a beautiful body and a keen intellect. How much better, we think, than the self-tormenting ascetic, the inhuman persecuting bigot, the victim of puerile superstitions, the narrow-minded money-grubbing man of business—all types of Christian history and modern conditions. But in reality we cannot be Greeks, and we cannot be Pagans. We cannot be Greeks because ages of civilization and race-experience separate us from that wonderful efflorescence of naïve and half-barbarous perfection. I say half-barbarous, for by modern standards Achilles is a violent and sulky savage, Odysseus an amusing rascal with a wife in every port and a lie for every emergency. Themistocles and Alcibiades are as unscrupulous as Machiavelli, but we don't judge them so severely, because we remember their date. We slur over such scenes as the massacre of the Melians and Mitylenians by the Athenians at the summit of their glory; we smile at the truculence and mendacity of the Athenian orators; we do not think of the significance of Aristotle's quiet assumption that women as a class are inferior to men, and slaves 'altogether bad.' And we cannot really be Pagans either, because neo-Paganism means the rejection of one of those revelations which, like Hellenism itself, is a permanent endowment of the human race. Santayana distinguishes between pre-rational and post-rational religion. The words are not very happily chosen; but the distinction is valid. A middle-aged man may wish he was a boy again, but he cannot go back to his past. Neither can the human race.

The truth in the regretful admiration of Greek Humanism has I think been rather well summed up by Professor de Burgh. 'The phrases humanism, humane learning, the humanities, point to the distinctive quality that gives to Hellenism its abiding value. The theme of Greek thought and literature was humanity

—man as he is amid his actual environment. But the Greek thinker never forgot, as the modern world is prone to forget, that man, with all his potency of thought and will, is part of a whole, a member of an ordered universe. Our passion, in the economic field, for production, heedless of leisure and the fitting enjoyment of the produce of our toil; our rejection, in the field of politics, of any institution or form of government that is not the creation of the popular will; the efforts of science to remould nature after our heart's desire, and of philosophy to interpret reality as relative through and through to the human mind—would appear to his astonished vision as the wild audacity of *hubris*. Where, he would ask, in this seething whirlpool of motion, is there place for rest? Where lies the spiritual good of all this striving, the unity of purpose that gives direction and meaning to man's hustling enterprise? He would point in answer, with calm assurance and a deep pity for our confusion, beyond the realm of becoming to that of being, beyond the temporal to the eternal, beyond the many to the one. *Theoria* as well as *praxis*, knowing as well as doing and making, is essential to enduring satisfaction . . . Further, if man is to know the world and share its future, he must first know and shape himself. In the power of self-knowledge he must be the architect of his own character. Personality is the finished form to be realized in the raw material of human nature. So taught Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.' Pagan Humanism, thus understood, is more comprehensive than Livingstone allows; and whatever may be said on the other side, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle were Greeks, and a Hellenism which leaves them out of account is not the real Hellenism of history.

But if we revert to the quotation which I made early in my lecture, that Hellenism is not a matter of race, but of culture, we may take Pagan Humanism not as a bygone historical phase in the development of practical philosophy and morals, but as a permanent type. And if so, we shall probably be wisest not to look for examples in antiquity, but in quite modern times. And I suggest that we may find our typical Pagan humanist in Goethe.

That Goethe was a thorough Pagan is certain from the whole course of his life. And in spite of his gift for brilliant aphorisms

on all serious subjects, in which his only rival is Bacon, I do not think he was fundamentally serious over anything except art and science. He was a Pagan humanist in his total want of awe and reverence for anything above himself; in his well-balanced and sane view of life as lived on the psychical, not the spiritual plane; and in his calm resolve to build up (as he said) his pyramid of existence, completing and perfecting his own experience in all directions, with no aim except to make his life a supreme work of art. In collecting these experiences he sacrificed men, and especially women, rather ruthlessly. He loved always with limited liability; he preferred the luxury of a wounded heart to the hampering presence of an affectionate wife. A rough classification of his loves gives about eight in the first class—*heiss und leidersschaftlich geliebte*; at least five more, with whom he stood *in innigsten Verhältniss der Liebe*; and an uncounted crowd of *holde Wesen*, the recipients of passing adoration. 'To live resolutely in the Whole, the Good, and the Beautiful,' is a fine programme, which might serve as a motto for Humanism generally; but if Christianity has taught us anything, it is that these absolute values can be attained not only by self-expression and self-fashioning, but by self-surrender. In all the literature of Humanism this, the lesson of the Cross, is wanting. However, I rank a philosophy based on Goethe's maxim above the mere relativism of much modern Humanism. A philosophy does not cease to be humanistic because it holds that 'the throne of the Godhead is the human mind.' It all depends on whether man is *capax deitatis* or not.

MAN AS ORGANISM

By Professor Sir J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A., LL.D.

TO consider man as organism, in blood-relationship to animals, is necessarily a partial view, and it would be pedantic to adhere to it with rigid strictness, for we cannot, even as biologists, ignore the fact that man has been for a long time a social being of rational discourse. If the saying be true : *nemo psychologus nisi physiologus*, its converse holds, for man above all : *nemo physiologus nisi psychologus*.

(I) MAN'S RESEMBLANCE TO THE ANTHROPOIDS.

Even the conservative anatomist Sir Richard Owen admitted the 'all-pervading similitude of structure' between man and the anthropoid apes; and this has been corroborated in increasing detail up to the hilt. To take the most complex organ, there is no part of man's brain that is not in that of the gorilla, his nearest living relative, though there are differences in absolute size and relative proportions. So it is throughout the body. Though there are minor differences, as in man's chin and heel, they only accentuate the anatomical resemblances.

Man's body is a walking museum of relics, dwindled and useless remains of organs or tissues that are well-developed and functional in less highly evolved forms of life. From these vestigial structures we can read history, as well as from our mind, our words, and our clothes. Such vestiges as the hint of a third eyelid in the inner upper corner of the eyeball, or the muscles which can be occasionally activated in the pinna or trumpet of the ear are unintelligible if they are not indicative of our ancestry, but it cannot be said that they point to any particular affiliation; they only show that man is a scion of a mammalian stock.

But there are in man's development some distinctly simian features: thus the baby has a power of gripping with its toes, and with its big toe in particular, that points back to an arboreal apprenticeship, and the 'all-fours' progression in its very marked form is another phylogenetic reminiscence.

As is usual, man shows in his embryonic development, and even in childhood, an abbreviated recapitulation of the presumed evolution of his race. Various archaic structures, such as the notochord, the predecessor of the backbone, persist in the human embryo, but are represented in the adult by useless vestiges only. Gill-slits are present, as permanently in fishes and transitorily in tadpoles, but they have no respiratory significance, and they disappear except that the first becomes our Eustachian tube, from the ear-passage to the back of the mouth, and two others are concerned in the making of the thymus gland.

Man and ape show a striking resemblance in their bodily life, and they may be alike in misery when victims of the same disease, such as tuberculosis or rheumatism. Human blood may be transfused harmoniously into a chimpanzee, though not into the much more distantly related monkey. Thus there is evidence even of the degree of the literal blood-relationship. Verily, as the poet said, man appears stuccoed all over with quadrupeds. In short, after many confirmations, we may quote to-day the dignified closing sentence of Darwin's *Descent of Man*: 'We must, however, acknowledge, as it seems to me, that with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which extends not only to other men, but to the humblest living creature, with his God-like intellect, which has penetrated into the movements and constitution of the solar system—with all these exalted powers, man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.' To these words there is assent, so far as we know, among all scientific investigators: 'man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp of his lowly origin.'

(2) MAN'S APARTNESS.

So far man's likeness to the anthropoid apes of to-day, but we cannot shut eyes to the fact that his direct Hominoid ancestors diverged very long ago—perhaps a million years ago—on a line of their own. From the arboreal apprenticeship of their ancestors, these early Hominoids inherited an emancipation of the hand, a new pose of the body, a recession of the probing snout, a correlated increase in the cranial capacity, a shunting forward

of the eyes and an increase of stereoscopic vision, a greater mobility of the head, a greater emphasis on touch, a decrease in the olfactory region of the brain, and a growing dominance of the neo-pallium concerned with hand and eye and ear, and with the higher mental processes. But with a dwindling of the forests there probably came an assumption of terrestrial life, and it was *then* that the Hominoids began to diverge more markedly, gaining a more definitely erect pose, a subtler speech rising into language, a relatively much larger cerebrum, and not a few minor peculiarities from chin to heel. Even without stressing the momentous acquisition of Language and Reason, we may as anatomists recognize a definite degree of *apartness* in Homo. It is not possible to derive him from any living Anthropoid.

(3) RELATION TO ANTHROPOID APES.

Now when we find in zoological classification two stocks with much in common and yet with important divergences, we draw the conclusion that they sprang from a common ancestral stock. Thus it is the usual view that Hominoids branched off—in Oligocene or early Miocene times—from an extinct stock common to them and to the likewise separated off Anthropoids. About this extinct common stock we know very little, but the discovery of a few generalized fossils, *e.g.* Dryopithecus and the Taungs Ape (Australopithecus), has done something to lessen what Darwin, with his wonted frankness, called 'the great break in the organic chain between man and his nearest allies.'

(4) TENTATIVE MEN.

Less shadowy than the ancestral stock common to Hominoids and Anthropoids are sundry primitive Hominoids whom we venture to call 'tentative men.' They are hominoid, but they have not yet reached the level of the genus Homo. Some of them are so nebulous to inspire in others the confidence that their discoverers seem to feel: witness Hesperopithecus reconstructed from two teeth found in Nebraska. But others are more satisfactory, and they cannot all be misinterpretations. Thus the gulf between Homo and the vague Anthropoid-Hominoid common

stock has been partly bridged by the discovery of the Ape-Man of Java, known as *Pithecanthropus the Erect*, and the Piltdown Man, *Eoanthropus*, from the Sussex Weald. Nearer ourselves, and probably in our genus, may be included the Chinese *Homo sinensis*, quaintly called the Man of Sin, the Heidelberg Man, and the Rhodesian Man. It cannot be asserted that any of these is on the direct line of human ancestry, for genealogical trees often show numerous diverging branches among which there is severe pruning. The probability is that the Hominoid stem gave off branch after branch, all but one coming to nothing—to nothing that has survived. This point is perhaps clearest where the facts are most numerous, namely, in regard to Neanderthal Man, *Homo neanderthalensis*, who lived on towards the end of the last Glacial Epoch. Numerous skeletons are well known. He was a short, slouching, shuffling, big-headed, beetling-browed, silent huntsman, who pursued small game with flint-headed weapons, who used fire, and buried his dead with reverence. Now the Neanderthal species did not, of course, turn into *Homo sapiens*, for that sort of transformation never happens; and it does not seem likely that our species arose as a divergent mutant from Neanderthalers. What is probable is that *Homo sapiens* and *Homo neanderthalensis* diverged from a common stock. Thus while we have no reason to be ashamed of Neanderthal Man, he was rather a distant cousin than an ancestor of ours. Yet we should like to know what he thought of the insurgent upstarts destined to increase, as he is to decrease, and what he thought of the Purpose of Evolution as he waned away.

(5) FACTORS IN THE EMERGENCE OF MAN.

If *Homo* arose from a stock of Primates which split into Anthropoids and Hominoids, the former remaining arboreal and relatively unprogressive, the latter becoming terrestrial and leading on to *us*, the question arises as to the factors in the divergence.

First and foremost there was that trend of brain-evolution emphasized by Professor Elliot Smith—the predominance of the neopallium or true cerebral cortex, which is peculiar to mammals, and of those regions which are concerned with visualiza-

tion, enregistration, attention, manipulation, and intelligent processes in general. There is no particular difficulty in understanding cerebral advance, for variations in that direction are frequent and of survival value. They were illustrated on a big scale when Birds emerged from an extinct Reptilian stock; they were illustrated in a quite different way when Mammals arose; they occurred throughout mammalian evolution, and on lines different from that of the Primates, such as those of horse and dog.

But the particular type of brain that characterizes man is pointed towards by the arboreal series which began in very humble forms like the Half-Monkeys or Lemurs, and progressed through monkeys and apes. This trend towards a dominance of what we may call the higher centres has been correlated by Elliot Smith with the freed hand, the reduced snout, the forward shunting of the eyes, and so forth, reasonably thought of in connection with the arboreal apprenticeship. But as all this would apply to Anthropoids as well as to Hominoids, our question must take a sharper point: What factors were particularly associated with the divergence of tentative men?

Here we lean on the theory that the appearance of Hominoids was connected with the abandonment of arboreal and the assumption of terrestrial habits, and that this change was correlated with a shrinkage of the forests during a period of aridity in the late Miocene or the early Pliocene, perhaps about the time of the uplift of the Himalayas. Forced from the trees, tentative man would have to face a keen struggle for existence in which brains counted for more than brawn. Variations or mutations in the direction of nimbler wits would have marked survival value.

We do not regard with any complacency the problem of the factors operative in Man's ascent, and we do not suppose that it is all cleared up by stressing his descent from the trees. But we regard that as one of the factors, and we look for others in the partial shifting of survival value from musculature to mind, in the legacy of social predispositions, in the implications of prolonged ante-natal life, prolonged infancy and playful childhood, and in the pre-human hints of manipulation. These were among the sieves favouring the establishment of human qualities.

(6) NATURALISM AND MAN'S EVOLUTION.

In regard to the factors in man's evolution there is no warrant for dogmatism, since the facts are few and uncertainties abound. But the inquiry is still young and scientific inquiry remains hopeful in its attempt to account for man's emergence and evolution in terms of variation, heredity, selection, and isolation—the factors applicable, and in some measure verifiable, in other cases.

There is on the part of the great majority no inclination to depart from naturalistic description, that is to say from trying to account for a result in terms of the scientifically demonstrable factors known to be resident and operative in the antecedent conditions. These factors are of course in part psychical. On the other hand it seems fair to notice that Alfred Russel Wallace and others have found great difficulty in discovering any naturalistic factors that could, in their judgment, account for the evolution of man's mathematical, musical, artistic and moral qualities. Thus, as is well known, Wallace was led to postulate 'some origin wholly distinct from that which has served to account for the animal characteristics—whether bodily or mental—of man.' He therefore postulated a 'spiritual influx,' such as operated, he thought, in the origin of life and of consciousness. While he believed that man sprang from a stock common to him and to the Anthropoid Apes, he was equally convinced that there was something unique in man—something 'of a spiritual essence or nature' which had not any primordium in the beast and did not evolve naturalistically.

Now we may emotionally sympathize with this view, but it is open to various objections. We should surely be very chary about going so far on naturalistic or scientific lines and then invoking transcendental aid to help the evolving organism over a difficult stile. It is a dangerous dualism. Moreover, it suggests a quaint imperfection in Creation, as if the World-Process required special attention and assistance at critical junctures. It is perhaps simpler and grander to suppose that God created the initial Order of Nature able for all the tasks of His purpose.

Is it not very premature to abandon the scientific analysis of the factors in the evolution of man's higher faculties? It is unlikely that they were more than small initiatives to start with. It is probable that they are mainly social rather than organic

resultants. Mutations are still common in mathematical, musical, artistic, and moral endowments. We do not regard a 'calculating boy' as an outcrop demanding a departure from naturalistic methods, any more than much more ancient mutations that led to a spider making an orb-web or the bees their honeycomb. There is a fallacy in isolating man's artistic gifts just as in isolating man's eye; in all such cases we must envisage the long evolutionary series.

There is often selectibility in, say, musical talent, whether in the nightingale's lyric or in a war-song. Similarly, with moral excellence, it has on the whole survival value.

Furthermore, as Darwin clearly saw, a subtle variation, such as mathematical ability, which may have no survival value in itself in the everyday struggle for existence, may be correlated with an advance in a more general life-saving quality, such as clear-headedness and visualizing power. We are thinking mainly of the earlier days of human advance before societies were evolved enough to make these higher values the ends of deliberate evolutionary effort. When that began there would be gradual increase in the survival value of the subtle; and Wallace's difficulty largely disappears.

Finally, while we welcome emphasis on man's apartness, as a counteractive to the crude biologisms which make too much of the bipedal simian aspect, we deprecate any exaggeration of the difficulty of giving a scientific account of the evolution of the finer human qualities. Naturalists who know something of the endowments of higher animals in intelligence and feeling and skill, and in the raw materials of the primary virtues, cannot but recoil from a view which creates a pseudo-difficulty by depreciating the pre-human legacy and by talking too often of early Homo as if he were a Melchisedec 'without descent.'

Here perhaps one may be allowed to say that since the aim of Science is empirical description, and since it never even inquires into the deeper 'Why?'—the significance or purpose of Becoming, it remains open, for those who do not regard Science as the only Right of Way to Truth, to supplement the scientific *description* by religious, theological, or philosophical *interpretation*. To say that man is the long result of Time does not prevent us believing that he is the child of God.

(7) RECOIL FROM THE DARWINIAN THEORY OF MAN.

On most new ideas of the first magnitude there is a tax to pay, and the Darwinian theory of man is no exception. The truth gained was man's solidarity with Animate Nature; the tax was an impoverishment of man's dignity—for some minds at least. If man arose as a mutation from a vaguely-known generalized stock, from which the present-day Anthropoids also diverged; and if it all happened in a continuous natural way, like the rise of Birds from Reptiles, then Man is no longer so unique as he seemed to our fathers. He is indeed at the top of a stately genealogical tree, but is he any longer 'but a little lower than the angels?' The transition from the concept of special creation to that of evolution made a far-reaching difference.

It is easy to say that we have no alternative, but that does not prevent a repercussion not wholly in the first instance to the good. Man remains what he was, yet he is brought nearer to the animal. If he is the outcome of natural evolution, we are bound to think a little more of the pre-human legacy which he could not but inherit.

We are said to think even more highly of a great man when we discover his humble origin, yet it leads us sometimes to watch too keenly for his feet of clay; so it is not wholly to the good to dwell on the poor relations we share with the apes—though they are too distant and shadowy to bring a blush to our proud cheeks.

We cannot alter the facts; we carry about with us the indelible stamp of our humble origin, yet it is not wise to be always looking into the pit whence we were digged. We must accept the situation and counteract it with a re-appreciation of our dignity. We should think also of the sacredness of our legacy, coming not as the gift of a Jehovan day, but after aeons of groaning and travailing, sobbing and sighing.

So let us exalt Man's achievements—which cannot be near their end. He brings the stars near ('*Approximavit sidera*' was Fraunhofer's epitaph); he can see the invisible, hear the soundless, and play with many stretches of the great gamut of electromagnetic vibrations; he can weigh the universe in a balance and knock fragments out of an atom; he can wring bread (or fer-

tilisers at least) out of the thin air; he can tame the microbe and turn the wolf into a dog; and all this, with how much more like it, refers only to one side of man's life—as minister and interpreter of Nature. In his life of emotion and imagination, artistry and aspiration, how unique is man—who emerged from a stock common to him and to the Anthropoids. Shakespeare's appreciation is matchless: 'What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god.' Yet he bears about in his body the indelible stamp of his lowly origin!

We would admit then that the Darwinian picture of our origin is certainly not that of 'trailing clouds of glory,' so that it seems wise in the education of youth to dwell on man's evolved greatness; and there are some other facts to be borne in mind.

To those who shrink, in spite of themselves, from the idea of Man as evolved not created, the idea of *emergence* should be explained. The word 'evolution' is terribly overworked, but whether we regard the long process of World-Becoming as radically continuous from nebula to city, or as a more staccato advance, including inorganic *genesis*, organic *evolution*, and human *history*, we must distinguish two kinds of steps—those that are merely additive and those that are qualitative, resulting in the emergence of something intrinsically new. Many organic changes in plants and animals are typical Darwinian variations, a little more of this, and a little less of that, but others imply original patterns, genuine novelties, new departures—in a word mutations of considerable magnitude. We must shirk the logical difficulty of distinguishing the qualitative from the quantitative; here and now it is enough for our purpose to recognize the fact that many steps in Organic Evolution, like the ascent of Birds from among Reptiles, were new syntheses or emergences. Even in the inorganic world the appearance of water from the union of two gases—hydrogen and oxygen—was a more or less unpredictable event, since the remarkable properties of water could not have been deduced from those of the gases except by an omniscient chemist. Professor Lloyd Morgan aptly illustrates the idea by quoting Browning's line, 'That out of three sounds he frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.' By 'star,' Morgan says, Brown-

ing lays poetic stress on the emergent character of 'chordiness,' which is something more than the additive resultant of the constituent tones—something genuinely new.

Now while we do not perhaps solve any problem by calling certain steps in the world's Becoming 'emergences' or 'creative syntheses,' it is certainly useful to recognize that all newness is not the same kind of newness, and that there have been from time to time opportunities which allowed of the expression of novel aspects of reality. This is peculiarly true of Man. He was a mutant pattern, an original genius, a new synthesis, no mechanical additive resultant, but a vital new creation; not involving any breach of continuity, yet making a fresh disclosure of the unending riches of reality.

The evolutionary view may also become more acceptable (and more accurate) if we get rid of the bogey of chance. Erroneous views have been sown by catchwords that are floated about like thistle-seeds. An aboriginal 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' was followed, we are told, by many 'a chapter of accidents,' until at length man appeared as a final 'episode.' But this phraseology is in great part unwarranted. When Darwin called inborn variations 'fortuitous' he meant that we do not know much about their complex of causes; but the more we know about them, the less fortuitous they appear. There is some shuffling of the hereditary cards or 'genes' in the maturation and fertilization of the germ-cells, but every variation that comes to stay must be viably congruent with what has been already established, and this limits fortuity. So far as we can judge from the evolutionary gradations that persist, there is little suggestion of the fortuitous in the long-continued cerebral advance that led to the neo-pallium and to its particular Primate pattern.

Then again one of the most certain facts of life is that organisms play their hand of hereditary cards, testing their idiosyncracies, and thus sharing, even if subconsciously, in their own evolution. There are chances, no doubt, in the struggle for existence, just as in a well-fought football match, but it is by no means fortuitously that the organisms saying Shibboleth are discriminated from those saying Sibboleth. Natural Selection works in reference to a sieve—the already established system of inter-relations, the *Systema Naturae*. The idea of Organic Evo-

lution as a 'chapter of accidents' is a discreditable, if not discredited, bogey.

So again it is not more than half the truth to picture Animate Nature as 'red in tooth and claw with rapine,' as 'a vast gladiatorial show' and 'dismal cockpit.' The other half of the truth is that Nature's régime gives the approval of survival—and it may be a crown of success besides—to the loving as well as to the combative, to the self-subordinating as well as to the hustlers, to the socially disposed as well as to the individualistic. As Darwin said, the struggle for existence certainly includes stern individual competition, but it as certainly includes all endeavours that tend to secure the welfare of the offspring. Cradling nests have survival value as surely as sharp talons, and the generosity of a mammal mother's milk may secure success in the struggle for existence as effectively as teeth and claws. In short, is it not for our encouragement that Man is the evolutionary outcome of trends that are in the direction of the gentler as well as the stronger virtues?

(8) THE GOSPEL OF EVOLUTION.

Thinking of Man from the point of view of biologists and evolutionists, we have sought to show that the taxes on this way of looking at ourselves are not so burdensome as some suppose. In any case, so far as the facts go, there is no alternative. But without overbalancing oneself in reaching out from the scientific standpoint, one may make a more positive suggestion, that the evolutionist view is a real gain. Man becomes more intelligible and therefore more controllable when we recognize his affiliation, and the pre-human strands that linger in our fabric. As Shakespeare put it, 'the web of our life is of mingled yarn, good and ill together'; and we are all aware of coarse threads that require to be humanized. Not only does our complex being become less puzzling in the light of its past, it is encouraging to know that we have behind us not a descent, but an ascent, and that there is in us some appreciable momentum in the right—uphill—direction. Besides original sin there is original righteousness. This is part of the Gospel of Evolution. But there is more!

The largest fact in the story of Organic Evolution is the growing dominance of the mental aspect of life, and of this trend Modern Man is for the time being the climax. But who can say, especially in our very imperfect understanding of the Mind—Body relation, that the emancipation of this side of our being has reached its limit. Why should it stop?

Let us close on a practical note. Even if evolutionists are sometimes impetuous, sometimes ensnared in biologisms, sometimes not altogether wise in their formulations in regard to Man, he remains, whatever else he may be, a very remarkable bio-psychic organism, a Mind-body and a Body-mind still evolving, and from the study of biological processes—of variation and heredity, selection and isolation—he may receive hints which will be, within their limits, lights on his path, which will enable him increasingly to rid himself of gratuitous handicaps and brace himself for the higher adventures of the Spirit. *In hoc signo laboremus.*

MAN AND EXTERNAL NATURE

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AS a preface to this paper may I be allowed to make one or two observations? In the first place, it is of course hopeless to attempt to cover such a vast subject in such a short space, and I hope therefore that excuses will be made for what will sometimes appear to be scrappy and dogmatic statements. Secondly, I shall assume the objective reality of the world as realized by our human sense perceptions. I am aware that such a doctrine as *Maya*, enunciated by Indian philosophers, is both possible and somewhat popular to-day in the West; from my point of view, however, it is simpler to assume that that which we perceive with our senses actually is—at least for us. Lastly, I propose to treat the subject of my paper historically. After showing the conditions under which man first developed, I shall attempt to outline the evolution of nature religions, and then continue by considering the effect on humanity of the growth of settled communities. The result of these studies will be, perhaps, to show us how, out of man's struggle with nature and himself, our modern religious beliefs have been evolved.

The title of this paper is at first sight perhaps somewhat misleading, especially when it is explained by the sub-title as 'External Nature and Man's conflict with it, conquest of it, and adaptation to it.' Far too many of our theological ideas result from the tacit assumption that somehow or other man is *apart* from nature; *in* nature, of course, but not really *of* it. Lip service is nowadays given to the idea of evolution, but none the less at heart man instinctively dislikes the giving up of the belief that he was a 'special creation,' subject in part to, but separate from, the external world in which he lives. There have been folk who have supposed that this very dislike of admitting the oneness of man with the rest of nature constitutes a proof that a real dualism—nature and man—exists. A more probable explanation is the vanity inherent in mankind which urges him

to consider the human race as a creation quite apart from and superior to the rest of life. To begin with, then, it cannot be too strongly urged that man is but a product of nature, inferior to the giraffe and elephant in size, inferior to the crocodile and rhinoceros in offensive weapons, inferior to the horse and gazelle in speed, but endowed to a greater degree than any other living creature with a capacity to remember and to co-ordinate his memories with later impressions, with the result that he has developed one of the highest and most important products of nature, a critical faculty. At the same time, from certain points of view it is undoubtedly an advantage to treat the human family as if it stood somewhat apart from the rest of nature, and there is no harm in doing this as long as the real truth of the matter is never forgotten. Just as the typologist and the grammarian make classifications and rules which often have no real bases, but which are found to be useful for the purposes of study, so the separation of man from nature and observations as to his behaviour in face of natural phenomena throughout the ages will be found to be interesting. But once again it must be stressed that man, being part of nature, has no extra-natural powers to help him to conflict with, to conquer, or to adapt himself to her. There are no known physical, emotional or mental reactions occurring in the human species which are not found to a lesser extent in the animal world, growing ever weaker in their manifestations as we descend the scale of living organisms.

The history of this planet of ours has been written by the geologists in five volumes and an introduction. Each of these volumes, in turn, they have divided into chapters, paragraphs, etc. With the introduction (the Pre-Cambrian period) we are not concerned; nor with the first or palaeozoic volume. For although our coal measures, formerly the great source of wealth to us English folk, were forming during the time covered by its last chapter but one, no trace of anything approaching to humanity had yet made its appearance. The same is true of the second or mesozoic volume—the great age of the reptiles. In the last chapter of this period the chalk cliffs of Dover were deposited in a fairly deep sea, but still there is no sign of man. However, moving among the reptiles, then the kings of creation, there might have been seen a new and still insignificant type of

animal, the mammal, who had certain advantages over his scaly competitors: he had, for example, evolved the four-chambered heart, which ensured a much better blood supply to the various organs of the body. The third geological volume describes in S.E. England a broad estuary with muddy banks which have become to-day the London clay upon which our metropolis is built. In the third chapter of this volume we hear of much movement of the earth's crust and learn, among other things, that the Alps were upraised. The climate, judging from the flora, had been rather warm during the period covered by the first chapter; later, however, it began to grow colder, and this decrease in temperature culminated in an arctic period: the Great Ice Age was about to begin. It is at this time during the fourth and last chapter of the third volume of geological history (the pliocene period of tertiary times) that the first evidence for the existence of man occurs.¹ The fourth volume is concerned with the fluctuations of the Great Ice Age. This quaternary period is of immense importance in the story of human evolution—at any rate in the northern hemisphere—and a brief description of it will perhaps not be out of place. Formerly the Great Ice Age was considered to have been a single very cold period, probably world-wide, during which great ice sheets, similar to those found to-day in Greenland, covered the surface of the earth, at any rate in the northern latitudes where now we live and grow our food. But it is now demonstrated that the Great Ice Age, far from being a single cold period, consisted of a succession of cold and warm alternations, the latter being indeed probably sometimes warmer than the climate of corresponding latitudes to-day. Further, even during the maximum of a cold period the mean annual temperature was only a few degrees below that of modern times in the same district, and, while ice-sheets did appear much further south than is the case to-day, large areas of Western Europe were ice-free and inhabited by prehistoric man. At the same time let no one consider that during a glacial maximum life in Western Europe was an easy affair. Perhaps the sort of conditions then obtaining can best be reproduced to-day in northern Siberia. Further south, in tropical areas, except in high mountains where of

¹ The famous eoliths of E. Anglia, found and described by Reid Moir.

course there was ice, the extremes of cold of the glacial maxima were replaced by intense pluvial periods.

It has been sometimes stated that the late war was a great testing time for civilization. What then must have been the effect of the ever-deteriorating climatic conditions culminating in the first glacial epoch upon the archaic being who had but recently passed the Rubicon which separates the animal from man? How best to define this Rubicon has puzzled many minds. For some, the artificial production of fire, probably soon afterwards followed by the cooking of food, has been the touchstone which distinguishes the human kind from their animal forbears. For others, man is the first tool-using animal; while for others again—and I believe Dr. Elliot Smith would be among the number—it is the development of the speech areas² in the brain which makes the difference.³ Undoubtedly, however, the Rubicon indicates a mental rather than a physical development.

But we have digressed from the rigours of the Ice Age. The theory has been put forward that it was indeed the recurring adverse conditions of the quaternary period which, as it were, gave man his chance, since with the aid of his improved mental equipment he was better able to cope with the difficulties of the changing climate than were the members of the more automatic animal world. Unfortunately it is just at this most important moment, when the human species is emerging from the simian chrysalis, that we have least material to

² In this connection it is interesting to remember the paraphrase of *Genesis* ii that we find in the Palestinian Targum and in the later Onkelos version of the same. In the former we read, 'The God Iahweh created man with two dispositions, and He took dust from the place of the House of the Sanctuary and from the four winds of the world, and He mixed it with all the waters of the world; and He created man, red, black and white. Then He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the breath became in the body of the man a speaking spirit to make the eyes light up and the ears attend.' In the Onkelos version we read: 'The God Iahweh created man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his face the breath of life; and it became in man a speaking spirit.'

³ It is probable that animals can transfer their thoughts to one another, perhaps to a greater extent than we can ourselves, by some telepathic process which we have almost lost, though they seem never to have been able to devise a method of co-ordinating sounds and thoughts. It may even be that we can conceal our thoughts better than they can, only transmitting what we want to through the medium of speech. But, of course, all this is largely speculation.

work on. Well authenticated, definitely dated skeletal remains are more than rare. All the more important, then, is the recent find of *Sinanthropus* near Peking. Sufficient evidence, however, has been unearthed to make it certain that the earliest man still possessed many simian traits which have subsequently been eliminated, and that the physical structural developments which took place were not always along the same lines. Rather the growth of humanity has been like that of a tree: many branches were put forth, some of which came to nothing, while others were 'leaders' in the line of development of the various races of mankind which can be distinguished to-day.

Obviously tools of this early date are rarely found, and when they do turn up are generally both simple and crude. Only implements made of stone or some imperishable material survive, and it is of course quite unfair to judge of the state of civilization reached by their owners solely on the criteria of the stone tools which have remained. In fact, for certain later periods such an attempt would be most misleading, for the more backward peoples show a higher standard of flint work than do their neighbours who have learnt to work in another and a better medium. There may, too, have been other elaborate industries of wood or other materials which have not survived. On the whole, however, we could not expect to find any very considerable development of civilization among these earliest humans. Life was hard, and the newly evolved mental apparatus must have been taxed to its uttermost to permit mere existence, while, as has been said, there were many simian traits to be got rid of before man could face nature and to some extent make himself independent of her varying moods.

Gradually, however, cultural developments did take place along more than one line, and true civilizations began to appear. Indeed it was before the close of the Great Ice Age that man, the hunter, seems to have had thoughts about and glimmerings of an interest in a something beyond his strenuous existence while alive; for even in those far off times occasional elaborate burials betray the fact that he must have practised what can only be called a veritable cult of the dead. Representations of Neanderthal man are well known. He can hardly be called a fine type of humanity, and from an anatomical point of view he

is quite a lowly being. Yet burials have been found containing Neanderthal skeletons and showing that care and trouble was taken by the survivors in the treatment of the dead. At the small cave of the Chapelle aux Saints numbers of finely-made stone implements were buried with the corpse, while at La Ferrassie the body of a child was found interred in a trench which had been covered by a large stone carved all over with cup markings. It is difficult to avoid seeing in all this at least some sort of belief that death did not mean extinction, but only a vanishing to some other place where the same kind of stone tools, etc., would still be needed. In rather later, but still Palaeolithic times, besides stone tools we often find, especially in the case of women, necklaces and other objects of adornment buried with the body, while the body itself is sometimes covered with red ochre, which perhaps was meant to represent the blood, that is, the life.

But these ochre burials belong to a new stage in the evolution of our race which must now be considered; for somewhere, outside Europe, a new modification of the human genus was evolved during quaternary times. This new species we call *homo sapiens*, or Neanthropic man, in distinction from Palae-anthropic Man with whom we have till now been dealing. Towards the end of the Great Ice Age *homo sapiens* spread over Europe, bringing with him a new and much more advanced culture. It is to the men of this type that we are indebted for the marvellous works of art which are found in the prehistoric 'homes' and on the walls of deep caves in parts of France and Spain, where mammoth, boar, and bison are portrayed with a skill and beauty that might well awaken envy in the breast of a modern artist. But wonderful as are these naturalistic cave paintings, and much as we must marvel at the artistic skill displayed by our forerunners so many thousands of years ago, they are of still more importance to us from another point of view: namely, in so far as they show us something of the attitude of early man to nature. We have pointed out that the essential difference between man and the rest of the animal world was the evolution of his powers of co-ordinating memory and new impressions and his consequent development of a critical faculty. This critical faculty engendered in him a consciousness of self

and his surroundings. Now in man's primitive existence there would seem to have been three great factors which were ever present and early realized by his budding consciousness to be of paramount importance. These were birth, death, and food. The fact of birth must have struck man, as soon as his mental powers developed, as something strange and unexpected. Still more strange and far more awful—in both senses in which we now use the word—must have been the phenomenon of death. We have already noted that as early as the time when Neanderthal man roamed over Western Europe ceremonial or 'careful' burial was practised for certain individuals, and that as these burials were not confined to old men likely to have been great leaders of the family or tribe, it is probable that death was not considered as extinction, even in the case of young and as yet untried members of the clan. But birth and death, though constantly present, are not quite such immediate and ever-pressing phenomena as is the hunger urge. In an age when man knew nothing about agriculture or the domestication of animals, when he subsisted solely by hunting and food gathering, and when the storage of food for any length of time was impossible, the question of the food supply must have loomed very large indeed and have been an everlasting problem for his prehistoric mind to tackle.

Hope deferred maketh the heart sick is a true saying, but equally truly can it be said of primitive man to-day—and therefore doubtless, too, of prehistoric man—that hope deferred leads to mimetic representation of that which is desired. In this connection there is no time now, nor is this the place to write an essay on primitive psychology and the motives underlying the production of most of the wonderful Upper Palaeolithic cave art. But it can briefly be said that while obviously the folk who made the paintings must have been of an artistic nature, the actual reason for their production was almost certainly connected with hopes for successful hunts and the increase of the food supply. Moreover, this art production was not the result of haphazard artistic effort. There is evidence to show that fairly early the whole matter was in the hands of an artist—medicine-man—priest caste who were probably taught their job in art schools and who officiated in what can only be called cave-temples. Be-

lieve me, these are no rash statements, and there is considerable evidence behind them. Thus we find that, side by side with a veritable cult of the dead, which had already appeared with Neanderthal man in Western Europe and which was continued by the Aurignacian branch of the *homo sapiens* new-comers, there grew up a system of what anthropologists to-day call 'sympathetic magic,' by which man believed he could somehow or other influence nature and so make her help him to supply his special needs.

For the first time, then, we seem to see man 'standing up to' and taking steps to guide the events in his surroundings. Of course it must not be imagined that prehistoric man would think of himself as outside nature, or that he would put forward his demands in an aggressive spirit. Throughout all the ages there have been some fiery souls who have tried to compel their environment to fit their desires, but most men, on the contrary, have approached Dame Nature, or whatever gods they deemed responsible for her various manifestations, in a humbler spirit. In our own day we approach the problem in a scientific manner, believing that the so-called natural laws are *real* and that therefore by a series of arrangements and dodges we can be fairly certain of accomplishing our purposes. Nevertheless it would seem to have been as long ago as Aurignacian times, towards the end of the fourth volume of geological history, some 15,000 years or more ago, that the first attempts were made to influence nature to do what the members of the human race required.

As human civilization advanced and new and less primitive cultures developed, man's needs grew ever greater. Actually of course early prehistoric man knew no means of adapting nature to his own ends, but as time went on and the Ice Age came to an end much that he could do was discovered. Thus in Neolithic, or New Stone Age times, methods of agriculture were learnt and the domestication of animals practised. The discovery, too, of the making of tools of metal by the smelting and blending of certain metallic ores enabled man to make rapid strides forward, and among other things, he became a first-rate carpenter. However, though he could work in wood, he was still at the mercy of the woods. For there have been many post-glacial climatic changes, chiefly changes of humidity rather than

of temperature, and certain of these fostered the growth of forests, with the result that prehistoric man, now cultivating his fields and herding his sheep and cattle, had to face the choice between extinction or migration. Obviously he would choose the latter, and indeed in pre-Roman times most of the great movements of peoples in Europe can be connected with these climate changes. It was not until the organizing power of the Romans and the building of roads enabled enormous human efforts to be concentrated rapidly in small areas that humanity was able to cope with nature when she had decided to grow forests over the lands that men were occupying. Incidentally we cannot yet be always certain of our complete victory over nature. There are still large areas of Africa rendered uninhabitable by uncontrolled pests like the tsetse fly and, until lately, the mosquito!

The story of the rise of great civilizations generally begin with the hybridization of two or more suitable cultures *under satisfactory climatic conditions*, and these suitable climatic conditions did not necessarily always occur in our own latitudes. At different periods in human history they were found around the shores of the Mediterranean, and along the valleys of the Nile, the Euphrates and Tigris, and the Indus, areas now largely desert except close to the rivers, but once much more fertile. The suitable hybridization of human cultures in these areas resulted in the growth of the wondrous Bronze Age civilizations about which, especially in Mesopotamia, we have recently learnt so much from the spades of the excavators. But their glory was not to endure, the climate changed, less favourable conditions set in, everything collapsed. Perhaps history will repeat itself for our west-European civilization some day! Further with the rise of these great civilizations went the production of large populations, and conversely, when the civilizations fell the populations had to grow less. Increase and decrease of population are often, therefore, functions of natural conditions not under man's control, for there always has been and always will be much that is automatic in mankind, and this side of his nature reacts instantly to the changing conditions of his environment. What about that awful sanctity of the individual human life that we so frequently hear about from unenlightened religious teachers?

At different times, then, under suitable climatic conditions, in varying latitudes, the growth of human civilization continued⁴ and man progressed by learning Nature's secrets and so adapting himself to her laws that he was enabled in many cases to get her help in accomplishing what he wanted to do. Until the growth of the study of natural science within the last three hundred years developed a materialistic pictorial representation of nature and her modes of operation, it was, as is natural, customary to view everything from a more anthropomorphic standpoint, and as a result the forces of nature were personified and called by such names as Ra the sun, Zeus the lord of the sky, Agni the god of fire, and Thor the god of thunder. Man tried to please these gods in the same way as he would try to please other human beings in the hope that thereby he would get benefits for himself. Hence libations,⁵ sacrifices, etc., were made, and there grew up the great nature religions which we find still surviving in the early Graeco-Roman world.

To summarize, then, we have seen how man from very early times realized his existence in the world around him and how he strove to obtain what he wanted, partly by observation of natural phenomena, and thus perceiving what it was possible for him to do, and partly through 'sympathetic magic' which he believed influenced nature so that she gave him what he needed. With the personification of the various natural phenomena nature religions developed, in essence simple and materialistic, and these have only been displaced in recent times by the scientific conceptions of nature where, except from the point of view of creation, the gods (or God) are largely eliminated.

We must now return again to the end of quaternary times, that is to say to the close of the fourth volume of geological history, and consider some of the effects on human behaviour of the discoveries of agriculture and the domestication of animals which had inaugurated what we call the Neolithic or New Stone

⁴ Where conditions were less favourable, humanity, of course, continued to exist, but it is only under the best conditions that cultures seriously progress, and it was not until our own day, when transport modified matters, that the rapid spread of a civilisation evolved in one area to a more backward region became possible.

⁵ I need not mention that often these libations themselves become sacred. Comp. Soma. But this does not concern us here.

Age. At this time, too, the firing of clay to make pottery was discovered, while not long afterwards came a knowledge of simple metallurgy. The use of pottery and metal tools permitted a much greater refinement in the home, but above all the practice of agriculture and the domestication of animals enabled a far greater number of individuals to exist in a given area than had been possible before. Consequently, partly no doubt by a decrease in the rate of infant mortality, etc., the populations, where the new civilization had been accepted, increased largely. Further, where agriculture was the chief method of food production, settled communities developed in which individuals congregated together in close proximity to their plough lands and their stores of grain, and in which we may soon expect to find specialization of trade and occupation the normal rule. In the case of a purely hunting and food gathering people, each individual is far more of a 'jack of all trades' than he is in an agricultural community.

The formation of communities, or villages, produced new problems which man had to face. Firstly, so that he could continue to exist and breed, he had to adapt his new existence to the laws of nature in such matters as sanitation, etc. But, even more important, means had to be discovered to enable men to live in close proximity with one another and yet remain at peace. For the first time on a large scale the lesson of give and take had to be learnt. The effect on human history and thought has been momentous. From this simple beginning dates all custom and law, all morality and ordered existence. Indeed one might even say that the herding together of population led directly to the idea of gods of cosmic order and thereafter to the conception of an ethical God. Further, settled communities come to own property, both individual and communal, and possessions and their defence lead to strife and war. My father, Professor Burkitt, has suggested that actually war has been a most potent civilizing agent. The self-sacrifice required in war, not only on the part of the individual, but also on the part of different tribes allied together in the face of a common danger, has contributed much to the growth of organization and order and, in turn, to ideas of justice. At any rate the early growth of these ideas can be traced as far back as the third or fourth millenium B.C., and later on in

the earliest Sanskrit writings, as well as in the Avesta, we find that humanity had definitely visualized the importance of order, and as a result had conceived that some at any rate of its gods were not so much personifications of natural forces as gods of cosmic order.⁶ I need not remind you of Asha or Arta (ethical order) among the Mitani, that small but important people who lived just to the south of the Hittite kingdom, who supplied a queen for Egypt, the mother of the heretic Akhenaten. Nor need I recall the heretic king himself and the wonderful ethical religion he tried to introduce : there are indeed not a few who believe that he directly influenced the religious evolution of the Israelitish peoples. Sufficient it is to point out that henceforth side by side with the growth of nature religions we have the development of ethical religious systems. The two lines of religious thought have run parallel throughout the ages, and perhaps have never yet been really fused into one.

The growth of a religion especially concerned with ethics and man's behaviour led to further and very important results. The demands of an ethical religion often clashed with the demands of Nature. Man had tried by 'sympathetic Magic' and the like to lead Nature to agree to his requirements, but now he frequently found himself absolutely in opposition to her. The cry, 'I feel a war in my members . . . ' will come to your mind at once, on the plane of morality. The giving, as well as taking, required of the strong man is not natural and is only partly satisfied by the human invention of rules and customs which later were codified into laws and from which were deduced a concept of absolute justice, naturally attached as an attribute to the gods of order already mentioned. With the rise, then, of society, we see the beginning of man's age-long fight with nature and his attempt to emancipate himself from her thralldom. Let it be said at once that it seems likely that this attempt is ever foredoomed to failure ; but (a new discovery) it is just in the continual failure of the individual in this fight to attain what he desires, that character or personality is evolved. Once again through suffering, struggle and failure higher aspirations grow and flourish. Through his struggle with nature, demanded from

⁶ Comp. Varuna, the guardian of Rita (universal cosmic order) in early Indian religious thought.

him by his ethical religion, even though he is perpetually doomed to failure, there is born in man something new, something of which only the potentiality previously existed—a soul.⁷

The story of early man and his reactions to and conflict with the world around him, has been all too briefly epitomized. We see as a culmination, the result of struggle and failure, the generation of the soul. So much is true for the generality of human beings, from the earliest moment when humanity appeared until well on into historical times. But it would be hardly fair to close this paper without any reference, however brief, to that special development of the mental powers which has taken place among a minority of human beings and which has led to the growth of philosophy and a more subjective view of the earth and all that therein is. It is true to say that there has never been such an outpouring of mental activity as took place around the shores of the Mediterranean between the years 800 B.C. and 500 A.D. At the same time as the early Hebrew moralists—Amos, Hosea, Micah and the first Isaiah—were perfecting a moral outlook on the world, the early Greek thinkers were trying to view the cosmos in the light of pure reason. Unfortunately of course their lack of actual knowledge of the world—at least in terms of human sense perceptions—led to many of their premises being unsound, and it is only in the last three hundred years that experimental science has attempted to rectify their errors. The correlation of the results obtained by pure thought with those contributed by scientific investigation has still to be made. How far when this is done our old conceptions of the world will be superseded remains to be seen. It should always be remembered that Jesus Christ revealed, in part, to man God the Father; he said nothing about natural laws, nor made any revelation of nature. The early Church had a false cosmogony, and even to-day Christians do only lip service to the discoveries of such investigators as Copernicus and others. The present dogmas of organized religious bodies, both Christian as well as pagan, are many of them false. But nevertheless we must be optimistic and believe that out of the struggle after truth, and with the help

⁷ Biologists affirm that an individual life epitomizes the history of the race. In the same way it would seem that for an individual to possess a soul he must equally follow a thorny path of struggle and suffering.

of the greater sincerity which exists to-day, there will develop a new conception of God, Man, and the World: of God as revealed by a study of His works and the teaching of Jesus Christ—not of the early Church—and of man and the world as revealed by the study of what natural science and philosophy have to teach us.

EDITORIAL NOTE.

The Editor regrets that he has been compelled to publish Dr. William Brown's paper out of its proper order. It appears in this number last but one in the series of Conference papers.

THE ROOT OF RELIGION

By Sir FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, K.C.I.E., D.Sc.

CONSCIOUSLY or unconsciously, we have to decide one crucial question affecting our whole lives. Do we or do we not believe that the world is governed for good—that, in the last resort, the things we value most, and not a rise or fall in temperature, count in the universe and determine the result. If we decide that however much we may strive after goodness and beauty and truth, and however successful we may be, yet eventually cold will freeze out of existence every being in the whole universe capable of appreciating and achieving these things of the spirit, then we must have a fundamentally different attitude towards life from others who believe that the last word rests, not with the laws of physics and chemistry, but with spiritual values. If we believe that, however distant the date, our sun and the whole universe will have radiated away its heat and all beings capable of life and love will have been frozen to death and nothing remain of men's most heroic efforts, then we must have depression at the bottom of our hearts. We may face life with courage. We may be exceedingly good and upright. We may achieve high intellectual distinction. But there will be a chill in our souls all the time. We shall regard it as an uphill fight. We shall give the impression of pluckily making the best of a bad job. We shall have no true zest in life. We may even go a step further: we may hate those who have. If we get this idea that the universe is a mechanical concern ultimately controlled by the laws of physics and chemistry and that goodness has nothing whatever to do with the government of the world, but is a mere by-product, a chance emanation from some fortuitous compound, we may positively resent the activities of those who hold the contrary view. We may think they are misleading men. We may believe that those who are pinning their faith in the goodness of things and are persuading others to do the same, are doing positive harm. And we may, like the Soviets, actively oppose and suppress them and constrain men to devote their

whole attention to the immediate practical business of providing food, raiment, and shelter for themselves. We may deride devotion to God and holy things as the survival of superstition, as mere waste of time—as worse, as something sapping all virility and self-dependence out of men.

On the other hand, if we hold that the universe is governed for good—that spiritual values have a determining voice in the ordering of the universe—the universe as well as our own particular solar system—then we shall have the satisfaction of feeling that in working for goodness and beauty and truth, strenuous and difficult though it may be, we are working with and not against the grain of things. Instead of having a secret sense of the futility of our efforts we shall have satisfaction in knowing that whether by ourselves or by others, whatever of good we are working for, must inevitably be achieved.

This much benefit we shall derive from even a mere intellectual assent to the proposition that the world is governed for good. But if we possess something more than simply this knowledge, gained perhaps by sheer argumentation and resting solely on logic and reason—if we are more than only philosophical idealists, if we feel in the marrow of our being that we are part of the good, the beautiful and the holy—if we have a living conviction that the world is governed for good, then we shall have the root of religion in us, and exceeding gladness will be in our hearts. Joy will be in our lives. And we shall put it into all we do.

What justification have we for holding this latter faith? What ground is there for this root of religion?

On the face of it, there seems much to be said for the view that physics and chemistry must have the last word. For millions of years before any life appeared on this earth physics and chemistry had it all their own way here. There was, or seemed to be, nothing but chemical compounds acting in accordance with physical laws. Two or three thousand million years ago the chance passing of a stray star had drawn away some droplets from the sun. And one of these had cooled down into this earth. There were no signs of life—much less of love. There was only fiery mist. Similarly, in a certain number of thousands of millions of years the sun will have radiated away its heat. This earth will have become unfit for human or any living habitation. And all

life and love and beauty and every other lovely thing for which we have most ardently striven will have vanished from this planet, as a light extinguished.

And the same with the whole universe. The universe is running down, we are told by the astronomers. The second law of thermo-dynamics is their god. It rules everything with inexorable authority. None can dispute it. It lays down that heat radiated away is never recovered. Slowly but surely and inevitably the heat of the sun and the heat of all those other suns, the stars, as numerous as the grains of sand upon the seashore, will be radiated away. There will be one vast heat death. We living things are like polar bears on an iceberg, drifting southward. Inevitably we must go under.

But against this running-down view of the universe, even some physicists—let alone philosophers—contend that the second law of thermo-dynamics, though applicable generally, may not be applicable universally. In the deep recesses of Space, under conditions as yet unknown, radiation may be reconstituted, matter may be re-born. As fast as some atoms may be broken up others may be rebuilt. The evidence of any such winding-up of the running-down universe is not yet forthcoming. But it may come. Sir Oliver Lodge and Millikin think that it will. And that it should eventually be forthcoming is certainly in accordance with all else we know about the universe. A one-way running-down process from some problematical beginning is so much at variance with the course of things we see elsewhere that we suspect somewhere a flaw in the argument.

Then as to life on this planet being the result of a chance combination of chemical compounds. Is it likely that without any external influence and without any internal urge from something more than physical and chemical forces, there could possibly have arisen anything with such marvellous capacities as life with, in its turn, capacities for that still more wonderful thing, love? Physics and chemistry alone could not have done this wonder. Something must have been added thereto. Some additional element must have been at work. Far more reasonable is it to suppose that all along there were bearing in upon these chemical combinations from the universe at large (of which the solar system is a truly integral part) spiritual forces mould-

ing them to a spiritual purpose. The universe—so philosophy and science tell—is a single whole with its parts in continuous connection with one another in space and in time. It is a dynamically inter-connected system—an organic whole. And if life appears on this part of the universe, it is more reasonable to assume that life is characteristic of the universe as a whole than that it arose unaided from mere chemical compounds.

Thus the fact that in the early stages of this planet's existence there was on it no living thing and that it was from chemical combinations that life arose, affords no ground whatever for believing that the universe as a whole is ultimately governed in accordance with physical and chemical laws, and that when it disappears from this planet, it will disappear from the whole universe. For the very reason that it appeared here, we may assume that it has been appearing in other parts of the universe and will be appearing long after it has ceased to exist here. The universe is alive—always has been and always will be. No other conclusion will fit the facts.

Yet even supposing it is alive it may not be good—some perhaps may argue. There may be a living power at work in the world, but it may not be working for good or may be working only very faintly and fitfully and unsuccessfully, and may not therefore be a power of such a nature that we can trust and put our faith in. It might not afford any ground for religion. There is a terrible amount of pain and evil in the world—cruelty and suffering, greed, lust, avarice, hatred, jealousy and every kind of evil; and good is hard put to it to keep its head above the evil which would immerse it. How with all this evident evil can men be expected to believe that the world is governed for good?

That is a question which has been asked for thousands of years, and doubtless will continue to be asked for countless ages to come. Only by asking it, in fact, can we make our faith in goodness secure. There is no harm and only good in putting this question to ourselves.

Now that evil exists I certainly would not deny. Moreover, I believe it to be part of the make-up of the world. In the world there is evil as well as good, sorrow as well as joy, pain as well as pleasure. I believe that it always will be so. And I cannot conceive any worthy state of things in which this would not be

so. For if we are to have any feeling at all we must have pain. And unless we have feeling we cannot have joy. And joy in life is what makes life worth living. Life without pain would be life without joy. And life without joy would be the life of a cabbage—if even as good as that. Moreover, suffering, as we know by experience, has its uses. It can operate for good. It can warn us against danger. Unless fire hurt us we might be burnt to a cinder before we knew we were on fire. And it may be a spur to improvement. The suffering of the Great War was appalling, but it has manifestly goaded the nations to conduct the relations between them in a more neighbourly and conciliatory and business-like fashion than they ever did before.

And without moral evil could there be any freedom? If there is to be freedom of choice there must be freedom to do evil or good—the lesser good or the higher good. A man incapable of doing evil would be incapable of doing good. He would be a mere automaton. So if there is to be good there must be evil.

The world is obviously something more than a wheel going round and round or even a system of wheels like a clock. It is a process. A process, so far as we have evidence of it, towards something higher. And in such a process there must be selection and elimination. What obstructs the passage to the higher, what does not make for the standard aimed at, is eliminated. And that which obstructs is the evil.

Yet this evil may be the very means and instrument for progress towards the higher good. And we have evidence enough that it is in the fighting, struggling, striving against the evil, or the lesser good, that the higher good is attained. It is an active factor in spurring men to rise above themselves to higher things.

Though pain and evil exist, we can see then that they do subserve some good purpose. They can be and they are turned into operative factors for the good. And we can see something further. We can see what is exemplified in the battlefields of Flanders. It happens that I saw these the day after the Armistice, when it was possible to drive all about them. I have seen great deserts and the most barren mountains, but never have I seen such a scene of utter desolation as those battlefields presented. As far as the eye could see every tree was shot bare. The trunk stood up stark naked. There was not a vestige of

vegetation anywhere. The whole surface of the earth was churned up. And every human habitation was razed to the ground. That was the scene in 1918. Now even without the aid of man, trees have burst into leaf, flowers have sprung from the ground and the whole aspect has changed. And man also has found something within driving him to repair the ravages of war. He has built new habitations for himself and he has sown the fields and planted the orchards. The wounds of war have been healed. And up to a certain point it has been the same with men wounded in the war. Their wounds have been healed. A balm has been thrown over the pains they endured.

What has been done in the physical sphere is only exemplification of what is also accomplished in the realm of spirit. Evil done remains. It cannot be expunged. But we see evidence of a redeeming love at work in the world which transforms the consequences of evil deeds and makes of them a means to a higher good. On every hand we see instances of a redeeming power which rescues men from the consequences of their own evil deeds, transforms those consequences into the very instrument for their higher good. About even the worst men can we truly say that he has not one redeeming feature? And about nearly every man, evil though he may be in some respects, do we not say on his death, when we can see his life as a whole, that his bad points were redeemed by his good? And taking mankind as a whole, would we not say that the consequences of evil men have done, is being slowly and surely transformed—like the battle-fields of Flanders?

We do then find evidence of a 'making-whole' power—a healing power at work in the world. Scars on the landscape, scars on the body, scars on the soul, are made whole—are healed. The suffering, the cruelty, the wickedness in the world is shocking. Evil is very active. Yet we are aware, both within ourselves and in the world about us, of a stronger and more intensely active power fighting against the evil. And if we look at the world as a whole and view the evil in its due proportion, we see that it is the power working for good that is the more successful. Even on the winteriest day we can see beauty and we know that the sun is shining above the fog—that spring is not far behind, and that in the antipodes it is already summer. Scars there may

be on every landscape, but there is not a view in nature that is not beautiful. Cruelty and struggle there is in wild life, but when we look at the birds and animals in their togetherness, it is their health and beauty and joy in life that strikes us. And the same with mankind. It needs no searchlight to find the sufferings and sinfulness of men. And any cynic may dwell on these. It is a very cheap and easy thing to do. And for purposes of reform, concentration of attention upon the evils is as necessary as the concentration of the doctor upon a malady of the body. But this focussing upon the evil does not lead to the truth about the whole. And viewed as a whole, what is much more evident than the evil is the prodigious effort man is making to overcome evil with good, to rise above himself to higher things, to create beauty, and to better conditions in every way. And in the long view we see that he has succeeded. In the last hundred thousand years in the realm of thought, of beauty, and of goodness, he has achieved marvels. And if we take a longer view still and reflect on the state of this planet as it was a thousand million years ago when life first appeared, and compare it with what it is to-day, we see that what pain and evil there may be, and may have been, sinks into utter insignificance alongside the main result achieved. The factor making for good must have been of incomparably greater power than any evil.

The existence of pain and evil in the world is then no obstacle in the way of our believing that the world is governed for good. What evil there is may be the very instrument of good.

But though this may be true—though we may readily give our intellectual assent to the proposition that there is a Power for good at work in the world, and that it is triumphantly overcoming the evil, we have not yet arrived at the root of religion. A coldly calculating philosopher or a thoroughly impartial scientist may arrive at this conclusion and yet have scarcely a spark of religion in him. The root of religion goes deeper than this.

So far we have been dealing only with results reached through the intellect. But there are other ways of arriving at the truth of things than by the restricted methods of science and the chill reasoning of logic. There are faculties of the soul through which we can get nearer to the heart of things than the intellect alone will ever take us. We may use all the results of categorical

thinking. And we may ponder over them. We may chew them in the cud of the soul. And through subtle faculties of the soul, we may fathom deeper depths of the universe than the intellect, by itself, could ever reach.

Let us then see once more how we stand to the world. Each of us is an inseparable, integral part of the universe. We were born out of it. We live in it. We are dependent in every way upon it. Our bodies are very obviously bound up with the universe. It is only by continually breathing, eating, and drinking of the universe that we can keep them together. But our selves are still more intimately connected. A self consists of mental powers and dispositions, and these depend much upon the body and especially the brain, but also upon what is seen through the eye, heard through the ear and touched with the fingers. Cut the self off from contact, through the senses, with the outside world and it would cease to be. In utter separation from the universe the self could not exist. Each self is inextricably connected with the universe. We are members one of another and of the whole universe. We are interpenetrated by it. And as we are parts of that inter-connected system we are permeated through and through with its nature. Its express image is stamped upon us. There may, indeed, be in the whole something more and greater than there is in any of the parts. Still, we, as parts of the universe, must bear upon us some indication of the nature of the whole.

It will make the point clearer if we consider our own bodies. We probably bear to the universe as a whole somewhat the same relation as the living cells of which our bodies are composed bear to our whole selves. Each of those cells does in some rudimentary fashion represent our nature. It is living. It has fed itself. It has grown. It has reproduced itself. It has some inkling of mind. And some of these cells must, more than others, bear upon them the impress of the whole. The germ-cells, for example, must be more stamped with our essential nature than the brain-cells. For we know by experience that these germ-cells are capable, when fertilized, of expanding and developing till they have grown into persons like ourselves, with the individual characteristics of each—even the slightest turn of expression.

Now may it not be that certain highly-developed and most sensitive-natured men bear to the universe as a whole much the same relationship that these germ-cells do to a man? May they not to a certain degree bear upon them the impress of the nature of the universe? May not that impress be as much more upon them as our impress is more upon a germ-cell than upon a brain-cell?

Anyhow, we have this fact, that certain men (whom we may call religious geniuses) do from time to time feel themselves directly in touch with the spirit of the world. They feel in touch with the very heart of the universe and feel the Power which drives the world bearing in irresistibly upon them. They feel capable of expansion to the furthest limits of the world. And they feel the whole world concentrated on them. These men have a direct and immediate apprehension of the motive source of the Power which controls and directs the world. The whole is more and greater than they. Still, they in their experience at its truest give us a better indication than the strictest logician could ever provide of the true nature of the Power that governs the world. And we should from these men get the best available evidence as to whether the Power that drives the universe is coldly callous to life and all that life most dearly cherishes or is essentially spiritual and working—and working successfully—for the things that we most value.

Now those who have thus had direct experience (through their whole selves and not only through their intellects) of the Self or Soul of the Universe, are unanimous in affirming that it is working, not only for the good, but for something far and away beyond all that we can possibly conceive of what is most holy. They have not been able to find words to describe the surpassing greatness of that Power which is at work in the world. But they can assure us that it is making for all the best we know of Love and Beauty fused by divine fire into something higher than our furthest imagination can reach.

And this Power, they feel, is not only expecting, but most vigorously constraining us to strive for these supreme heights. We are not merely dependent upon this Power, and this Power is not merely dependent on us—and both these things are the case—but whether we will or not, this Power is working on and

in and through us every moment of our lives as incessantly as the action of the air we breathe, and as irresistibly as the force which drives the tree skyward.

This is the experience of the most sensitive of our race. And it will be seen to give pith and substance to the bare conclusion of philosophers that the Power which must be controlling and directing the universe is directing it towards the good. And herein is the root of religion.

I would describe it more fully in the following terms. Issuing from the remotest and holiest recesses of the universe—from above the highest height and below the deepest depth and beyond the furthest horizon—yet flooding through the narrowest crevices to the very centre of each minutest part which goes to constitute the whole—just as I myself permeate every tiniest living cell which goes to constitute me—is the Power of a Personality making unceasingly for a vision in its Mind of all that is most loving, most lovable and most lovely. This Power imperatively demands of us that we shall do our best to the utmost stretch of our particular capacity to help realize this vision. And, in-so-far as we comply with these demands, we can depend upon unfailing support.

This faith in the goodness of things is, I take it, the root of religion. And it is a faith on which we who have it will stake our lives.

THE ROOT OF MORALS

By the Rev. C. F. RUSSELL, M.A., Headmaster of Merchant Taylors' School, Crosby; formerly Fellow of Pembroke College, Cambridge.

I WISH to say, at the outset of this paper, that I believe the difference between right and wrong to be based in the Divine character and will. My ethics are not divorced from my religion; and if the two are separable for thought and for argument, they are not independent in fact. I say this now, not so much because I want to forestall a criticism, but because I want to avoid a misunderstanding. It would be easy to denounce the ethical theory which I hold as naturalistic or evolutionary-utilitarian, and to criticize it as one which did not involve either Christian or even theistic belief. I need not quarrel with the name, but I am convinced that such a criticism would not be justified. On a superficial view, and taking a part of the theory as if it were the whole, it might seem fair enough; but if the whole of what I have to say is taken into account, I think that the criticism cannot be maintained. Later on, I shall return to this point, and I shall try to justify my view, so I will not say more at the moment by way of explanation; but I say so much, as an introductory remark, because I think that your attitude to the first part of my paper will be affected by your knowing that, in spite of appearances, I am not stating, at any rate in my own belief, a theory of ethics which leaves religion out of account.

The subject which has been assigned to me, 'The Root of Morals,' obviously refers to historical origin in the past rather than to philosophical justification in the present. We are concerned with the problem of how moral ideas came to be established long ago rather than why we hold them to-day. But it is scarcely possible to keep the two problems apart, and I ask you in the first place to direct your attention to the latter question. The more attempts we make to explain why we accept anything as a moral duty in the present, the more, it seems to me, we are driven back on the other problem; and if that is so, it will be well to recognize the fact. Let us, then, fix our ideas by taking a particular moral obligation, the obligation of truthfulness, and

ask ourselves why we hold that it is right to speak the truth and wrong to tell a lie.

If anyone says that lying is wrong because it is displeasing to God, we may admit that the statement is true as far as it goes, but we are at once compelled to ask him *why* it should be displeasing to God, and *how he knows* that it is so; and the questions are obviously necessary and legitimate ones. What answer will he give?

(1) He may tell us that we know lying to be wrong because the Bible says so. This seems to me to be quite unconvincing. Not only are there things forbidden in the Bible which we do not now regard as wrong, *e.g.* working on Saturdays, harnessing an ox and an ass to a plough, eating snails, the wearing of male garments by female hikers, or (in the New Testament) the taking of an oath of any kind whatever, but further—and this is a much more important consideration—the statement puts ‘the cart before the horse.’ We do not believe a thing to be true because the Bible, otherwise known to be the word of God, tells us so, but we believe that the Bible is the word of God because, and in so far as, it tells us what we recognize in certain matters to be true. If a new saying of our Lord was discovered which denounced, say, the respect and affection which we believe that a child ought to feel towards his parents (and, indeed, we already have two or three sayings of Christ which, *if taken literally*, seem to do this, *e.g.* Luke ix, 62; xiv, 26), we should not alter our opinion and decide that filial love was wrong, but we should say either that the text was spurious or that its real meaning was something else. That is to say, the moral teaching of the Bible has to justify itself at the bar of our otherwise established ethical convictions, rather than the other way round; and consequently an appeal to that teaching cannot be final as an answer to our question.

(2) Again, the answer may be given that we know lying to be wrong by intuition, and that such intuitive knowledge is presupposed by the fact of conscience. There is much truth in this, and for practical purposes, for most people and on most occasions, it is neither desirable nor possible to pursue the inquiry further. But when we are concerned not with a practical and every-day decision about action but with the ultimate grounds for our belief, we cannot be content with this answer any more

than with the other. Different people's intuitions contradict one another; different people's consciences guide them in opposite directions; and even if this were not the case—if ethical intuitions were always identical and conscientious people never disagreed—we should still have to ask how these intuitions had arisen and how our consciences had acquired their authority. It is highly probable that as recently as 5,000 years ago people had no intuitive conviction that it was wrong to kill a prisoner taken in war. The conviction must have arisen somehow and somewhy and somewhen: it did not suddenly spring into existence out of nothing. How and why did it arise? Such questions take us back behind the intuition or the ruling of conscience, even if we admit their existence at our present stage. I do not believe that there are any so-called moral intuitions behind which we cannot push our inquiry if we will. And certainly, so long as these vary in different individuals, it is important that we should do so if we can. I am not satisfied, therefore, in the last resort, by an appeal to conscience or to moral intuition any more than by an appeal to the Bible.

(3) A similar situation arises if we are told that lying is inconsistent with the perfection of manhood. We probably accept the statement as true in itself, but we want at once to know something about the way in which the ideal of perfect manhood has come to be what it is. And a reference to the teaching of Christ, or even to His personality, does not help us over our difficulty. For here again it is important that the cart and the horse should be arranged in their proper order. We know Christ to be divine—to be the revelation of the character of God and the supreme example for mankind—because we see in Him the embodiment of perfect goodness; we do not accept Him as perfectly good because we have previously and independently been assured that He is divine. This means that the possibility of our seeing God in Christ rests upon our having a prior knowledge of goodness or at least a prior capacity to recognize it as such when it is presented to us. The moral sense must be established in us already. To quote words which I have used elsewhere, the doctrine of the divinity of Christ is not so much a source from which ethical consequences flow as a summary statement in religious language of an ethical position already achieved.

(4) Once more, to say that we know lying to be wrong because we have been taught to think so by our fathers, who in their turn learnt it in the same way, is plainly no satisfactory solution—so plainly that it would not be worth saying at all except as a reminder that a similar futility attaches to any answer which bases the conviction on tradition or authority. The tradition is genuine enough; the authority, to most if not all of us, may have great cogency; but as we follow back along the line of human (and possibly pre-human) experience, we are bound at last to reach a time when the tradition was not there. And our question then returns upon us with all its original force: how and why did the tradition arise?

(5) What of the answer that lying is wrong because it is in its very nature irrational? This sounds more hopeful. I observe, however, in the first place, that we have so far been considering possible answers which would apply equally to other wrong acts—that lying is displeasing to God, forbidden in the Bible, inconsistent with perfect manhood, and so on—and that this answer is of a different kind. Lying may be irrational, but it could hardly be maintained that laziness or bad temper is irrational in that sense, and we want (if we can get it) a principle of wider application. Moreover, even in the case of lying, I find in this answer a difficulty of another sort. It seems to prove too much. It clearly implies that to be irrational is to be wrong, otherwise it could not be put in the form that the wrongness of lying is due to its irrationality. But if this is so, it necessarily follows, it seems to me, that no lie is ever justifiable. Now I happen to hold the opinion—though of course you may not agree with me—that there are occasions when it may be right to tell a lie. Yet, in that sense of the word 'irrational' in which it is said that 'a lie is irrational in its very nature,' such lies are quite as irrational as the lies which we condemn; and if it is their irrationality which makes them wrong, then these are wrong too. If we try to get out of the difficulty by saying that there are exceptional occasions when a lie, in spite of its irrationality, may yet not be wrong, we have thrown overboard the criterion of moral judgment which we had invoked. In that case, irrationality *in itself* does not constitute wrongness, but only in certain circumstances. Our judgment depends on the circumstances, not on the irrationality.

Once more we are driven back behind the test which was proposed.

My purpose so far has been, by this very brief consideration of a few of the answers that might be given to our question, to help you to understand why I believe that it is impossible to construct a satisfying doctrine of moral obligation in the present day unless we push our inquiry back to the origin of moral ideas, and recognize that this origin cannot be accounted for by intuition, or conscience, or a divine command. It must be connected, I believe, with the results which were found in past experience to follow from different kinds of human conduct.

My answer to the question, therefore, would be on the following lines. Lying is an act which, in its very nature, endangers the conditions on which the possibility of social life depends. The communication of ideas, the imparting of information, however elementary, and whether by voice or by gesture, began to take place, not only among men but also among animals, as soon as any form of social life was developed. It is characteristic, not only of human life in the tribe or the clan or the family, but equally of animal life in the herd, the pack, the hive, or the nest. It was evolved for a definitely useful purpose; and I should imagine that at first it was naturally truthful, and that the deliberate use of it to convey false information, as when a bird tries to mislead an enemy as to the whereabouts of its nest, was a later development of the art. But whether that is so or not, such lying would be reserved for enemies, and truthfulness would characterize all communication within the social group. Any conflict between the individual and his group, however, brought with it the possibility of deception being practised within the group—the possibility, that is to say, of lying between those who should have been friends. Whether that took place at the animal level or not I cannot say, but if not it must have occurred early in human experience. And as soon as it occurred, there began the first movement, albeit an unconscious movement, towards the discovery that lying deals a blow at the stability of the social structure, that confidence is necessary for co-operation. It was a long and a slow process. The data were there from the very start, but the conclusion was not arrived at till much later, and anything like explicit recognition of that conclusion was of

course much later still. But, even so, that last stage may well have been reached several thousand centuries ago, and the great and uniform importance of the conviction has resulted in its being permanently established as part of the mental furniture of every normal person. It has gradually become stereotyped as the doctrine that lying is wrong, something that ought not to be done; and it has existed so long in that form, and its recognition as an induction from experience is by now so far back in the past of the race, that ordinarily we do not think of it as such an induction at all, but accept it without question as a dictate of conscience or a moral intuition.

I have taken the case of lying as an illustration, and I think it is a typical one. In all other fundamental kinds of immoral conduct, we have the same reasons, I believe, for being dissatisfied with explanations which look only at the experience of to-day or yesterday, and we must find the origin of our judgment in the slowly accumulated experience of the race in the far distant past, in inductions from that experience of which at the time perhaps no individual was explicitly conscious, and in the gradually acquired habitude of normal men and women to think and feel along the lines of these inductions without questioning them or inquiring how they had come to be made. Moreover, I cannot see why we should dislike such an explanation; it does justice to the fact of conscience, though it declines to start from it; and as regards the criticism that it makes morality relative to local conditions on this planet, and consequently deprives it of any absolute value, I shall have something to say later on. If we are content to acquiesce in the view that the acceptance of some positive or negative rule of human action over a considerable area—some particular taboo or sacrificial regulation—in which the obligation has at length come to be regarded as absolute and categorical, has arisen in this way, without feeling any need to postulate an original intuition or a divine injunction, I am unable to understand why it should be considered inadequate to apply similar treatment to the problem of those basic moral notions whose wider, and indeed almost world-wide, range of acceptance is due to the uniformity of human experience in certain fundamental relations.

It is important, in this view, to observe that, far distant in

the past as is the beginning of human life, yet to go so far back and no further is not sufficient. The foundations of morals had been laid before that, and human morality did not begin with a blank page. I have already referred to the fact that the distinction between truth-speaking and lying—between the imparting of correct and of misleading information—is already implicit in the conduct of animals; and the same may be said of other moral acts. Combination for the purpose of mutual protection as a means to safety supplies the seed of loyalty. Care for the young is the beginning of parental affection. The ant and the bee are proverbial examples of industry. There would seem to be a risk, in dealing with animals like dogs and horses, of our being misled by qualities which have been acquired through human companionship, and so it may be unwise to attach importance, in this connexion, to cases like the one recently reported in the press of a dog, rescued from a burning barn, who went back to die in the flames rather than be saved without her puppies; but the mother-love of the hen-bird, and the courage which it inspires, are not to be discounted on such grounds. I am not now maintaining, you will observe, that conduct of this kind in animals ought to be called moral; I put that question aside; I am merely asking you to recognize that definite ways of acting in definite circumstances must have been well established in our animal ancestry, and that when men first came on the scene they started with all the advantages that these conferred. We have lately become so familiar with the view that sin in human life is largely due to the survival of animal practices beyond the period of their usefulness that we tend to forget that these represent only one part of our animal inheritance. Our virtues, as well as our vices, can be traced back to a pre-human stage. In the course of biological and social evolution there emerged what we now call principles of conduct, and these principles were not only self- but also other-regarding. It is therefore a mistake to suppose that what I am putting before you implies the ridiculous notion that primitive man decided in favour of altruism after a careful calculation and comparison of the results to be obtained by selfish, or unselfish, conduct. Altruism was there already in many shapes and forms; and nothing more was required of those who brought their dawning intelligence to bear on the problem

than to see altruistic conduct for what it was and to recognize its indispensable social value. Moreover, the most elementary attempt to justify or condemn altruism on intellectual grounds cannot have been made until a comparatively late stage; throughout the immensely long preceding period, the permanence of altruism as one of the principles of conduct was guaranteed by biological and social necessity.

I have said far too little on this main point, but it is as much as time allows, and I hope that I have made myself intelligible. There are many other points to which I must pass on.

It may be objected that even if we can account in this way for the origin of certain crude moral notions, yet morality as we understand it to-day is much more than these, and cannot now be thought of as based upon any human experience, however prolonged, of the results of different kinds of conduct. No consideration, it may be said, of individual or social or racial utility would lead to the recognition of the importance which we now attach to motive and disposition as distinguished from positive action, or to our counting virtuous such devotion to an intellectual ideal as that of Browning's Grammarian, or again to our appreciation of such virtues as humility and reverence. With this view I entirely disagree. When conduct has begun, to however small an extent, to be guided by conscious thought, it is inevitable that men should think about the implications of their principles, and develop them further and further. This would be an extremely interesting point on which to enlarge, but I must content myself with a few remarks which may indicate the kind of reply that I should wish to give. (a) The discovery of the overwhelming importance of disposition and motive, although it must have occurred later than the consideration of mere action, was surely as inevitable as the other, even on the basis of social experience. (b) The view that, while the consideration of the results of conduct might have led to the general condemnation of certain actions, it would have failed to make men abstain from those actions as wrong whenever it seemed clear to them that *this time* the normal results would not follow, is sufficiently met, I think, by saying that this suggested practice—the practice of men's questioning the authority of the general custom in particular cases—is itself socially dangerous, and that a period of,

say, half-a-million years, which is long enough for the discovery that any action is harmful in general, is also long enough for the further discovery that it is necessary for the well-being of the community and the race that individuals should not question such general judgments on private grounds. (c) The idea involved in some actions or attitudes which we regard as high examples of virtue is often not simple but complex. Our admiration of the Grammarian is a case in point; it is compounded of our recognition of industry, unselfishness, modesty, self-dedication and the like as good qualities on the one hand, and of our recognition of the value of the study of language on the other. To put the two together and so arrive at a judgment about the virtuous quality of that particular life is, it seems to me, not more difficult or mysterious than to discover that the institution of slavery, which our Lord never discussed, is inconsistent with His teaching. Our theory does not require the world to wait for a large number of such high-minded Grammarians, and reserve its verdict until it has reached it as an induction from the observed results of their lives. (d) The higher developments of morality, unlike the fundamental notions, are dependent on the meditative insight of sensitive and thoughtful men and women. They are the work of individuals, not of the crowd. Sometimes the bulk of the people are led by these seers to the recognition of the newly-discovered truth, but at the best such an advance takes a long time. It would not surprise me to be told that four out of every five persons in this country regard the Grammarian as an old fool.

I have already pointed out that the theory for which I am arguing gives full recognition to conscience and moral intuition as facts, while at the same time it goes behind them. I also desire to press on your attention that it is in no way inconsistent with the association of morality and religion. Given the belief in a divine power controlling in any way the lives of men, it is an obvious step to regard moral rules as expressing the will of that power—as being in fact divinely ordained; and with the taking of that step a breach of the moral law becomes sin. The Old Testament is particularly helpful here; it shows us the Hebrews tracing each detail of their legislation to the direct promulgation of Jehovah, and it actually preserves for us their

traditional account of the occasion on which He recited the Decalogue. It was Jehovah who told them how much flour and how much oil to mix together for a meal offering, Jehovah who told them to celebrate harvest festivals, Jehovah who told them not to eat the flesh of the hare; just as it was Jehovah who forbade stealing and murder. In general, we find that the attribution of rules of morality to a divine will is a gradual process; at first, the regulations so attributed may be those only which are concerned with the community's worship, because that is the only part of its activity in which the god is supposed to be interested; at the other end of the scale of culture we cease to believe literally in traditions like that of the giving of the law on Sinai, but we still speak of the laws of God and of obedience to His will. Why need we find anything puzzling or mysterious in the use of such language? Where there is belief in a Creator of the world and of men, to speak in this way is surely natural and fitting.

The language is natural—yes, but is it true? Are we justified in believing that moral ideas, if they have arisen in the way I have described, have any connexion with the mind of God? For myself, at any rate, I answer that question definitely and emphatically in the affirmative. It is part of my faith that the totality of things, whether material or spiritual, in which we live and move and have our being, is a universe, a system which is coherent and self-consistent, in which there cannot be, in the last resort, contradictions or irreconcilable facts. I believe that God is one, the creator and sustainer of all, whose character and will are revealed alike in nature and its laws, in society and its conditions, in reason and its principles. Consequently it is for me as inconceivable that lying and theft and bad temper and laziness should be inconsistent with the possibility or with the smooth working of human society without being shown thereby to be contrary to the character of God, as it would be to suppose that there could be a universal law of gravitation which was not rooted in the divine will. If any kind of human action has come to be disapproved as a result of the accumulated experience of mankind, either that disapproval was a mistake and not justified, or else it was a discovery, so far as it went, of the nature of reality. That is one reason why I am not disturbed overmuch if I am told that my ethics are naturalistic; for what is nature

but the garment of God? and what can we possibly learn from nature, if we interpret it aright, but that which must bring us nearer to the understanding of the divine mind?

And there is another consideration which I would press upon your attention. Assuming that morality is rooted in the being of God, what conceivable way is there in which its principles could have been made known to men except by this very method of letting them be discovered through experience? Any alternative method of revelation—a writing on the wall, a voice from Sinai, a book fallen from the sky—is out of harmony with what we now believe to be the divine plan; and even if it were not, it would still have had to prove its sacred authority. The mere fact that it had come as a ‘bolt from the blue’ would be no demonstration that it was a special divine communication to mankind. But if, on the other hand, moral principles have been established in the way that I believe, they have an assured and trustworthy foundation; certainly I can think of no other foundation which would inspire me with anything like the same confidence. No revelation can prove itself to be divine by just claiming to be so; it can do it only by bringing coherence and consistency into our idea of the universe, and by strengthening in us the attitude of reverence and worship towards its Creator. I venture to claim that in so far as moral principles are made to rest on a basis which treats the results of conduct as strictly irrelevant, there is introduced an element of incoherence into our understanding of reality as a whole, because it is assumed that the order of nature, itself the sphere in which moral ideas must be realized, has a constitution which is independent of them.

From our point of view we are able to understand better the occasional revision of our judgments in regard to particular actions. The alteration of any elements in the fabric of social life may make some of the results of human conduct different from what they were before. An act or a state of being which was unobjectionable may thus become open to serious objection, or the reverse may happen. This means that an action which was formerly (and quite correctly) judged to be right will gradually pass over into the state of being judged (quite correctly) to be wrong, or *vice versa*. To take an illustration, which because of its extreme improbability will serve perhaps all the better to

make my meaning clear, if men should ever acquire the power to read one another's thoughts without being dependent on words and gestures, what we now call lying would become a matter of moral indifference, simply because no one would ever be deceived by it. This would not mean that any change had taken place in regard to that fundamental law of society which I have expressed by saying that co-operation depends upon confidence, but only in regard to its application. I do not suppose that moralists of any school of thought would find anything here to object to, in the abstract; but differences of theory do, I think, affect one's readiness to consider the case for revision in particular instances.

At the present time some changes of this kind appear to be gradually taking place. It is not my task to discuss these, and I content myself with asking you to note the condition to which I have referred. It seems to me that any particular prescription of our moral code ought to be re-examined—I do not say reversed, but re-examined—whenever there is good reason for thinking that important changes have occurred to alter the results which follow from the conduct concerned. It is hardly necessary to add that, even then, no one who is not qualified to take an intelligent and unselfish view, of a width and length to include the community of both to-day and to-morrow, can safely be regarded as having a useful opinion on the matter, and least of all those whose only interest is in their personal pleasure and amusement.

In case anyone thinks that I do less than justice here to the acknowledged canon of criticism that validity is not wholly dependent on origin, I may remark that I do not by any means overlook that fact, and that I should be prepared, if time allowed, to defend myself against the charge.

At the end we seem to have a conception of evil which is definite and distinct. Evil is that which, in the moral sphere, is disintegrative in relation to its environment. And this means much more than appears at first sight. It means that anything which in any respect is evil exists not through the power of the evil in it, but solely through the power of that in it which is good. A wholly evil thing would be shattered out of existence. It could not endure.

A person whose intentions are malicious always desires that the rest of society shall not act in accordance with the evil principles by which he guides himself. The liar does not want other people to tell him lies. The thief hopes that the rest of the world will act honestly. The fraudulent person finds his opportunity in the simplicity and the trustfulness of his fellow-men. The lazy person expects others to work. More than that, in any group that is constituted for an evil purpose, success depends on its possession of virtuous qualities within itself. As soon as it fails in this respect, it breaks up. And because there are always a tendency and a temptation to put into practice within the group those evil principles which it is intended to practise only in relation to the world outside, a group of criminals is of necessity unstable. There is always the likelihood that a band of assassins will begin to assassinate one another, and that the members of a robber gang will start robbing each other of their spoils. We refer to this when we talk of the need for 'honour among thieves.' One of the best, as well as best-known, examples of this kind of thing is contained in *Paradise Lost*. The rebel angels can be represented as organized and their power as formidable only because they are primarily the possessors of so many virtues, and have just a few vices thrown in. They are obedient to their rulers, resolute in purpose, brave in suffering, splendid in their loyalty. Let anyone try to envisage an army of devils, all of whom are completely devilish, and he will quickly realize that Milton had to do it in that way or not at all. It is significant as pointing to the true nature of evil.

I once asked a friend the following question. Suppose that God was wholly evil, but possessed of all knowledge; if He decided that, for his own private amusement, He would act for a billion years or so as if He were good, could we who lived during the experiment ever discover the true state of things? Is there any possible means by which we could 'find Him out'? My friend thought there was not: we could not tell the difference between such a state and the one which we believe to exist, till afterwards; and I think the answer is true so far as it goes. But is it not a more satisfactory answer that the condition of things postulated in the question is an impossible one? A God who was wholly evil could not be. We need have no fear on that

score. A house that is divided against itself cannot stand, but hath an end.

Such a view of evil is consistent with what I have tried to say in this paper, and indeed arises out of it. It helps to point the way in some practical questions which cause difficulty at the present time. It throws light, I think, on some of the problems that are raised by the doctrine of immortality. Lastly, it is startlingly orthodox; for to say that evil is that which is disintegrative, in the moral sphere, in relation to its environment is to say that it is the opposite of all that makes for coherence, for co-operation, for harmony, for friendship. The evolution of human society, it seems, has made it increasingly plain that the upward progress of life depends on a principle which is expressed at last in the supreme Christian virtue. In that sense, the ethical theory which I hold confirms in me my Christian faith that love is the key to the understanding of the universe. It is love that makes the world go round.

THE NATURE OF GRACE

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THE doctrine of grace is not only closely associated with the Christian doctrine of man but is so much an integral part of it that what Western theology from St. Augustine onwards meant by grace is intelligible only in the light of its more general view of the nature of man. It is therefore of the wider doctrine that I shall have now to speak. And as that doctrine was the chief concern of Western theology throughout many centuries and its sovereign achievement, any treatment of it which would be at all adequate ought to be largely historical. But as such a treatment would be impossible within the limits of this paper, I must confine myself to a statement of the doctrine in the developed form which it assumed at the highest point of mediaeval speculation.

It is hardly necessary to say that the mediaeval interest in man was predominantly religious. Its anthropology was without any direct scientific motive. It did not set out to provide a scientific account of the nature of man. Yet that is not to say that it was lacking in all scientific interest and value. On the contrary, it was elaborated with a jealously watchful eye on the facts as to man's status in the scale of being which were then known or knowable. Those facts were indeed interpreted through the medium of Revelation. But that by no means involved a mere confusion of observed fact with the data of Revelation. At least from Aquinas onwards, it meant simply that without those data the observed facts were found insufficient to explain even themselves. When science had exhausted its resources in rendering an account of man's nature, Revelation was needed to supply just the knowledge which was required to make its account self-consistent and fully convincing.

I.

The science of the Middle Ages was, like the science of our own or any other age, an attempt to make the world of things, the multifarious objects presented to our senses, intelligible.

Like ourselves, it took for granted that that world was intelligible. Like ourselves, too, it recognized that no individual object was intelligible by itself. The only possibility of knowing it was through its relations to other things. The mind, for instance, had the power of detecting those features which all the members of a particular group of things had in common and which were not shared by any individual outside that group. To distinguish those groups or kinds of things was a beginning of knowledge of the individual things comprised in each kind. But for the increase of such knowledge it was necessary that the process of mental separation or abstraction from the characteristics of individual objects should be carried further. Within the more general kinds it was possible to distinguish various subordinate classes, all the individuals of each class possessing, in addition to the characteristics of the more general kind, the specific difference peculiar to that class. Thus men and horses and elephants and a thousand other classes or species shared all the characteristics of the larger kind or genus, animal, while all the individuals of each class were characterized by the particular difference which made them into a single class. The specific difference of man, for instance, was reason. Man was a rational animal. In that definition, embracing the abstractions represented both by genus and species, you had a certain knowledge of every individual man, past, present or future. Now what is important is that what was thus known was conceived of as a reality, something actually existent in man and in each individual man. It was not a bare abstraction only, a mere figment of the mind. But again it had no existence of its own apart from things. It was not a Platonic idea. It existed only in things, and existed in them as the principle both of their intelligibility and of their existence. In this latter regard it was the *form* of the thing, the ordering principle or idea impressed upon a material substrate to make it just that particular thing. Thus each individual thing in the whole created order consisted of matter and form. But further, the created order was a world of continuous becoming, a constant process of generation and corruption. Everything was capable of becoming something higher in the scale of being or of becoming more fully itself. Every existent composite of matter and form could thus become matter of a

higher or fuller form. Regarded as matter, it was the mere potentiality of a higher type of being which was actualized by the assumption or impress of the higher form.

Now the importance of all this is its bearing upon the nature of our human knowledge. What we know does actually exist in things. Form and matter, potentiality and actuality, and the passing from one to the other, are actual elements in the becoming of all existence. And these phases of reality we can and do know by the mind's power of abstracting them from our sense-impressions. But they are all we know. The infinite depth and richness of the individual thing escapes us. If man is a rational creature, his intelligence is yet of the lowest order of intelligences. A perfect intelligence would not depend for its knowledge upon the roundabout process of abstraction, with its very imperfect results. It would apprehend in a momentary intuition the wholeness of reality. Such knowledge was impossible for man just because he was not a pure intelligence like the angels, but an intelligence dependent upon body for all the materials of its knowledge. Yet man was constituted with an insatiable thirst for knowledge. He could never be satisfied with the only kind of knowledge which was possible for him here *in via*. Only the knowledge, the immediate vision, of the Divine Perfections could satisfy him, and for that knowledge all his life here must be a preparation.

II.

Such was the conception of man's nature to which the doctrine of Grace had to be fitted. That doctrine as shaped by St. Augustine was a corollary of the doctrine of the Fall. For the East, prior to Augustine, it seems as if the tragedy of the Fall had centred principally, if not altogether, in man's loss of immortality, while the redemptive work of Christ was mainly the re-conquest of immortality. Even St. Paul might be interpreted benignly in this sense. 'As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive,' could be taken as governing his more uncompromising statements of the effects of Adam's sin. So, too, the gift of God, His free grace, was eternal life through Jesus Christ. Grace was almost a synonym for the whole Christian economy. As most fitly describing God's free gift of

newness of life through Jesus Christ, it was the natural antithesis of the Law which could only convict of sin and death. The economy of grace, of the new life with its almost natural dower of immortality, had so annulled the effects of the Fall that within its magic circle of renewing power man was henceforth able of himself to render true and in some sense even meritorious obedience to God. Christ had accomplished the work of redemption in the power of which the initiate were required to shape their own lives after His example. In some such circle of ideas Greek theology seemed to move, especially when, as in Chrysostom, it took on a mainly pastoral and practical character. Not Pelagius, but Augustine, was the innovator here.

Augustine discovered St. Paul, or at least he discovered the St. Paul we know. After him, no one up till quite recent times attempted to read St. Paul without the aid of Augustinian glasses. And what Augustine discovered was that St. Paul had taken the Fall seriously, and that therefore his doctrine of grace had a religious depth and fulness of which Greek theology had at the best no more than a distant glimpse. Whether he had interpreted St. Paul aright is a question which we need not now discuss. What matters is that his interpretation became the classical doctrine of grace which the whole of later Western theology accepted as alone bearing the hall-mark of revealed truth. Later theological systematization might indeed entail certain changes which seemed to modify the stringency of its statement. But the doctrine itself was definitely beyond the reach of challenge or criticism.

The root-conception of the Augustinian doctrine was the utter corruption of human nature which was the result of the Fall. As partakers in Adam's sin, all men were also sharers in his guilt. They were the born-thralls of sin, the predestined victims of God's avenging justice. They lay in the hell like sheep, incapable of one least movement even of desire for the Infinite Goodness which was yet the only satisfaction of their original created nature. From that universal impotence the free unmotivated mercy of God rescued those whom He had predestined to everlasting life. Stated in this schematic fashion, the doctrine has not unnaturally seemed rather an indictment than a justification of the Divine Goodness. Someone has described

the theology of Karl Barth as the 'theological form of atheism.' It is easy enough, I think, to see what is meant, and to see also how every Augustinian 'dialectic' of grace may lie open to the same condemnation. But this is not the way to do justice to a doctrine which in one way or another has been the nerve of almost every great revival of religious feeling throughout Christian history. Not only its value but its very meaning must be sought within those moments of feeling, and especially within the moment which first gave it birth. The anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine must be read in the light of his Confessions. The theologian must be interpreted through the saint. And here, as always, the saint is just the man who recognizes himself both as a sinner and as one who is being continuously rescued by a Power not himself from his sin. It is unnecessary here to elaborate the doctrine which St. Augustine in the light of that experience found in the teaching of St. Paul. We shall have occasion presently to consider some of its details as utilized by the mediaeval theologian. For the moment it will be sufficient to call attention to two points at which the Thomist theology diverges from its Augustinian heritage. For Augustine grace is the restoration of man's true nature. That nature had been sufficient to the true knowledge and the adequate service of God. The Fall had so vitiated that nature that it could neither know God nor serve Him unless and until the free act of His grace had restored its original power. And, secondly, the Augustinian theory of knowledge required for its effective exercise purification of spirit. Truth was apprehended only in virtue of a direct divine illumination of the human intellect. It was only in God, as that great seventeenth century Augustinian Malebranche put it, that we could perceive the truth of things. And as the intellect had suffered from the debilitating effects of the Fall, it was only grace that could restore that irradiation of the soul by the Sun of Truth on which all its real knowledge depended. There was nothing on which the Augustinians of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, from Anselm to Bonaventure, were more agreed than on this, that all knowledge depended on purity of spirit.

Now St. Thomas no more than anyone else who accepted the Christian Revelation denied that the Fall had weakened

man's intellectual power. Reason was inevitably obscured by the mists of inordinate passions and affections. But it had been weakened only, not radically injured. Besides, the Christian Aristotelians had an entirely different theory of knowledge. They rejected altogether the Neoplatonic and Augustinian intuitionism. For them all human knowledge was derived from the data of sense-perception. The knowing subject was not for them, as for the Platonist, a mind imprisoned in a body, but a mind informing a body and using it as a medium. But just because the mind was thus allied to body its reach was limited. It was not equal to the satisfaction of its native desire for the apprehension of absolute reality, for the attainment of ultimate truth. Yet that was its desire, and the satisfaction of it its blessedness. It could indeed of its own power, by the use of the first principles of reason with which it was endowed, the principles of contradiction and identity, of sufficient reason and the like, ascend from sense-data to a certainty of the Divine existence, even to a knowledge at least analogical of the Divine attributes. But the Divine essence, the inner mystery of the Divine nature, it could never know. Yet God had not left the desire for even that knowledge altogether unsatisfied. He had revealed it—revealed it, that is to say, so far as it could be revealed to the incorporate human intelligence—through such distant analogies as those by which the natural reason had already apprehended the Divine attributes. Thus Reason and Revelation represented the two grades of knowledge by means of which man could prepare himself here for that immediate vision of the Perfect Truth to which he could only fully attain hereafter.

Now to these two orders of knowledge, the naturally acquired and the revealed, there corresponded two orders in which man's whole life was set, the natural and the supernatural, the order of nature and the order of grace. The order of nature was the created order as it was shaped by the creative thought of God. But whereas man's share in that nature was conceived by St. Augustine as sufficient for the achievement of eternal blessedness, St. Thomas held that it had no such sufficiency. If man had never fallen, he would still have needed the help of grace to attain his true end of blessedness. While therefore for

Augustine the Fall was the total corruption of a perfect nature, it was for Aquinas at most the weakening of a nature which was of its very essence imperfect, which had always needed another order of nature to supplement and complete it. This is the outstanding difference between the pure Augustinian and the Thomist conceptions of grace, and it is easy to see how much that difference might mean. What for Augustine was but a Divine intervention in the religious domain became for Aquinas a feature of the metaphysical nature of reality. With St. Thomas the doctrine of grace, without for a moment losing its religious character, takes on a metaphysical character as well. Even the most repellent corollaries of the doctrine, like predestination and election, though of course accepted by him in all the formal rigour of their dogmatic content, lose at any rate something of their appearance of mere arbitrariness.

Let us consider for a moment his metaphysical use of the doctrine before coming to its more distinctly religious use. The whole of the created order, whether the order of nature or the order of grace, depends in every moment of its existence upon that same Divine activity by which it was first brought into being. Creation and conservation are but different temporal moments of the same timeless Divine act. God is present in the fulness of His essence and His power to every unit of His creation, be it stone or be it angel, in every moment of its existence. If for one moment He withdrew that presence of His from His universe or from any fragment of it, in that moment the universe or that fragment of it would drop into nothingness. This is necessarily so because God alone is self-existent Being, and every creature exists only by and in the measure of its participation in that Being. As such participation was the result of the Divine act of world-creation, so its continuance is the result of His unceasing act of world-preservation. Now in the order of nature that presence of God to His creation has no other purpose than that of enabling each creature to exist and act according to its specific nature. It asks for no recognition, no response, from the creature other than that of being itself, of functioning according to its special place and capacity in the hierarchy of being. It is the Divine *concursus*, God's self-accommodation, as it were, to the pace which He has Himself

set for each being. And all creatures, whatever their status in the scale of created being, whether stone or beast or man or angel, are beneficiaries of this Divine *concursus*. But there is another mode of God's presence to the created order. It is the mode by which God so imparts Himself to certain of His creatures that their whole nature is awakened in response to His presence, that they become capable of, and actually enter into, communion with Him. This is God's presence to His world in the order of grace. All spiritual beings, *i.e.* all intelligences, men and angels, belong at least potentially to this order of grace as well as to the order of nature. They are all at least capable of life in these two worlds.

But do all such intelligences actually belong to the order of grace? The answer to this question takes us to the very heart of the Thomist system. For St. Thomas, reason is the essence of the specifically human nature. And as such it exists and functions in virtue of the ordinary Divine presence to the order of nature, in virtue of that Divine *concursus* of which I have spoken. Man therefore, as mere man, does not need the assistance of grace. But, on the other hand, man is made for eternal blessedness, for the vision of God in which that blessedness consists. And the due preparation for that vision which is alone possible here does require the assistance of grace. If he is to achieve that vision, or rather to be in the way of achieving it, God must be present to him as a power awaking him to active response. Only when man is aware of an active desire for communion with the Supreme Goodness and the Supreme Truth has he made his entry into the supernatural order. And the very existence of that desire in him is the all-sufficient evidence that God has been already present with him with that presence which is altogether beyond His presence to the order of nature.

So then the supernatural order, the order of grace, is also the order of charity. Its specific character is the love of God, and the love of God is the exclusive gift of God. No least movement of desire towards God on man's part is possible without the prevenient act of God. The presence of God in grace was as necessary for Adam in his unfallen nature as it is necessary to retrieve us from the consequences of his Fall. And if we had never become victims of that Fall it would have still been

necessary for us. As a creature of the natural order man may gain the certainty of God's existence, may know God as a necessity of reason. But the love of God and the kind of knowledge which that love can give are not within the competence of mere reason, nor are they the result of the ordinary Divine concurrence with our reason. They are the result of a higher kind of participation in the Divine nature than that which is possessed by ordinary created nature. God must communicate Himself to us in an infinitely higher manner than is necessary for the ordinary purposes of His providence if we would gain and advance in that intimate knowledge of Him which we call love. And yet there is no divorce, no abrupt cleavage, between the natural and the supernatural orders. On the contrary, the supernatural depends for its very existence upon the prior existence of the natural. It is rooted in, it grows out of, the natural, not indeed by an automatic process, but inasmuch as both are effects of the operation at different levels of the same Eternal Will. Grace corresponds to nature even in its methods. Continuity and growth are characteristics of the one as of the other. The Divine urgency which is grace conforms itself to all the exigencies of natural process. If it forms virtues, it forms them as habitual states of the soul. It is beforehand with the activity of the human spirit, not only in some specially creative moment, but in the spiritual creativeness of its every moment. Or rather, it is the Divine action making every moment of the human spirit creative.

This is the general conception of the two orders, the natural and the supernatural, as it appears in the Thomist system. That conception, as I have insisted, holds good for a human nature which need never have been affected by the Fall. But naturally for the Christian thinker it is as it applies to man's fallen state that it is chiefly important. For if nature in its original perfection needed grace to supplement it, much more will a nature weakened and corrupted by sin. Nature, St. Thomas thinks, cannot desire God with that intimacy of desire which gives vision, real knowledge. God must first reveal Himself with that intimacy which will awaken the response of love before nature can become super-nature. Grace is just that intimate revelation. In its every form and degree it is God's revelation of Himself

in the innermost substance of the human spirit. The effect of grace in that spirit is an immediate awareness of God, through repentance, through faith, through the adhesion to Him which we call love. Now sin is the state of soul which makes that awareness still more impossible than it need be, which the more obstinately resists the illumination of grace. Its most disastrous effect is that it obscures the soul's vision, that it makes it content to dwell with the hidden things of darkness. Man must seek his own blessedness, and the deceitfulness of sin is that it is a seeking of that blessedness where it is not to be found, in the momentary enjoyment of the things of sense. Only the self-revelation of the true blessedness can overcome that fatal tendency of man to rest in the transient which the Christian tradition of belief has called original sin. That revelation need not be known save in its effects. But its most elementary effects, the first awakening in the soul of the desire of God, the first halting movement of faith, are irrefutable witness to its reality. It is an unsuspected theophany, the theophany of grace, that has made possible the faintest discontent with self that leads to repentance and newness of life.

III.

We are now perhaps in a position to sum up the doctrine of grace as formulated by St. Thomas. It had for him both a metaphysical and a religious character. It was an integral element in what Dr. Whitehead would call his 'metaphysical description' of created being. The whole created order has a relative independence of its Creator. Every creature has a particular nature which is a fragmentary phase or aspect of the infinite perfections of the Creator. In using that nature it is playing its part in the total economy of creation by showing forth one aspect of the Divine perfection. And the use of its own nature is the measure of its independence. Its activity is independent, but its being is not. It participates in being at all not only by the original act of Divine creation, but by the uninterrupted continuance of that act throughout every moment of its being. Nature, therefore, and every particular nature are immediately dependent upon a Divine prevenience, upon God's being at every moment beforehand with it to sustain it in being. This is as true of the rational

nature of man and of the still higher intelligences as it is of sub-rational creatures. Man uses that reason which is his specific nature in virtue of this ordinary Divine prevenience. But the nature of intelligence has no limits but the infinity of the intelligible. It cannot be satisfied until it has reached the innermost secrets of ultimate Truth. Now man's reason, by the very fact that it operates through a material medium, that it depends for its exercise upon the data of sense, is incapable of itself of reaching to pure intelligibles as they are in themselves. It sees them always through a distorting medium of material imagery. The journeying therefore of the reason towards God, the *itinerarium mentis in Deum*, requires an altogether other and higher kind of the Divine prevenience, the kind which is called grace. It is the special character of this prevenience that it awakens response. It does not merely sustain nature in its special mode of being. It heightens the specific rational nature of man into active response to the whole supernatural order. It makes him a denizen of that order, gives him an at-homeness in it. It gives him a power of gaining real knowledge of the secrets of that order, yet a knowledge which is still analogical only. St. Thomas indeed provides here for a kind of special Divine illumination, and so seems to approach the Augustinian theory of knowledge. But it is in appearance only that the approach is made. For man, for St. Augustine, has a natural intuition of God. Natural human reason, the reason of his unfallen nature, operates in virtue of a Divine illumination. If the Fall has obscured that light, grace disperses the cloud of sin which veiled its brightness. But for St. Thomas the illumination of grace is necessary to eke out all possible knowledge of the natural reason. And yet it is fitted into the framework of that knowledge, as it were. The whole supernatural edifice is built on the foundation of the natural. The illumination of grace is indeed a Divine gift. But it is the gift of an intensification of the knowledge which the reason has already acquired.

This then is the metaphysical account of the distinction and the interconnection of the two orders of nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural. It remains to consider the religious import of the doctrine. Man has a natural desire of God. *Cor ejus inquietum est donec requiescat in Deo*. And not only

in Deo, but *in Te*, in the God whom he can address. And yet that desire he finds he can never satisfy. However he explains that impotence, whether with Augustine by the fact of the Fall, or with Thomas by the incapacity of mere nature intensified by the Fall, it is there. Yet the impotence has been once and again removed. And wherever it has been removed, it is accompanied with the sense of a power which has been simply given and which is always given in the same way. It is as though the object of desire had itself come and removed the inhibition to man's knowledge of it. If It had not Itself come, it seems, It could never have been known. But now that It has come, It is known with that recognition of the heart which we call love. And as It not only comes, but remains, that knowledge of the heart grows, irradiating even the mind with some distantly-imaged knowledge of its nature. Life becomes a commerce between the recognizing soul and the gracious Presence which has given it the power to see. Through self-abasement before the majesty of that Presence it finds that it is gaining the power of abandoning itself to Its service, of finding its supreme happiness in that service. The capacity for that service, the growth of power in it, become a *habitus*, a habitual state of the soul supported by this Divine companionship. And always there is the certainty on the soul's part that its every movement towards good is but the response to a Power which it cannot resist because It is truly desirable and most authentically the object of its desire. That is what the theologians mean by grace, that God is felt as beforehand with us in every feeblest desire of Him, in every increase of that desire and of the knowledge of Him which it alone can give, in every advance in the power of doing His will. The order of grace is throughout the order of charity. It has its origin in God's gracious love to man, its effect in man's grateful love of God. It is *gratia gratum faciens*—the free act of God's love which makes man objectively pleasing to God and subjectively grateful to Him.

It is in its metaphysical, not its religious, aspect that the Thomist formulation of the doctrine of grace differs from the Augustinian. And that means, as I hope I have succeeded in showing, that it is not really in their doctrine of grace that Thomas and Augustine differ, but in their doctrine of man.

Augustine had the higher conception of human nature, of what it was capable of if it had not been guilty of self-betrayal. Thomas was both more realistic and more scientific. He saw more clearly man's place in the hierarchy of created beings, and more especially his place in the hierarchy of intelligences. As an incorporate intelligence, man was fundamentally incapable of that immediate and intuitive knowledge of the intelligible world which was possible for incorporeal intelligences and for them only. And as love depends on knowledge, as what is not known cannot be loved, the natural human reason as incapable of this knowledge in any adequate degree needed the supplement of grace, needed, that is to say, that God should reveal Himself to and in the soul before it could know Him. This schematization of the natural and the supernatural has to many religious minds been a stone of stumbling. Harnack is reported to have said that he would sooner abandon faith altogether than accept it. To others, however, it has seemed almost a revelation, the one view which was able to reconcile faith with the stark realities of man's very general indifference to his own blessedness.

It was, however, the religious aspect of the doctrine only that seemed important in later theological controversy. Luther, Calvin, Baius, Jansenius, St. Cyran and the rest returned with one accord to Augustine, but not to the neo-Platonic Augustine of the *Soliloquies* and the *Confessions* and the *De Civitate Dei*, but to the Augustine of the anti-Pelagian treatises. And the only metaphysic which Augustine developed in the course of the Pelagian controversy was a purely theological metaphysic of the kind that has often tried faith to the uttermost. St. Thomas of course accepted those corollaries of grace, predestination, election and the like, as fully as had St. Augustine, both because they were so indubitably data of Revelation and because they followed inevitably from the metaphysical attributes of God. But I incline to think that the Thomist conception of the natural and supernatural orders was meant to ease that tragic difficulty of Christian theology, the reconciliation of God's metaphysical with His moral attributes, and that it has in fact helped, if only in slight measure, to ease it.

THE EPIC AND THE TRAGEDIES OF CIVILIZATIONS

By Lt.-Col. Sir ARNOLD WILSON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

THE material for my theme is the recorded history of some sixty centuries. I have forty minutes in which to offer, with all humility, my contribution to current thought on a subject which has occupied from the earliest times the minds of the greatest, and many inferior, thinkers in successive ages.

For the purposes of this paper I define civilization, in the words of Matthew Arnold, as 'the humanization of man in society.' It is not a perfect definition, for it begs the question, but it will serve our purpose for the moment.

The thesis is many-sided, and two of its most important aspects I omit, namely,

- (1) The *Rôle* played by Religion in Civilization; and
- (2) The Crisis of Modern Civilization,

as they will be dealt with in other papers before this Conference.

I will begin by discussing the question 'Why have civilizations so often been characterized by impermanence?'

Let us remember, to begin with, what a very brief space of time is in reality covered by these 'civilizations.' 'The lives of but sixty old women,' to quote Thoreau,¹ 'say of a century each, strung together are sufficient to reach over the whole ground. Taking hold of hands, they would span the interval from Eve to my own mother. A respectable tea-party merely—whose gossip would be universal history.' Less fancifully, and reckoning three lives to a century, less than two hundred generations have lived and died since the beginnings of the first civilizations definitely known to us. Only a few thousand generations separate us from the earliest cave-dwellers. The torch of light and learning has burnt sometimes brilliantly, sometimes feebly, but it has nowhere been completely extinguished save perhaps once—when the civilization of Mexico was obliterated by a handful of Spanish bandits in a few years. A comprehensive policy, a carefully ordered financial system, a highly developed

¹ Shepard: *The Heart of Thoreau's Journals*. Allen and Unwin, 1930.

legislation, with administrative ideas and an economic and literary tradition of a high order, was so completely annihilated by a few cannons and hand-guns, that two centuries later the relics of the population retained not a memory of it all. Here indeed is unrelieved tragedy, for in the four succeeding centuries nothing of equal value has taken its place, nor is even in prospect. The tragedy was due, so far as can be seen, primarily to the paralysing influence of a religious speculation, which caused the Aztecs to accept the arrival of the Spaniards as the expected manifestation of the god Quetzalcoatl, and to the absence of adequate military forces for the defence of a civilization not less worthy of preservation than any that exists to-day. The moral is clear to me, but I will not press it, lest I be called to order.

Yet the case of Mexico and of the Aztecs is unique, and we must leave it to consider the great cultures of the Old World, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Here civilization has, it seems to me, been demonstrably continuous and its story an epic rather than a tragedy. It is a tale of human endeavour, and of human endurance, of the gradual emergence of the higher from the lower, by a process of evolution which we have every right to regard as purposive, and from which we are entitled to draw, with John Bright, the conclusion that 'notwithstanding all the immeasurable ignorance and stupidity of the majority of the race, there is a gradual and sensible victory being gained over barbarism and wrong of every kind.'

But this belief in the reality of Progress, which has been elaborately challenged,² amongst others, by Spengler, to whose views I will presently refer, is itself of comparatively recent origin. The idea of Progress has profoundly modified our ethical ideas. When Isocrates (400 B.C.) formulated the rule of life 'Do unto others,' he probably did not mean 'others' to include slaves or savages. The Stoics and the Christians extended its application to the whole of living humanity. 'In late years,' observes Bury in his book *The Idea of Progress*, 'the rule has received a vastly

² Cf. D'Israeli in *Tancred*, writing of Europe: 'In vain they baptise their tumult by the name of progress. The whisper of a demon is always asking them, "Progress—from whence and to where?"' The European talks of progress because, by an ingenious application of semi-scientific acquirements, he has established a society which has mistaken comfort for civilization.'

greater extension by the inclusion of unborn generations of the future.' This principle of duty to posterity is a direct corollary of the idea of Progress; it supports the administrator, and inspires the soldier; for this idea men and women will suffer as for no other. If the sole meaning of a concept is to be found in the consequences to which it leads, the idea of Progress is to be reckoned amongst the greatest that have inspired mankind, and the late Professor J. B. Bury's study of the subject must be regarded as a more valuable contribution to human thought by far than Spengler's confused pessimism.

The central thesis of Dr. Spengler's system as set forth in his *Decline of the West*³ is that the achievements of a culture are but the development of a destiny implicit in its earliest beginnings. The author visualizes the external world in its time setting as a process moving towards its predestined end by a law of internal necessity. His theory is that certain specific attitudes of mind towards the external world have worked themselves out in recorded time, their initial impulse developing, maturing and fading away like the life of an individual. He identifies five cultures that have in turn dominated the Old World—the Egyptian, the Classical, the Arabian, Gothic or Mediaeval, and the Western European. He describes, on lines which may not unfairly be described as fanciful, the specific quality of each of these cultures, and claims that the successive achievements of each culture were efforts to express a dominant attitude of mind, accomplished out of an inward necessity.

The fundamental defect of Dr. Spengler's system is that its conclusions stand in amazing contradiction to its premises. It is put forward as the only philosophy within the possibilities of the West-European mind in its next stages. So this West-European mind, whose outstanding quality is in its emancipa-

³ For a lucid summary and discussion of the Spenglerian philosophy of history see *Civilization or Civilizations*, by Goddard and Gibbons, 1926. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, who contributes an introduction, makes the following comment: 'It is a mistake to ascribe to natural "laws" any power to coerce the events they formulate. It is, no doubt, true that nations and civilizations rise and fall, but that they all do so may be a series of coincidences, due to different causes in each case. The decline and fall of a civilization may always be due to human stupidity and to a reiteration of the same fatal blunder, rather than to the blind necessity of an inexorable "law."'

tion from the world of sense, and in its pursuit of the infinite, is to be summed up in one philosophy, and that philosophy rigidly determinist.

This is not a reading of history with which I can personally concur, and even if we accept his view in its application to our own culture and to its probable ultimate decay, an intellectual conviction, based on a review of history, that in the end the rhythmic forces of the world that we term Fate will beat us, does not of necessity imply surrender here and now to despair. Even on Spengler's theory—which I am inclined to regard as the patriotic reaction of an *oberlehrer* to his country's defeat—we have no lack of life left in us yet. The material achievement of our own culture is so great that it will not soon be displaced : and so long as it lasts it is superior to anything else in the world, for it has a background of spiritual and philosophical beliefs which enable us to rise superior to the thought of remoter calamities. It is moreover implicit, and indeed explicit, in Spengler's work, that the so-called Great Cultures, such as ours, succeeded or are distinguishable from lower cultures of a type incapable of achievements such as those attained by Great Cultures, and that mankind may yet develop a civilization as superior to that of our day as is ours in advance of its predecessors, though he regards ours as capable of only a limited, though stupendous, development.

The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, to which I will now refer,⁴ is not less profound than Spengler's work, nor less wide in its range. The author, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, was born at Southsea in 1855, the son of a British Admiral, and of a daughter of that distinguished officer and writer, Captain Basil Hall, R.N. He made his home in Germany, and married a daughter of Richard Wagner. His earliest writings were on music : then came a work on botany, followed by a further work on music and by his *Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts*, which appeared in 1899 and had an immense circulation and influence in Germany, where eight editions had appeared by 1910. His patriotism was a burning belief in the future of the Teutonic race, in which he included this country. Whatever else may be

⁴ In my estimate of this work and Spengler I have drawn largely on contemporary critiques in *The Times Lit. Sup.*

said about it, this is one of the rare books that really matter. Few English readers can lay it down without the feeling that something serious has happened to them. If anything in literature can stir us, it is the conceptions that have been put before us, with the trumpet-note of passionate conviction, bidding us gather round a new centre and obey, not a new law, but a principle which has unconsciously guided most of us and our forefathers.

Out of many passages in which the fundamental thesis of the book is stated, I have selected for quotation one from his section on 'The Sacredness of Pure Race.' Mr. Chamberlain here explains himself as follows :

SACREDNESS OF A PURE RACE.

'Here we touch upon a deep scientific fact; we are touching upon the revelation of the most important secret of all human history. Every one comprehends that man can in the true sense of the word only become "man" in connection with others. Many, too, have grasped the meaning of Jean Paul's profound remark, that "only through man does man enter into the light of day"; few, however, have realised the fact that this attainment of manhood—this entry into the light of life—depends in degree upon definite organic conditions, conditions which in old days were observed instinctively and unconsciously, but which, now that owing to the increase of knowledge and the development of thought the impulses of instinct have lost their power, it becomes our duty consciously to recognise and respect.

'I have already shown from examples taken from methodical animal breeding and from human history how race arises and is gradually ennobled, also how it degenerates; what, then, is this race if not a collective term for a number of individual bodies? It is no arbitrary idea, no abstraction; these individualities are linked with one another by an invisible but absolutely real power resting upon material facts. Of course, the race consists of individuals; but the individual himself can only attain to the full and noblest development of his qualities within definite conditions which are embraced in the word "race." This is based upon a simple law, but it points simultaneously in two directions. All organic nature, vegetable as well as animal, proves that the choice of the two parents is of decisive influence upon the individual that is born; but besides this it proves that the principle prevailing here is a collective and progressive one, because in the first place a common parent-stock must gradually be formed, from which then, similarly step by step, are produced individuals who are on an average superior to those outside such a union, and among these again numerous individuals with really transcendent qualities.

'Now what must not be lost sight of in the case of the human race is the circumstances that the moral and intellectual qualities are of preponderating importance. That is why in men any want of organic

racial consistency, or fitness in the parent stock, means above all things a lack of all moral and intellectual coherence. The man who starts from nowhere reaches—nowhither. The individual life is too short to be able to fix the eye on a goal and to reach it. The life of a whole people, too, would be too short if unity of race did not stamp it with a definite, limited character, if the transcendent splendour of many-sided and varying gifts were not concentrated by unity of stem, which permits a gradual ripening, a gradual development in definite directions, and finally enables the most gifted individual to live for a super-individual purpose.'

That is the root idea. The great things of the world are done by individuals who have a strong personality, and by races which have a strong race-personality.⁵ Now, over against this idea, and in eternal hostility to it, Mr. Chamberlain sets another idea, or something which is half idea and half a concrete fact with a definite historical genealogy, and this something he calls 'The Chaos.' What is 'The Chaos' historically? Its genealogy goes back 'to the countless thousands of liberated slaves from Africa and Asia, to the jumble of various Italic peoples, to the military colonies settled among them from all countries of the world'; in short, to 'the Chaos of Peoples which the Empire so ingeniously manufactured.' The fatal thing is that the great heritages of Greek art, of Roman institutions, and of Christian religion have come to us not in their purity, but as they were handled and transformed by this motley crowd of denationalized half-breeds. This, and not the irruption of the Goths, was the true downfall of the classical civilizations. When pure race disappeared, man stood alone; his earthly life was emptied of value; the value was sought in superstition and in dogmas founded on Greek philosophy misunderstood, and the bond of union with one's kind in a 'universal' ecclesiastical organization. And thus the Chaos acquired for itself an 'idea.' It was, and is, no longer a mere geographical or historical fact. Fragments and processes of it extend everywhere, and are everywhere in conflict with the true shaping of forces of European life and European religious thought. It is the mother of all superstitions, all intolerances, all vain dogmatisms on ultimate things, all Socialistic or Imperialistic tyrannies—in short, of all Absolutism, for Absolutism, in thought or in practice, is the very soul of the Chaos; therein lies the only cohesive and propagat-

⁵ Cf. Horace, '*Fortes creantur fortibus et bonis.*'

ing force it can ever attain. Such is Mr. Chamberlain's analysis of 'The Chaos.'

All subsequent European history is conceived by Mr. Chamberlain as the conflict of life and order with 'The Chaos,' and the gradual redemption of the human spirit from it. This redemption is accomplished by the formation and assertion of the principle of race. And the leadership of Europe is conceived by him to be vested in a particular race, which he calls the 'Teutonic.' Mr. Chamberlain's use of this designation must not be misapprehended. By the Teutonic people he means, broadly, those who have best preserved the Great Aryan traditions—the principles of civil liberty, of free creative energy in all departments of life, tolerance of intellectual differences, loyalty to chosen leaders, spirituality and imaginative ardour in their conception of the universe. Since the fall of the classical nations these traditions are represented by the Northern peoples—Scandinavians, Celts, Goths, Franks, Germans, and the older and pure Slavs, all of whom he includes under the title Teutonic, simply because, if one must have one designation for them all, it is natural to take that designation, as we take the name English, from that of the leading stock.

To Mr. Chamberlain the critical issue in the conflict of Teutonism with 'The Chaos' lies in this, that when the Teuton came into Southern Europe, 'a child among old experienced libertines,' 'The Chaos' subdued him, and impressed upon his spirit alien ways of thought, alien religious conceptions, which turned aside the proper development of his genius. As against the Jew, on the other hand, the Teuton succumbs in many fields of action by virtue of one of his own noblest and most profound characteristics. A mighty and invincible worker and fighter in all things that appeal to his soul, to his ideals, he is careless of those that do not—he cannot bring himself to take them seriously. Hence the business of money-making, the organization of popular amusements, the popular Press, commercial literature, commercial art, and the stage tend more and more to fall into the hands of the now emancipated Jew, whose enormous will-power and absence of disturbing ideals (outside the definite and narrow sphere of his religion) enable him to triumph easily in all these fields and so to impress on the surface of Aryan life

a wholly un-Aryan physiognomy. In the conflict of Teutonism with 'The Chaos,' Mr. Chamberlain summons us to complete the victory half won at the Reformation by a deeper apprehension of the Christianity of Christ and by the fitting of that Christianity into the framework of the Kantian philosophy. Protestantism, in his view, is even now only keeping itself afloat on rafts constructed out of the wreckage of Romanism.

Houston Chamberlain would, I think, certainly claim that the major cause of the decay of civilizations in the past has been the decay of racial purity, the failure to maintain racial standards, the perversion of racial ideals. To him an internationalism which, by obliterating nationality, produced a new Chaos, would be an abomination. He would regard the system of caste as practised by Jews, and by Brahmins, as the truest means of ensuring the upward progress of the human race, both physically, mentally and spiritually; and he would, I believe, find that the scientific investigations of the last two decades tended to support his dislike of mixed marriages, which is typical of Teutonic peoples. 'Le Coeur,' said Pascal, 'a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas.' Chamberlain's views appeal to me as the expression, albeit one-sided, of a profound truth to which I can wholeheartedly subscribe.

Another view, complementary to those of Spengler and Houston Chamberlain, was elaborated⁶ by the erratic genius of John Brownlee, M.D., the possessor of a knowledge of many things outside the field of medicine, and who was at one time Director of the Statistical Department of the Medical Research Institute at Hampstead. He claims that the available evidence is wholly in favour of a rhythmic change in the life history of man, founded on a biological process. 'Rome,' he writes, 'may be taken as the type of empire to which all more or less conform. Here, from the time of the founding of the City till that of the Caesars, we have the alternation of energy and lassitude which should be expected if this thesis is found substantial.' For exact evidence he turns to modern Europe. In English history he finds five waves of expansion, with four intervening periods

⁶ *Germinal Vitality*. A Study of the Growth of Nations as an instance of a hitherto undescribed factor in Evolution. Royal Philosophical Soc. of Glasgow, 1908.

during which there was no national response to the intellectual action of the few great men who lived or ruled during these times of depression.

The first period of energy is represented by the invasion of the Angles and the Saxons: the fruits of this period were seen in the conquest of the Britons (450 A.D.—550 A.D.). A second crest in the wave of Saxon expansion is the period of the foundation of the Kingdom of Wessex (650—800), followed by a retrogressive period when the Danes ravaged the land. This period of depression lasted for several centuries. There was nothing to indicate that the English had any future, and the Norman Conquest proceeded with an ease which would have been impossible a few centuries earlier.

It was of this period of English history that Milton wrote in 1670 (though with special reference to conditions in his own day) as follows:

'Valiant, indeed, and prosperous to win a field; but, to know the end and reason of winning, impudicious and unwise. In good or bad success, alike unteachable. . . . Hence did their victories prove as fruitless as their losses dangerous; and left them still languishing under the same grievance that men suffer conquered: which was indeed unlikely to go otherwise; unless men more than vulgar lured up, as few of them were, in the knowledge of ancient and illustrious deeds, invincible against many and vain titles, impartial to friendships and relations, had conducted their affairs.

'Many whose ignorance was more audacious than the rest were admitted. . . . to bear no mean sway among them, both in church and state. . . . What could be expected. . . . but confusion in the end.'

It is difficult not to apply these words to our own day. The depressed period of the fifth to the twelfth century was followed by a heroic age—that of the Edwards. From this time to the end of the reign of Henry VII came a period of quiescence, marked by a stationary population. During the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth, the population doubled itself. It was another heroic age, marked by foreign conquest, literary brilliance, and philosophic adventure. With the accession of James I the increase of population came to an end, if indeed it was not followed by a decrease. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the last wave of increase began; it reached its height during the middle of the nineteenth century, and is now declining. Like its predecessors, it was marked by brilliant achievements in every field of action and thought.

Brownlee gives detailed figures in support of the foregoing contentions, and refers at length to similar phenomena in the history of the Empires of France and of Spain, to which no allusion can here be made. He considers (writing in 1908) that we are now passing again into the intellectual atmosphere of another eighteenth century. This, he says, cannot be avoided; it is a symptom of the lack of the necessary nervous energy which makes men display that independence of trifles and intolerance of convention which characterize a creative age.

He regards the heroic periods in our history as short periods of germinal vitality, associated with a high birth-rate rather than a low death-rate, and probably with greater physical (and consequently mental) strength. Such periods are preceded by longer ones during which energy is stored up in such a manner as to result in germinal efficiency. Such efficiency does not necessarily express itself in great fertility, but in alterations of the germinal plasm which, in suitable environment, may produce individuals of exceptional powers. Rapid increase in numbers, he adds, may induce germinal weakness so marked as to require a long period of rest in order to re-establish metabolic equilibrium. If germinal vitality is present, war, plague and famine have little effect on numbers: if it is absent, good conditions do as little to produce an increase.

Brownlee's hypothesis is of profound interest: I have referred to it very briefly, and I am unable to say whether it has been developed more fully by other writers. It is not alluded to by Spengler, though he was clearly thinking on somewhat similar lines. It cuts across Chamberlain's views, for Brownlee does not attempt to discuss the question of race. There is clearly room for a much fuller study of the matter, on scientific lines, than has yet to my knowledge been attempted.⁷

Yet the fall of successive civilizations—Sumerian, Assyrian, Persian, Chinese, Aztec, Maya, Egyptian, Cretan, Hittite, Greek and Roman—is a historic fact, and it is in every sense tragic, in the sense in which the word tragedy is defined in the O.E.D., *viz.* 'an unhappy or fatal event, or series of events in real life.'

⁷ *The Problem of Decadence*, by J. M. Milner (Williams and Norgate, 1931), reached me, unfortunately, too late to utilise in this study. It is a serious and illuminating study that will repay careful reading.

But it is possible, and even probable, that we over-estimate the extent of the tragedy of the loss of human happiness and of virtue that was involved by these events. How little the memory of the fall of early civilizations affected Greek philosophers may be gathered from the remark of Thucydides that before his time nothing of significance had happened, and he was no mean exponent of the art of history. It is not an uncommon attitude with 'advanced' politicians to-day, but happily rare in other walks of life. Yet it is a useful reminder to us that the historian is seldom able to envisage the effect on human happiness and welfare of the rise and fall of empires. Moreover, the inevitable tendency of historians to dramatize events in the long-distant past has given currency to many false impressions. It is by no means true that 'barbarians' suddenly 'broke into' the highly-civilized Roman Empire, and brought down on men the 'night of the Middle Ages.' Europe to-day owes more to the Goths than to Rome. It was the Teutonic people that saved the Western Empire from being laid waste by Huns. It was the first care of Theodoric, the Eastern Goth, to protect and restore the monuments of art that Theodosius and his tools, the Christian fanatics, had done so much to destroy. Religious toleration was the principle of the Goths, and it was under Goths, not Romans, that the great Christian missionaries worked most successfully. From the Goths came new noble races, new languages, and a new culture. Dante was of Gothic parentage.

The invasion of Persia by fanatical Arabs in the seventh century involved the destruction of much that was good: it involved the disappearance of a faith that was in many ways more lofty than Islam. The people at large accepted the new faith mainly because the old faith was associated in their minds with priestly oppression. The ancient books of Persia were consigned to the flames—in such vast quantities that the public baths in the principal cities required no other fuel for many months. But Persia was revived and rejuvenated, and in succeeding centuries was more influential than ever.

The invasion of Persia and Mesopotamia by Chinghiz Khan and Tamerlane in the fourteenth century entailed the massacre of nearly a million townfolk, and the complete destruction of the principal centres of civilization. Yet the conquerors saved

all craftsmen, built fine buildings and encouraged the arts and crafts with results that had no parallel since Sassanian times. Two centuries later Persia was more powerful than ever before.

But I must not stress this point further. That civilizations have been impermanent is not in doubt, but we are apt to exaggerate the loss to humanity involved in the downfall and decay of one civilization and the rise of another. The fall of empires must not be identified with the extinction of civilizations.

Neither Spengler nor Houston Chamberlain deal with climatic and economic factors. It has been suggested that the increase of malaria was one of the primary causes of the decay of Rome. The introduction of new diseases, zymotic and venereal, into the South Sea Islands, against which the inhabitants had no innate powers of resistance, is known to have caused great havoc in our own day. Something of this kind has happened with the aboriginal inhabitants of Patagonia. We know, too, that when unsophisticated races come in contact with western civilization, their will to live, and to reproduce their kind, sometimes seems for some obscure reason to fail.

Again, economic factors have probably always been of great importance, but very obscure. It seems, however, fairly clear that all forms of national prosperity which arise from the levying of tribute from foreign possessions, or from the possession of slaves, whether direct as in past days, or indirect, as in more recent times, are full of peril to the national character, and eventually to the stability of a civilization. Plato is emphatic on the subject (*Laws IV*, 704. Jowett's Translation).

'Had you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, some mighty saviour would have been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to have a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance of manners. . . . The sea is pleasant enough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish quality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and begetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways. . . . There is a consolation, therefore, in the country producing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of the soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been abundance, there might have been a great export trade and a great return of silver and gold, which, as we may safely affirm, has the most fatal results on a state whose aim is the attainment of just and noble sentiments.'

I believe the type of prosperity, to which Plato refers, to have been a less important factor in the growth than in the ultimate

downfall of nearly all empires and civilizations of the past. Time was once considered one of the dimensions of excellence. A great and worthy civilization is a product of slow growth: it requires the existence of a population a considerable proportion of whom are beyond the reach in ordinary circumstances of cold and hunger, and of a leisured, enlightened, and travelled class, who can in some measure transmit their acquired characteristics from generation to generation, and be patrons of the fine arts and of literature, and of science and philosophy. Such a class, where it exists, creates a civilization, endows schools, and colleges, and subsidizes the best craftsmen and artists, and encourages every beneficent work. Its scions have, in every age, represented their country abroad, and sought to spread to other countries the civilization of which their ancestors were the begetters, and of which they are the accredited agents and representatives. They have endeavoured, at the sametime, to impart to other races the religious or ethical principles of their own nation. The British in India declared from the outset their intention to 'tolerate' all religions: though they opposed Christian Missions, they suppressed *sati* and other forms of self-immolation and self-torture, frowned on immemorial practises inconsistent with the highest standards of western propriety, regarded with horror the indifference to suffering of human beings and animals displayed by the ruling classes of the populace, and sought to impose their own ethical standards in all matters, whether by legislation or otherwise. We have done and are still doing likewise in Mandated Territories; hence some, at least, of our troubles.

Yet such a civilization contains, it would seem, the seeds of its own decay, owing to the danger implicit in that petition in the Litany, 'In all time of our wealth . . . *Good Lord deliver us.*' The dangers of wealth, the folly of men newly enriched, the profligacy of the heirs of wealthy men, and the evil effect of the examples set by such men on the rank and file of society—'envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness'—have been the subject of satire and passionate denunciation in every civilization, and especially at a period when such a civilization seemed to be at its height. I will not attempt to cite examples; many will occur to you all. The Bithynian praetor, whose justice has been immortalized by Catullus, has had his successors in every

colony and in every age. When the Roman civilization was at its height, the elder Cato drove the usurers out of Sardinia (*Livy XXXII, 27*): it was generally thought that he was too severe (*asperior tamen in fenore coercendo habitus*), and it is highly probable that he violated every sound economic law, and ended by doing more harm than good, but the references show that the problem was an urgent one.

The Roman civilization, too, had to face the problem of trusts; there existed 'coalitions of rival companies, in order jointly to establish monopolist prices' (*Mommsen III, ch. 12*). Things are probably, almost certainly, better now than they were two thousand years ago, but we must admit that we have yet to learn to use wealth with wisdom, and on the solution of this problem, whether by the individual or by that modern and dubious entity 'the State,' depends, in my judgment, the maintenance or decay of our civilization. 'Popular governments,' wrote Froude, 'have hitherto uniformly glided into democracies, and democracies uniformly perish of their own excess.' Gibbon remarks that 'corruption is the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty.'

Another problem very closely allied to the wise expenditure of wealth is the right use of leisure. The misuse of leisure by the people at large seems to be symptomatic of the decay of a civilization. The followings is an extract from Tacitus (*de Oratore*):

'Again, there are the peculiar and characteristic vices of this metropolis of ours—the passion for actors, the mania for gladiatorial shows, and horse racing. When the mind is engrossed in such occupations, what room is left over for high pursuits? How few are there whose home-talk runs to any other subjects than these. What else do we hear our younger men talking about whenever we enter their lecture-halls. And the teachers are just as bad. With them, too, such topics supply material for gossip more often than any others.'

This passage might have been written to-day: it was actually penned about A.D. 50, when the Roman civilization was at its height, but decay had begun to set in. I will not, however, touch further upon this question; it was adequately dealt with at this Conference last year. I repeat that on the right use of leisure, and of wealth, mainly depends to-day the maintenance of a civilization. If we can use these gifts aright, then we can bear material prosperity without moral deterioration.

Apart from, but connected with, the use of wealth and leisure is the tendency, recently pointed out by Mr. H. W. Nevinson, who in his seventy-fifth year is one of the freshest minds in Fleet Street, very noticeable in current literature on educational subjects, to extol and exalt a standard of living which is purely cerebral. It is the cause of much unhappiness and discontent. The glories of modern science, of all art, of architecture and music, and the compassionate arts of surgery, and even of medicine, depend ultimately on the use of our faculties, our eyes, our voices, and especially our hands. A purely intellectual standard of life entails misery, futility, and eventual decadence. Literary men, professors, thinkers, philosophers, preachers, teachers, and politicians have their place in life, but skilled manual workers are the real creators of a civilization. A discerning and sympathetic estimate of the interdependence of the various classes of a civilized community was given some 2,000 years ago by the son of Sirach.⁸ Keen eyes and able hands are the real expression of good brains, and it is on the shoulders of

⁸ Cf. *Ecclus.* xxxviii, v. 24 to end :

‘The wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure : and he that hath little business shall become wise.

‘How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough, and that glorieth in the goad, that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labours, and whose talk is of bullocks?

‘He giveth his mind to make furrows ; and is diligent to give the kine fodder.

‘So every carpenter and workmaster, that laboureth night and day ; and they that cut and grave seals, and are diligent to make great variety, and give themselves to counterfeit imagery, and watch to finish a work :

‘The smith also sitting by the anvil, and considering the iron work, the vapour of the fire wasteth his flesh, and he fighteth with the heat of the furnace : the noise of the hammer and the anvil is ever in his ears, and his eyes look still upon the pattern of the thing that he maketh ; he setteth his mind to finish his work, and watcheth to polish it perfectly :

‘So doth the potter sitting at his work, and turning the wheel about his feet ; he applieth himself to lead it over ; and he is diligent to make clean the furnace :

‘All these trust to their hands : and every one is wise in his work.

‘Without these cannot a city be inhabited : and they shall not dwell where they will, nor go up and down :

‘They shall not be sought for in public counsel, nor sit high in the congregation : they shall not sit on the judges’ seat, nor understand the sentence of judgment ; and they shall not be found where parables are spoken.

‘But they will maintain the state of the world, and (all) their desire is in the work of their craft.’

those who can make the fullest use of their bodily powers that civilization chiefly rests. Such men give the lie to the dreary theories that blight human progress, invented by literary people who have long since lost the use of their hands, by which alone we keep a grip on reality. If modern education had insisted more on hands than brains, civilized man would be more independent and therefore happier, and less prone to believe that the individual has an indefeasible claim on his fellows, in the person of 'the State,' independently of any services he may have rendered, or be rendering to it. The weakness of the Hadow Reports,⁹ in my humble opinion, lies in the failure adequately to emphasize this side of life. The results of the present system are for all to see: vast numbers of poverty-stricken intellectuals, who cannot use their hands to any useful purpose, men unable to paint their houses, or to effect even the simplest repairs, unable to understand what is wrong with the simplest mechanism, and obliged to call upon a semi-skilled workman to perform the simplest task. Women unable to sew, or cook, or to look after children, and who are miserable because they cannot afford to pay others to serve them.

This brings me to another important aspect of our civilization, namely, the use of machines. The increasing use during the past hundred years of steam and electric power, and of machines, is having effects upon those nations mainly concerned analogous in some respects to the effects of slavery—that Nemesis of Nations. It has resulted in cheap imports of articles that could formerly be produced locally with difficulty, or not at all. It is no new phenomenon, but one of such recent growth that we have not by any means adjusted the mechanism of our civilization to it. In the year 1835, shortly after the introduction of the machine, the Viceroy of India (Lord Auckland) wrote: 'The misery is scarcely paralleled in the history of trade. The bones of the cotton weavers whiten the plains of India.' That was on a larger scale a repetition of the misery caused everywhere by the sudden introduction of mechanical means of production. The indirect effects were worse, for they affected all subsequent generations—the change of status from that of independent in-

⁹ *The Education of the Adolescent*, 1926, 2/-. Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary Schools, 1931. 2/6 net.

dividuals, living for the most part on the country, to that of weekly wage-earners, herded in towns, and divorced from the land. They are no doubt better fed and better clothed, but they have lost something essential to the maintenance of a true civilization. Yet there is nothing fundamentally new in our economic position to-day, however much it may differ in appearance, from conditions in former times. No less hardship was caused by the change from trade by barter to trade by means of money and bills of exchange, by the Enclosure Acts, by the change from road to rail and by the adoption in this country of the principle of Free Trade. As Houston Chamberlain says (ii, 364):

‘Only when we have learned to recognise the essential features of our own character at work everywhere in the past, shall we be able to judge correctly the economic position of our present age.’

To build upon the past is not to copy—we have indeed no other course open to us. We have adjusted our present civilization to new phenomena in the past, and we can do so again. Unchanging political theories or institutions are no more possible than unchanging species. What is living is subject to change; what is stationary has lost the power of adaptation and in a changing world must die. Civilizations in the past have changed their outward forms, whilst retaining too much of the old spirit: we in this country have generally chosen the better way. We have retained the old forms but changed the spirit, thus endowing them with fresh life and reality. The principal criterion by which legislative and other developments are to be judged in their relation to the maintenance and growth of our civilization is: are they elastic, do they contain the seeds of growth, or are they calculated to check, limit, enfeeble, or stunt, human initiative and individual enterprise? Recent legislative changes, which have tended to make a great proportion of the nation look to ‘the State’ to provide for them from the cradle to the grave, have their counterpart in previous ages. The results have invariably been disastrous.

Tragedy, says Aristotle, is a vent for the particular emotions of pity and fear. It excites emotion only to allay it. Pity and fear, artificially stirred, expel the latent pity and fear which we bring with us from real life, or, at least, such elements in them as are disquieting. In the calm which follows when passion is

spent, an emotional cure (*Katharsis*) has been wrought. In his preface to *Samson Agonistes*, Milton, with the intuition of a poet and the erudition of a scholar, quoted Aristotle on the subject with approval and understanding. My own conviction is that what Aristotle said of tragedy is true of war, and of other human tragedies; they are a necessary *Katharsis*, expelling from the system of nations much that is evil, and bringing in its train much that is good.

Bearing this in mind, let us follow the advice of Pericles, 'esteeming courage to be freedom, and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war.' But in following this advice let us, in the twentieth century, place a wider interpretation on these words. Freedom is above all things necessary to human progress and human happiness, not merely political freedom, which is often merely the shadow of the reality, but individual freedom—the growth of free-will and liberty to the individual to think, to act and to choose subject to a minimum of external obligation. We are to-day not so far as we may think from the state of those men referred to in *Wisdom* xiv, 21, 22, who, 'serving either calamity or tyranny . . . lived in the great war of ignorance, those so great plagues called this peace.'

In considering Pericles' advice let us, moreover, bear in mind that peace, by itself, is rather the negation, the absence of war, than its antithesis, and as such offers by itself no such action and no such exalted inspiration as war may offer, unless it be regarded as a means, a condition for some higher end. The true antithesis to war is the shepherd spirit, at present nascent, weak, but growing in man. Its ideal is freedom for all, freedom for life and spirit, freedom from the wolf. The too little studied allegory of The Wolf and the Shepherd, preserved in the Gospel of St. John, was, as we are expressly told, not understood at the time and has been generally misinterpreted since. The Shepherd spirit furnishes at once an antithesis to aggressive war, a sanction for defensive war (not necessarily in defence of our own freedom), and, at last, a cure for war. Let us not emphasize unduly the tragic element in the life of the individual, nor identify the fortunes of a particular race with that of God's purpose as expressed in a civilization. It may well be that, as in the Greek torch race, he who passes on

the light attains the fairest prize in the Great Hope,¹⁰ and that the individual, or the nation, that perishes in the cause of human freedom is fulfilling God's purpose more amply than in any other manner. We labour blindly, not knowing the event. That knowledge is with the God, and none may fathom His purpose. If we have worked well and faithfully, then it is well with us, though our labour may seem to have been in vain. As William Cowper wrote in one of the finest hymns in our language, 'God is His own interpreter, and He will make it plain.' Alike to the wise and foolish, coward and valiant, gentle and simple, the God assigns the task and the reward. Let us say with Nietzsche :

' By my love and hope I conjure thee :
 Throw not away the hero in thy soul !
 Keep holy, thou, thy highest hope ! '

¹⁰ ' *Augescunt aliae gentes, aliae minuuntur,
 Inque brevi spatio mutantur saecula animantum
 Et quasi cursores vitae lampada tradunt.*'

(LUCRETIVS, *De Rer. Nat.* ii, 77-79.)

THE RÔLE OF RELIGION IN CIVILIZATION

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OPINION is much divided as to the part that religion plays in civilization. I think it well to introduce the theme by citing some of these conflicting views. I shall begin with Buckle. Buckle may be old-fashioned : but he was a scientific historian, and his *History of Civilization in England* has had very considerable influence in forming opinion. This is as much due to his lucidity and courage as to his desire to be strictly scientific. I am citing isolated sentences, not continuous paragraphs. But the passages cited do, I think, represent his conclusions correctly. Buckle writes :

‘The opinion of many persons’ that Religion is one of ‘the prime movers of human affairs’ ‘is altogether erroneous.’

‘Religion is among “the effects,” not “the causes,” of civilisation.’

‘There is no instance of a progressive country voluntarily adopting a retrogressive religion : neither is there any example of a declining country ameliorating its old religion.’

‘We may as well expect that the seed should quicken in the barren rock, as that a mild and philosophic religion should be established among ferocious savages.’

‘It is impossible that a highly civilised people should ever embrace a religion of which the glaring absurdities set reason and doubt at defiance.’

‘Religious opinions which prevail in any period are among the symptoms by which that period is marked. When the opinions are deeply rooted, they do, no doubt, influence the conduct of men ; but before they can be deeply rooted, some intellectual change must first have taken place.’

‘The religion of mankind is the effect of their improvement, not the cause of it.’

‘Intellectual activity should precede religious improvement . . . Indeed, in every page of history we meet with fresh evidence of the little effect religious doctrines can produce upon people, unless preceded by intellectual culture.’

Yet there are exceptions, and Buckle quaintly cites the following :

‘The French have a religion worse than themselves ; the Scotch have a religion better than themselves. The characteristics of the creed are overpowered by the characteristics of the people, and the

creed is inoperative because it does not harmonize with the civilization of the country in which it was established. How idle, then, is it to ascribe the civilisation to the creed.'

Buckle asks :

'To what possible circumstances can the subsequent change' of the Hebrews from idolatrous polytheism to ethical monotheism 'be ascribed, except to the simple fact that the Hebrews, like all other people, as they advanced in civilisation, began to abstract and refine their religion' (Vol. I, pp. 253—266).

This is indeed *simple*, but somewhat unconvincing. Why did not Israel's neighbours the Syrians and Phoenicians do likewise? There is more to be said for Sir George Adam Smith's *dictum* : 'The mystery and the treasure of the religion of Israel is its prophetism.'

My second citation is from Dr. Westermarck, sometime Professor of Sociology in the University of London and a well-known writer on ethics. In his little book published in 1926, entitled *The Goodness of Gods*, he writes :

'If the feeling of uncanniness and mystery is at the bottom of the belief in supernatural beings, it is obvious that goodness cannot be a general quality ascribed to them by primitive men' (p. 7).

'We have seen that the gods of the primitive peoples are to a large extent, though not exclusively, of a malevolent character, that as a rule they take little interest in any kind of conduct which does not affect their own welfare. Among peoples of a higher culture the gods are, on the whole, benevolent to mankind when duly propitiated . . . They avenge social wrongs of various kinds . . . The gods have thus experienced a gradual change for the better,' but 'when more closely scrutinized, their goodness and notions of justice are found to differ materially from what is deemed good and just in the case of men' (p. 42).

'The belief in a god who acts as a guardian of worldly morality undoubtedly gives emphasis to its rules. To the social and legal sanctions a new one is added, which derives particular strength from the supernatural power and knowledge of the deity,' yet 'it has been noticed that a high degree of religious devotion is frequently accompanied with great laxity of morals.' 'Among two hundred Italian murderers Ferri did not find one who was irreligious' (pp. 56—57).

My third citation is from *The Religion of an Artist* by the portrait painter, the Hon. John Collier.

'My religion is really negative. Most people assume that some kind of religion is necessary. I do not see the necessity. Some of the best people that I have known have no religion at all. No thoughtful person can deny that great evils have been wrought in the name of religion, but it is generally assumed that great benefits have also been derived from it. The object of this essay is to point out that

these benefits are independent of religion and can be attained by other means which are less conducive to strife and which put less strain upon the reasoning faculties' (p. 56).

I will cite but two more writers who take this view. Mr. C. T. Gōrham, a favourite writer for the Rationalist Press, in one of his latest books, entitled *Religion as a Bar to Progress*, expresses its purpose in the Preface as follows :

'I set forth facts which will demonstrate to an unprejudiced mind that in the aggregate the influence of religion generally, and of the Christian Faith in particular, has been of a harmful character.'

The Hon. Bertrand Russell, F.R.S. (now Earl Russell), in his booklet entitled *Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilization?* answers the question thus :

'My own view of religion is that of Lucretius. I regard it as a disease born of fear, and as a source of untold misery to the human race. I cannot deny, however, that it has made *some* contributions to civilization. It helped in early days to fix the calendar, and it caused Egyptian priests to chronicle eclipses with such care that in time they became able to predict them. These two services I am prepared to acknowledge, but I do not know of any others' (p. 5).

He concludes his essay with these words :

'It is possible that mankind is on the threshold of a golden age, but, if so, it will be necessary first to slay the dragon that guards the door, and that dragon is religion' (p. 30).

I will now cite some opinions on the other side. None of those cited, except Principal Fairbairn, are clergymen. I will begin with the father of modern science, Francis Bacon. In his essay, *Of Unity in Religion*, he calls religion the 'chief bond of human society.' In his essay *Of Atheism*, he declares that 'they that deny a God destroy a man's nobility.' Atheism 'destroys likewise magnanimity and the rising human nature.'

'Man, when he resteth and assureth himself upon divine protection and favour, gathereth a force and faith which human nature in itself could not obtain : therefore, as atheism is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means to exalt itself above human frailty. As it is in particular persons, so it is in nations : never was there such a state for magnanimity as Rome. Of this State, hear what Cicero saith :—“We may be as partial to ourselves as we will, Conscript Fathers, nevertheless it is not by our numbers that we overcame the Spaniards, nor by our physical strength the Gauls, nor by our strategy the Carthaginians, nor by our skill in the arts the Greeks, nor by our native intelligence and good sense our neighbours of our own race, the Italians and Latins themselves ; but we have overcome all races and nations by our piety and religion,

by this wisdom alone that we recognised that all things are ordered and governed by the mysterious power (*numine*) of the Immortal Gods.*

Goethe, whom Matthew Arnold described as 'Europe's sagest head,' gave it as his judgment that :

'Men are only creative in poetry and art so long as they are religious : without religion they are merely imitative.'

Tiele, the student of Comparative Religion, who contributed the article on 'Religions' to an earlier edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, wrote :

'Religion is one of the mightiest motors in the history of mankind.'

Herbert Spencer wrote in his *Study of Sociology* :

'A religious system is a normal and essential factor in every evolving society' (p. 313).

Benjamin Kidd in his *Social Evolution* wrote :

'It is under the influence of these (religious) systems that the evolution of the race is proceeding : it is in connexion with these systems that we must study the laws which regulate the character, growth, and decay of societies and civilizations' (p. 318).

Principal Fairbairn wrote :

'The religious is . . . the architectonic idea of society, the commanding idea of conduct . . . and he who can create its most perfect form is our supreme benefactor—the foremost person in all history.'

Mr. Lowes Dickenson in an interesting little book, *Religion : a Criticism and a Forecast*, writes :

'If we look historically at the development of conduct, we find that the great moral reformers have been men of religious genius . . . Indeed, a profound ethical intuition would seem necessarily to depend on a profound religious insight' (p. 66).

Professor Percy Gardner writes in *A Historic View of the New Testament* :

'To the most highly educated moral philosopher religion is still necessary in the region of intelligence : while in the region of the will it is as necessary to him as to the savage' (p. 43).

Professor Wilhelm Bousset in *What is Religion?* writes :

'It must be said that the question of the future of Christianity is the question of the future of religion. For what we have learnt in the course of our wanderings through the history of religion is precisely this fact, that the Christian religion is absolutely superior to the other religions, and that Christianity represents the highest point which religious development has reached' (p. 265).

* Bacon gives the Latin alone. The translation is my own.

That, I may add, was also the conviction of Max Müller, to whom the scientific study of religion owes more than to any other man in England.

It may be asked : Which then of these two sets of quotations is true? I am compelled to answer : 'There is much truth in both sets.' When you live among savage tribes, decadent populations, obscurantist and intolerant fanatics, you are forced to protest with Lucretius : '*Tantum relligio potuit suadere malorum.*'

Although contemporary religion is not lower in standard than religion was a century ago, yet since then, religion has suffered depreciation in the English-speaking world as the result of the publication during the last two generations of a great number of very able books dealing with religion. The facts about religion which this literature has stressed, have shown religion in a very sinister light. I refer to such books as Sir J. G. Frazer's *Golden Bough*, and its successors, to Lecky's *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, A. D. White's *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*, the volume on the *Wars of Religion* in the *Cambridge Modern History*, T. H. Huxley's *Lay Sermons and Addresses*, H. C. Lea's histories of *The Inquisition* and *Sacerdotal Celibacy*, Professor J. B. Bury's *History of Freedom of Thought* (published in the Home University Library).

Such books as these—and they are outstanding examples of a great class—written for the most part in a spirit of scientific impartiality, have created an attitude of suspicion and distrust towards religion which is far deeper and wider than that produced by the attacks of zealous secularists. These books give the impression that religion is crude and savage, obscurantist and fanatical, irrational and immoral, a bar to progress and the enemy of civilization. They reveal a grotesque and repellent side to religion, and the particular subjects treated by these volumes have compelled their authors to present this side almost to the exclusion of any other. When treating of primitive religious tabus and mythologies, as does Sir J. G. Frazer in his wonderful volumes, the moral and spiritual aspects of religion are necessarily ignored. When treating of the fight by rationalists and scientists to secure a hearing for new truth which con-

flicted with tradition, it is mainly the obscurantist, intolerant and conservative aspects of religion that must be manifest. When dealing with the horrors of religious persecutions and wars this repellent side of religion will be even more in evidence. It is such books which have attracted most attention because they are the product of two things which particularly characterized the nineteenth century: (1) Scientific research which contributed much new truth to the understanding of religion, and (2) the fight for complete intellectual freedom as a necessity in the modern state. Yet after reading these and many like volumes, the student is compelled in the light of a really comprehensive study of religion to exclaim with the Queen of Sheba, 'the half was not told me.'

When I read the great religious classics, when I contemplate the masterpieces of religious art, when I study the biographies of religion's founders, prophets, saints, and martyrs, when I come into contact with modern religious personalities, and mark their characters and influence; above all, if I myself have been the subject of first-hand religious experience, if I know something of religion's power in my own life in strengthening my will, deepening and unifying my personality, delivering me from slavery to base passions and low ideals, and thereby adding to my happiness and usefulness, I shall be disposed to believe that what my second set of citations avers is true of the higher forms of religion, and I shall feel that those who, like Earl Russell, deny it, do not really know what religion can be in this realm. I do not blame them. Religion for the modern man has some very terrible and repulsive features, and they are by no means entirely eliminated even from this modern world: Earl Russell, like Mr. Bradlaugh and Colonel Ingersoll, has undoubtedly come into contact with them. I cannot but think—I do not wish to seem supercilious—that Earl Russell's estimate of religion is not only based on a one-sided experience, but that it is also very superficial. How many young men become sceptics as a result of reading *The Golden Bough* and its fellow-volumes! Yet it is as absurd to become so on that account, as to become anti-Christian as the result of reading Driver's *Commentary on Genesis*. Francis Bacon's well-known saying applies here: 'A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in

philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion.' We remember Atheist's 'very loud laughter' in *The Pilgrim's Progress*, but it is not the laughter of him who laughs last. To deny the validity of the religious values either in the individual life or in the history of civilization is, I am convinced, a mistake, yet I do recognize the profound difficulty and complexity of the religious problem. There are products of religion which invite the attitude of Voltaire and his fellows: '*Ecrasez l'infâme*': there are aspects of the universe which seem to reduce all religion to self-deception and to demand the secularist's verdict. It is always possible, as Professor Carruth's eloquent poem stresses, to interpret human experience atheistically. It all depends upon our valuation of the religious consciousness.

'The echo of ancient chanting,
 The gleam of altar-flames:
 The stones of a hundred temples
 Graven with sacred names.
 Man's patient quest for the secret
 In soul, in star, in clod:
 Some deem it superstition
 And others believe it is God.
 Like the tide on crescent sea-beach
 When the moon is new and thin,
 They come, our soul's deep yearnings,
 Welling and surging in.
 They come from the mystic ocean,
 Whose rim no foot has trod:
 Some hold it idle dreaming,
 We know that it is God.'

There is no little justification in human history for the Bolshevik motto, 'Religion is the opiate of the people.' Yet there is the other side. Among the hundred definitions of religion ranging from M. Salomon Reinach's 'Religion is a collection of scruples which impede the true exercise of our faculties' (*Orpheus*, p. 4) to Dr. Bernard Bosanquet's 'To be one with the supreme good in the faith which is also will—that is religion' (*What Religion Is*, p. 79), there is a definition coined by a shrewd Scotch professor, Allan Menzies, 'Religion is the inner side of civilization.' He writes:

'Religion expresses the essential spirit of human life in various ages and nations. The religion of a race is the truest expression of its character and reflects most faithfully its attitude and aims and policy. The religion of an age shows what at that time constituted the object of man's aspiration and endeavour, as older hopes grew pale

and new hopes rose on his sight. Thus the study of the religions of the world is the study of the very soul of its history. . . ' (*History of Religion*, p. 14).

This I believe to be sound. When you have really got at the real religion of a man, you have got at the secret of his life and character, and when you have discovered the real religion of a people, you have learned the secret of their civilization—if civilization be as Matthew Arnold defined it, 'The humanization of man in society.' 'Men grow inly liker that they kneel before.' Their civilization reflects the essential character of the nation's *cultus*. That *cultus* may be mixed: it probably is, but it will have dominant features. If the nation's religion be vital, it will permeate and shape the nation's civilization. It is the worship of the Divine as Paternal Authority and Ancestral Custom which is the secret of Roman civilization. It is the worship of the Divine as Beauty, Truth, and Happiness which is the secret of Greek civilization. It is the worship of the Divine as Righteousness which is the secret of Jewish civilization. It is the worship of the Divine as Magnificence, Power, and Pity—a good Oriental Despot—which is the secret of Islamic civilization. It is the worship of the Divine as the Liberator from life, which is the dominant note in Hindu civilization; it is the worship of the Divine as Practical Utility which marks the civilizations in the still further East. It is the striving, with many set-backs, to worship the Divine as active, serviceable, self-sacrificing Love which reveals the trend of Christian civilization. The God of social democracy is the Spirit of Independence and Equality, but He cannot be worshipped, as He is only an equal. It has been suggested that the Deity of the civilization that is to come will be the great God Acceleration, and our future civilization will reflect his *cultus*—let us hope without a collision.

I am aware that what I have offered as illustrations are generalizations, and there is always an element of deception in generalization, but I believe that Professor Allan Menzies' conclusion is sound, that religion is the inner side of civilization. If religion be the inner side of civilization, the quality of the religion of a nation or state is one of profound importance for its welfare. No unprejudiced person can read Lecky's *Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe* without coming to the con-

viction that the rationalist and secularist spirit in freeing large sections of Europe from the horrors of religious fanaticism, intolerance, obscurantism, ecclesiastical tyranny, irrational terrors and disgusting and futile asceticism, conferred an immense benefit, yet as Lecky himself points out, there was loss as well as gain. He writes :

‘It is from the moral or religious faculty alone that we obtain the conception of the purely disinterested. This is indeed the noblest thing we possess, the celestial spark that is within us, the impress of the Divine image, the principle of every heroism. Where it is not developed the civilization, however high may be its general average, is maimed and mutilated’ (Vol. II, p. 404).

This spirit, he holds, was weakened in Europe by secularism.

Those who are most enthusiastic for the liberation of mankind from the ills that certain kinds of religion have promoted are not necessarily opposed to religion itself. Mr. H. G. Wells, who is representative of the modern scientific spirit, makes this quite clear in his stimulating little book, *Mr. Belloc Objects*—an *apologia* for *The Outline of History*. He there writes :

‘The disposition of those who apprehend this outline of history that modern science has made plain to us, and who see all life as a system of progressive change, is by no means antagonistic to religion. They realize the immense importance and the profound necessity of religion in this last great chapter of the story, the evolution of human society. But they see religion within the frame of fact . . . Man has accommodated his originally fierce and narrow egotism to the needs of an ever wider and more co-operative social life, very largely through the complex self-subjugations that religion has made possible. Within the shell and cover of religion the new less self-centred habits of mind have been able to develop. An immense mass of imaginative work, of mythology, of theology, that now seems tortuous, mystical, and fantastic, was necessary for the casting of the new moral being of socialised man’ (p. 53).

But at this stage Mr. Wells is confronted by a great doubt. Have we not come to a parting of the ways? Religion, as we know it, has served its purpose in humanity’s progress, but can it be of any further use? Even Christianity in its present theological and institutional form seems to have reached the limits of its usefulness, and to be incapable of adaptation to meet the needs of the new humanity which is being evolved. I think I ought to give Mr. Wells’ statement in his own words :

‘We seem to be entering upon a phase in which moral and intellectual education may be able to free themselves from the last vestiges of the mythology in which that new moral being was moulded: but it is ungracious and false to the true outline of history to deny the

necessary part that the priest, the sacrifice, the magic ceremonial for tribal welfare, the early tribal religions, have played in this transfiguration of the sub-human into the modern human mind, upon which all our community rests to-day. It is because of our sense of this continuity of our present dispositions with the religions upon which they are founded that so many of us are loth to part with all the forms and phrases of the old creeds and all the disciplines of time-honoured cults. Perhaps some of us (the present writer in the crowd among others) have been over-eager to read new significance into established phrases, and clothe new ideas in the language of the old scheme of salvation. It may be we have been pouring new wine into old bottles. It may be better to admit frankly that if man is not fixed Christianity is, and that mankind is now growing out of Christianity: that indeed mankind is growing out of the idea of Deity. This does not mean an end to religion, but it means a fresh orientation of the religious life. It means a final severance with the anthropomorphic conceptions of destiny, that interpretation of all things in terms of personality and will with which religion began' (p. 54).

I think what humanity has passed through of late years, and indeed is still passing through, makes it clear that we must have religion. If M. J. Guyau's forecast be true in his book, *The Non-Religion of the Future*, then humanity has no future. The Dean of St. Paul's has said that human society organized apart from God 'is largely a system of co-operative guilt with limited liability.' 'True union between human beings can be achieved only in the spiritual sphere. History confirms this view.' 'If I were asked to state in one word the failure of our civilization I should answer *Secularism*' (*Outspoken Essays*, Vol. II, pp. 147-154). But I feel the failure of our civilization—it has not yet failed—if it comes will be brought about by two things, Secularism and Superstition, and I would add that Superstition is the mother of Secularism. History shows us man as naturally religious: it is Superstition that makes him a Secularist. And what is Superstition? It is petrified religion, a religion incapable of adapting itself to new human needs and a new environment. Civilization decays when morals decay, and the decay of morals is preceded by the weakening of religion's influence due to its inability to develop. You cannot secure a noble, progressive, permanent civilization without a vital, adaptable, noble religion. Of course I can believe in morality without supernatural sanctions, but I cannot believe that the noblest ideals of conduct and character can be reached and maintained without spiritual help. May I add that, if religion when largely unspiritual, non-moral, and irrational, has done so much for humanity as Mr. Wells

admits, what could not a perfectly spiritual, moral, and rational religion achieve for humanity? There is no disharmony in such a religion, for as Professor Whitehead has truly said :

‘The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism’ (*Religion in the Making*, p. 73).

And as the great Cambridge Platonists taught, that which is truly spiritual is truly natural. I do not think Mr. Wells is sound in his anticipation that humanity will have to abandon the interpretation of its God ‘in terms of personality and will.’ Human personality is the highest thing we know, and we must express the Divine object of worship in the highest terms we know, and our relationship to that Deity in the same way also. We say God must at least be personal, but we add at once, no doubt He is supra-personal. Dr. T. R. Glover, whose studies in religion are as brilliant as they are learned, recognizes three great stages in religious progress—Magic, Morality and Personal Relation. This is much sounder than the older scientific view of the three stages of religious progress as Polytheism, Monotheism, Atheism. The higher religion involves, nay demands, this personal relation. If religion be, as Professor Whitehead has said, ‘What the individual does with his own solitariness,’ which reminds us of the definition of religion coined by Plotinus, ‘The flight of the alone to the Alone’ (*φύγη μόνου πρὸς μόνον*), it is the personal relationship which alone can satisfy us as St. Augustine’s golden sentence proclaims, ‘O Lord, Thou hast made us for Thyself and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee.’ ‘The Great Companion is dead’ was the lamentation of a Victorian scientist who had lost his religious faith. I do not think that we can transcend the personal relationship in religion of the highest kind. I do not think that Buddhism has transcended the personal relationship, it has annihilated it because it regards personality as an evil. The strength and vigour and development of our own personality depends on our maintenance of personal relations with a Personal God, and what the welfare of the individual demands the welfare of his civilization demands.

The other point in which I feel unable to agree with Mr. Wells is his statement, ‘If man is not fixed Christianity is.’ I know what strong support Mr. Wells’ statement receives from

the amazing obscurant conservatism of Christianity in the larger Christian communions: the astonishing growth of superstition in influential sections of the Church of England to-day, the materialism of our Creeds, the rigidity of our ecclesiastical organization. The way in which, for instance, the Roman Catholic Church is checking the betterment of our civilization by opposition to eugenics. There is much in our current Christianity to justify Mr. Wells' conviction that 'Christianity is fixed,' but there is still more to justify the view that it is not fixed, that it is not a religion of the letter but the Religion of the Spirit, that it is capable therefore of infinite expansion and progress.

This notion of the unchanging character of Christian doctrine is one in which the verdict of the historian has great weight.

Dr. Hastings Rashall, the historian of the Mediaeval Universities, said, in a sermon preached shortly before his death:

'Now in the face of such changes, it is too late to contend that the Church has always taught the same things, and that the clergyman who departs one hair's breadth from this or that ancient formula has no place in the ministry of the Church. We do wrong to think of Christianity as a fixed, stereotyped body of doctrine. It is and has always been a living, growing, evolving thing, ever reaching out after and absorbing new truth and pushing on to higher and higher conceptions of God and fuller and wider insight into the true and eternal meaning of the full revelation of Himself which God once for all made of Himself in the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ.

'It is a profound historical mistake—a pure mistake of fact—to suppose that the Church's teaching has always been the same on all subjects. The Church would have been dead long ago if it had been, and the promise that the Holy Spirit would ever lead the Church on to new truth would have failed' (*God and Man*, pp. 253-261).

W. E. H. Lecky writes in *The Map of Life*:

'No man can venture to assign limits to the transformations which religion may undergo without losing its essence or its power. Even in the field of morals these have been very great' (p. 234).

We can look on our civilization in a pessimistic mood or in an optimistic mood, and we can look on our Christianity in either way. The soundest way, in view of the evolutionary character of the universe, is, I believe, to view both our civilization and our Christianity optimistically.

When we think of religion—our religion—in relation to modern civilization, we shall do well to put to ourselves the series of questions which Dr. Glover propounds in his book, *Progress in Religion*:

'We shall ask, what a religion makes of God, whether it speaks of Him in the singular or the plural, the neuter or the abstract. And here we shall find that progress more and more depends on the personality of God—that this militates against polytheism and safeguards the personality of man and all the morality bound up with the society of men. Personality and morality will be somewhere involved in all the questions we ask. St. Paul, in a very remarkable passage, with great insight traces all the corruption and misery of the world to false views of God. God's personality and man's personality are going to stand or fall together. Does the religion claim enough of God for man: does it claim the utmost, including immortality.

'We shall ask—for our conception of society and of religion is dynamic rather than static—how far each religion is adapted to meeting changes in society, knowledge and thought. Another philosophical question, for the answer depends on how far the tenets of the religion are avowedly related to experience, how close it is intended to keep to truth. Does it prefer Truth—or something else, authority or tradition, emotion, archaism, an easy mind, or ecstasy? And our question implies yet another on its attitude to freedom. Does it stand for 'more beyond' or for a closed book—for a Holy Spirit, or for a Koran or Shastras? Is it, in fact, in day-by-day experience, moving forward to higher intuitions and their verification? Is it attentive to art, to poetry, to science, to politics, to ideas generally and the ceaselessly moving life of man? Or is it afraid of them? Once again, we shall have to ask what it makes of God. Is God away behind somewhere, or in front?' (pp. 13-14).

If a civilization have a religion which is able to give the right answer to these questions, and we who are Modernists know that we have in the Christian Religion properly understood and rightly lived, even though now we see that religion everywhere in chains, like Jean Jacques Rousseau's Mankind, then we may rest assured that this religion has within it a power of perpetual renewal and of undying life which is able to carry forward civilization to levels of welfare, happiness, and culture of which it is impossible at this stage to realize the quality—but such a civilization has to be paid for and paid for all the while. Its price is science, service, sacrifice.

'The kingdoms of the earth go by
 In purple and in gold,
 They rise, they flourish, and they die,
 And all their tale is told.
 One kingdom only is divine,
 One banner triumphs still,
 Its King a servant, and its sign
 A gibbet on a hill.'

THE CRISIS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION

By the Rev. CHARLES E. RAVEN, D.D., Canon Residentiary of Liverpool,
formerly Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

WHEN the subject of this evening's meeting was chosen, it could hardly have been foreseen that before our Conference it would acquire so particular and so poignant a significance. The momentous events of the past month naturally suggested to me that I should depart from the wider treatment of the subject which was appropriate to its place in our general discussion, and attempt to deal in some detail with the emergency that now confronts our own country and people. Perhaps this would have been the most appropriate, as it would assuredly have been the more interesting, course to pursue. I considered it carefully, and decided for a variety of reasons not to follow it.

In the first place, to treat our special crisis adequately involves a knowledge of the situation far beyond my powers. Secondly, while maintaining that the Christian citizen cannot and must not shirk the effort to study and estimate current political and social events in the light of his faith, I am convinced that the clergy are not necessarily qualified to frame or express opinions upon details of policy or of statesmanship: our business is rather to proclaim an ideal and to insist upon certain primary and often neglected principles than to dictate the methods by which those principles can be applied. Thirdly, vast as is the difficulty and for us the urgency of our position, it is in fact only an incident in the world-wide situation, a symptom of a universal disease, an illustration of a crisis not confined to our own land or to Europe. Finally, our own crisis emphasizes plainly certain features of the issue with which modern civilization is confronted and with which we as Christians are manifestly concerned: the international character of our whole social order with the consequent demand for some effective and all-embracing polity; the threat to human personality, to individual welfare and social stability which is involved in our failure to control the vast mechanism of our financial and commercial organization; the disastrous effects of our rivalries and sectionalism which prevent

us from realizing the needs of others or bearing one another's burdens in a spirit of broad human fellowship. It is of these matters that I would try to speak. For whether or no our own country succeeds in averting the worst consequences of the present calamity, our civilization will be continually threatened by similar difficulties unless we can accomplish that change of mind and of conduct to which we as Christians are committed, and by which alone the world can be saved.

Meanwhile, let no one suppose that I or any member of our Union takes a shallow view of the present state of affairs or is anxious to evade responsibility in regard to it. One who comes to you from a great industrial and mercantile community is not likely to under-estimate the intense and immediate gravity of the outlook. I would ask for your earnest sympathy with the statesmen who are now planning for our country's welfare, and for your whole-hearted co-operation in the sacrifices which will inevitably have to be made by us all and which will fall so heavily upon our already impoverished manufacturing and industrialized areas.

The crisis of modern civilization—for many months those words have been before me, and the knowledge of my promise to discourse to you upon them has clouded my dreams. When the invitation was accepted, it seemed easy: we are all of us expert in denouncing if not in diagnosing the conditions in which we live. As time passed, confidence diminished: that curious defence-mechanism by which we find excuses for postponing unpleasant tasks gave me pretexts for delay. Only the repeated stimulus of our *deus ex machina*, my predecessor in addressing you, broke through my inhibition. With fear and a great bewilderment I faced the necessity.

This confession is not made because (as we are told) such confession is good for the soul; nor by way of excuse for the futility of what follows. It is an allegory; and my experience of mental chaos, of attempts to escape, and of an eleventh-hour effort to solve my problem is (I cannot but think) typical of our whole condition. Indeed it constitutes the most serious evidence and chief contributory cause of the crisis of our time. Everywhere mankind is aware that its development has reached a critical stage; everywhere it feels the restlessness and excite-

ment of the times, at first with a certain exhilaration, then with an increasing perplexity, finally with a dangerous conviction of its helplessness, a sense of impotence not far from despair which is liable to find expression either in random grumbling or in sudden acceptance of wild and irrational remedies.

It is this widespread depression of spirit, arising out of the conflict between the knowledge that the times demand great decisions and the inability to respond greatly to their challenge that is itself our gravest peril. We must act : yet cannot discover a basis for action or principles on which to proceed. We must think before we act : and events move so rapidly that our thoughts are out of date before we have satisfactorily formulated them. In all this welter of problems, this mass of experiment, of adventuring and of charlatanry, how can we take a firm grip upon the situation and reassert the power of man to control the forces which he has created and the march of events which their operation must condition? We cry 'O Baal hear us' to the empty heavens, to the divinity of our choice, be he politician or economist, industrialist or philosopher, artist, scientist or churchman ; and there is no voice nor any that answers—unless when the Lord has put a lying spirit into the mouth of some self-appointed son of Chenaanah.

You are all aware of this almost universal psychosis of to-day—if not in your so enlightened selves, at least in your neighbours. I need not attempt any detailed illustration of it. Look for a moment at the political world, with its pathetic spectacle of statesmen striving to adjust constitutional procedure suited to the ancient days of self-contained nations and empires to an age which must achieve the unity of a world-state or perish, an age in which no single issue can be settled except on a world-wide basis. The older ones of us, and the majority of our leaders, have had to adjust their views already to two great changes, the change from the concept of an isolated England, 'this sceptred isle set in the silver sea' and manufacturing for the world, to that of the British Empire or family of nations : we cannot make the effort of a third and more drastic change to that of 'the commonwealth of man, the federation of the world.' So we muddle along with such light as inapplicable precedents can supply and such experiments as the proprietors of the popular

press permit. And the more adventurous among us cast glances of admiration at Soviet Russia or Fascist Italy as at peoples whose principles we dislike but whose courage and initiative we cannot but envy.

Or look at the economic problem, and its even more obvious irony. Malthus predicted a century ago that mankind would increase to the point at which natural resources would be exhausted by the teeming populations. Mankind has increased almost as rapidly and irrationally as he foretold. Its resources have been so vastly extended that now a four-hours' working day for us all would supply every need. Yet amid plenty we starve. Millions are out of work : machines lie idle : raw material rots in our warehouses : and millions need the food and clothes and houses which their labour could so beneficially supply. And we sit helpless because the financial system, the means of exchange, the credit-system under which we groan and suffer cannot enable the unemployed to devote their energies to the relief of need. The goods are there : the labour is there : the demand is there. It seems to be beyond man's power to organize his social and economic order so as to employ human resources for human well-being. No wonder if some of us feel that our magnates in finance and industry are not worth their pay if they cannot find means of escape from so obvious an absurdity. We have enthroned what Carlyle called the cash-nexus, and Christ called Mammon ; and our reward would seem a broad jest if it were not so grim a reality : we cannot use the stuff that Mammon gives us, the stuff for which perhaps we have sold our souls.

Or look at the more personal aspect of the crisis. It should surely be that mankind in face of acknowledged peril, of great need and great opportunity, would discover fellowship and with it courage and power. Our generation has seen from the war how a common objective can unite and sublimate the lives of men, and in the distresses of to-day is surely an incentive to unity. St. Paul defined for us the three chief human relationships when he said that in Christ Jesus there was neither Greek nor Jew, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female. Can we look at the contacts of race with race, of class with class, of sex with sex, and not feel that bitterness and suspicion are as characteristic of this new age as they were of the old ones? Much

has indeed been done : the habit of travel is freeing the younger generation from contempt of the foreigner : social service, if less enthusiastic than in the eighties, is certainly less patronizing : the new comradeship of men and women is full of promise. But our educational system, our athletics, our journalism—those greatest of formative influences—still, I am afraid, foster a snobbish individualism, a passion for selfish and often quite ill-founded prestige. It may not be wholly true that the public-school spirit is a compound of racial, social and masculine superiority : but at least we might consult Mr. Robeson, Miss Neillans and the first unemployed ex-service man that we can find before we decide that all is well.

Or look, finally, at the Churches. We have so far, from our cursory survey, discovered three features of the crisis : the necessity to secure world-unity ; the necessity to exalt human personality above machinery and possessions ; the necessity to achieve a wider fellowship. Now these three needs correspond to the three chief tenets of the Christian faith. We believe in one God, the Father of us all, whose will is to be done on earth, the Father whose love is not limited to Jew or Briton, who has no favourites. Old Testament prejudices still colour our concept of Him ; and heresies like that of British Israel with its monstrous blending of Jingo imperialism with Jewish fundamentalism indicate the extent of our failure. But we know ourselves to be committed to belief that mankind is one family, owning a loyalty to God that over-rides all sectionalism of tribe or state, nation or empire. We believe in Jesus as embodying in the quality of His personality the perfect revelation of God, and so as demonstrating the supremacy of personality. Faith in the Incarnation, however we interpret it, at least involves belief that money was made for man, not man for money ; that man's life does not consist in the multitude of his possessions ; and that no tabus or conventions, legal precedents, financial interests or mechanical systems must be allowed to frustrate or distort the growth of the Children of God into the full stature of the Christ. We believe in the Holy Spirit whose first fruits are love and joy and peace, whose evidence is in fellowship, who binds humanity into an organic unity under the influence of shared purpose and unselfish sensitiveness. Even those who do not like the formulations of our ancient

creeds will hardly doubt that unity, personality, love are essential elements of the Church's faith. Yet, look out on the so-called religious world, or study it in its weekly periodicals, and see how far the Churches are proclaiming the message entrusted to them, and demanded by the times. It is tragic to see statesmen impotent before the need for world-unity; industrialists helpless in the slavery of a system; comrades in the human adventure embittered and suspicious. It is surely more tragic, more ironically tragic, to see the Churches whose opportunity is thus so manifest, not less impotent and helpless and embittered.

If we examine the practical reasons which have made the present period so critical, we shall only intensify our conviction of the irony of the Church's position. The more remote reasons are of course that the development of man's material resources, the expansion of his civilization, and the changes in his way of life have been so vast and rapid that his mental and spiritual power has been unable to keep pace with them. At the Industrial Revolution the creed of *laissez faire* was adopted as an excuse for bewilderment. The leaders were unable to control the development of affairs, and so accepted a policy of non-interference. It was perhaps less disastrous than would have been a series of ill-considered or revolutionary experiments. To-day the same process is creating the same bewilderment. We do not avow *laissez faire*: we find ourselves forced to adopt it. But in our case two special conditions have exacerbated the situation. The war enormously speeded up the progress of events: changes like the unrest in the Far East, or the enfranchisement of women, or the mobilizing of mass production took place in a few months under pressure; had they developed more slowly and normally, the difficulties involved in them would have been less acute. Moreover, war deprived our own and all European nations of their most vital citizens: not only the deaths and maimings, but the exhaustion and permanent weakening of the younger folks have deprived our world of its natural leaders. It was the men and women of initiative, ability and sensitiveness who suffered most. Their absence lays a burden upon the elderly and the embusqués which it is not disrespectful to say that they are quite unfit to carry. War had its lessons for those who could learn them: to do so was almost inevitably to sacrifice the prospect of being able

to play a large part in the government of the future. It is a great cause of the present discontents that even now every department of national life and of the Church is controlled by people who escaped the actual experience of front-line warfare. Those who caused and profitted by the war are still in control ; for those who should have replaced them are either dead or broken. Yet to understand the human scene of to-day it is not enough to have stayed at home and written letters to the *Times* in 1914 to 1918.

These special causes reinforcing the difficulties of a period of unparalleled transition have swept the mass of men from their moorings. We have only to glance at the state of philosophy, speculative, ethical or political, to see how great is the confusion. It is not only that no clear interpretation of the universe, adequate to the new concepts of physics, astronomy, biology and psychology, is available. That would be a serious but not a direct loss to the multitude : for most of us have to be content to take our cosmic schema from the experts. What touches us all is the breakdown of the practical principles ultimately derived from the general philosophy, but accepted independently of it by the ordinary man for the settlement of his everyday conduct. Until recently the average European has professed to observe certain rules of life as sacrosanct. They were a miscellaneous collection, based upon a mixture of traditional morality, biblical and ecclesiastical regulations, and pragmatically tested conventions. They were often illogical, even self-contradictory. But just as mankind can live under a bad but recognized system far better than the theorist would expect, so this amalgamation of Christian, Stoic, utilitarian, and frankly egoistic tenets served, however disjointedly, as a guide to society. Its results were often brutally cruel, often scandalously degrading : its exponents could combine respectability with lovelessness, or piety with immorality, and feel wholly satisfied with their resultant prestige. But somehow it worked.

Now it is a thing of the past. The idol has not merely disclosed its feet of clay : it has fallen heavily from its pedestal ; and if its fragments still trip the feet of our children, its power is at an end. Not all the king's horses and all the king's men, not the House of Lords nor the bench of Bishops, will ever

put Humpty-Dumpty together again. And meanwhile his throne is empty.

Upon the last recorded occasion on which mankind lost its accredited faith, in that Augustan age so like our own, men talked either sadly of the death of Pan or proudly of the conquest of the gods by the new God from Judaea. To look back is to see the answer to what was at the time a problem as unsolved as our own. In that day, as in this, men searched for sanctions—in a philosophy that had lost its vitality, in an ethic no longer appropriate, in laudation of a past that could not return, or in dreams of a future which they could not make true. They looked for consolation, as we do, in the solid prosperity of the Empire, in the material resources at their disposal, in the genius of Caesar or the British Raj. They killed time in the theatre and the stadium, in bread and the games, in fads and fashions. They found relief in cults and crazes; spiritualism and the Salvation Army, theosophy and Christian Science had their prototypes and professors; and any new thing, if it proclaimed its novelty loudly enough, and with sufficient falsity, was sure of a hearing. To that world came the Galilean, and for a little while gave it a resurrection. Why should not the Churches recognize and act upon the parallel?

Here indeed is the irony of the position. The throne of the world is vacant. Mankind is becoming aware that if we are to escape disaster it must be filled. We are looking for a religion that shall secure world unity, the primacy of personality, the value of fellowship. These three are the essence of Christianity: and yet Christians do not see the opportunity that confronts them. If we ask the reason, it is not hard to state it. We have identified our Christian faith with the idol that has fallen, with scholastic philosophy, or Puritan bibliolatry, or the Elizabethan settlement, or the Victorian compromise: we have accepted the Christ of Rome or Geneva, of the Book of Common Prayer or of Hymns Ancient and Modern as the Saviour of our world; and such a Christ so belittled and bedizened cannot save us. Can we set free the Spirit of Jesus, the essentials of the faith, from the imprisoning accretions of the ages in time to reveal Him to an expectant world? Here is for me and, I think, for you the heart of our problem.

Let me put the matter plainly and in personal terms : its urgency must be my excuse.

The fundamental aspect of the crisis is not to be found in any problem less elemental than the religious. For ultimately it is what men and nations believe and value that determines their conduct and destiny. Our state is critical just because we have lost any clear and common vision of the nature and purpose of life, any passionate conviction as to the meaning of the universe, any standard of reference by which to estimate our actions and policy. Dr. Brunner, whose general position I for one cannot begin to accept, is surely right in his preliminary claim that the primary issue for our day is 'this question of God.' What he states in argument I would confirm in experience : fifteen years of active participation in movements for practical reform have convinced me that we cannot remedy our present disease by piecemeal and surface palliatives, that until we know and can agree upon our ground-plan we cannot build either the City of God or the house of humanity ; that only our religion, rightly understood and faithfully followed, can supply at once the criterion and the motive-power. Study at close quarters of the great empirical and pragmatic effort of American humanism, and less intimate study of its rival and opposite, the Barthian movement, have warned me that, much as we can learn both from immanentists and from transcendentalists, each by themselves is defective and inadequate. The religion of Jesus has exactly that which they both lack, for it insists that to concentrate either upon this world or upon the supernatural to the neglect of the other is disastrous. Jesus was neither Essene nor Sadducee, neither Eastern dualist nor Stoic materialist : He supplied what Barthians and Humanists severally deny.

In Christianity it has been (on the whole) the Platonic tradition, on which our President so steadily insists, that has kept clear the middle way, the synthesis of immanence and transcendence, and insisted upon the need to hold the temporal and the eternal in vital and intimate relationship. I believe, with him, that our Church, and its succession of Platonists, is admirably fitted to insist upon a truly incarnational theology. But I differ from him (with all diffidence and respect) in believing that neither

Plato nor Plotinus ever really rose to the full realization of that unity of God and man which Christianity should proclaim. The Johannine rather than the Platonic tradition seems to me to be our guide. Whatever its historicity, the Fourth Gospel expresses the essential message of Jesus in categories that alone do full justice to its universality, its personal quality, its insistence upon light and life and love. In the spirit of that Gospel, if anywhere at all, our age might find guidance and inspiration to solve its problems: if it does so, the crisis may yet usher in an epoch of achievement unparalleled in history: to that spirit mankind will eventually turn. It should be our task as a Union to see that the Church to which we belong realises in time of what spirit it is.

THE TERRESTRIAL PROSPECTS OF MAN

By J. A. FRASER ROBERTS, M.A., B.Sc., F.R.S.E.
(Institute of Animal Genetics, University of Edinburgh).

IT is a great privilege, and it involves a heavy responsibility, to be asked to speak about the application of scientific knowledge to human affairs. The biologist who spends his time in the laboratory or who is engaged in statistical investigation can but seldom indulge in the luxury of considering in a more general manner the wider implications of scientific discovery as they appear to him. It is inevitable that in any such attempt much is included that is a matter of personal opinion, much that is possible, or probable, rather than a statement of observed fact. The only course is to start from the basis of generally accepted conclusions and follow the lines of thought that appear to emerge naturally from that body of knowledge, always recognizing that another student might draw different deductions and that few would agree in every detail.

It is a matter of gratification to me that you should have asked a biologist to address you on the subject of the terrestrial prospects of man. Physical science has contributed in generous measure to the equipment of the human race for its attempts to control and organise its environment; but to-day theoretical physics would appear to be transforming itself into metaphysics, and to be removing itself from close contact with the concerns of everyday life. But whether or not physical science will contribute as much that is new during the next century as it has done during the last, there is a growing conviction that we are on the eve of an era of biological invention. The changes, when they come, will be intimate and probably disturbing. It will no longer be a matter of discovery that in the first instance affects man's surroundings, but discovery that affects man himself. It is peculiarly difficult to prophesy in this field, not merely because prophecy in general is a difficult and dangerous exercise, but because even the methods that will be used in biological research in the future, perhaps the very near future, are to a great

extent hidden from us. The apotheosis of physical science, the triumph of mechanism, has infiltrated to the deepest recesses of our minds. We find it difficult to think except in terms of machines, man's body as a machine, man's mind as a machine. There are not wanting those who assert that a new science of life will arise or revive, a science dealing in terms transcending those of physics and chemistry. It must be confessed, however, that achievements along such lines have been meagre as yet. The future alone can decide.

Science deals in abstractions, and each science contributes, not complete solutions to human problems, but relevant considerations that must be given their due weight in the discussion of those problems. The conclusions of physical science are not invalidated by biological discovery, but biological discovery adds a further chapter. Similarly, every biologist recognizes that there is much that concerns our lives in regard to which his science has nothing to say. Nevertheless, if the immediate past is any guide, the next century will witness biological discoveries that will modify the bodies and minds of men and women just as the discoveries of physical science have modified their surroundings. The problem of the immediate terrestrial prospects of man, therefore, is likely to resolve itself into the problem of the biological prospects of man. I have indicated how difficult it is for our generation to think imaginatively in terms of biology, certainly of human biology, and I trust that you will accept this as an excuse if I refrain from concrete prophecy and confine my remarks to certain more general considerations that seem to me to follow from present-day biological opinion.

During the course of this lecture, I should like to draw your attention to three theses. The first is that man's biological future rests, for the most part, in his own hands, and this to an extent that could not have been visualized in terms of the biological thought of yesterday. That thought was dominated by the teachings of Weismann. To-day, Weismannism in many of its implications has gone, leaving behind, as is usual in the case of fruitful scientific hypotheses, a permanent contribution, a nucleus of truth. Last century saw the rise of theories of rigid economic determinism; in Weismannism we see their biological counterpart, a rigid hereditary determinism: the germ-plasm

immutable and eternal, the soma frothing up and receding. Variation was hereditary variation, and if the forces of natural selection were not permitted to operate, decline and decay must inevitably follow. To-day, we think rather of the unfolding of hereditary potentiality under the impact of environmental stimuli, resulting in the complete individual. It is possible to draw an artificial distinction for purposes of convenience, always bearing in mind the essential inter-relationship.

There is little to indicate that the human race is evolving rapidly. Anthropologists tell us that man to-day differs little in his physical characteristics from man of millions of years ago. We do, however, see great variation as between different races, different groups, and different individuals. In part these differences are to be ascribed predominantly to heredity, in part predominantly to environment.

Upon what do hereditary differences depend? We must distinguish two kinds of inheritance, on the one hand organic inheritance, referable to the germ cells, on the other hand, social inheritance. Now, it seems to me that confusion often occurs at this point. There is violent controversy between those who believe that differences between the social classes, for example, are mainly an expression of hereditary differences, and those who believe them to be, for the most part, environmental. Commonly, in such controversy, the only form of inheritance recognized is organic inheritance. But social inheritance is none the less inheritance. As long as babies are born after months of uterine life—and the importance of uterine environment is a subject much neglected of late, but which, if one may prophesy, will shortly come into its own—as long as the family persists as a human institution, we are dealing in social inheritance with a force of incalculable power. Let us concede, for purposes of argument, that the less radical variations in social behaviour are not primarily conditioned by organic inheritance, for this is an unchartered field, yet social inheritance still remains; the problems raised by differential fertility still remain vital problems, even if organic inheritance is not deeply involved. By utilizing, therefore, these twin aspects of heredity, man may consciously mould the future of his race. It is unlikely that he can create much that is new, but he can continually raise the average.

I am not disposed to linger to-day over the problem of the elimination or reduction of inherited pathological defect; defective germ-plasm will be recognized with increasing certainty, and as our conscience is aroused, this important branch of study will assume its proper place in the sphere of preventive medicine.

Must nations or civilizations inevitably decay? I see nothing in biological science to indicate such a conclusion. Let us guard ourselves from the insidious fallacy of thinking of a group of human beings as though they were an individual. Individuals grow old and die, but a group of individuals is continually being born anew. It will lie increasingly within man's choice to see that the new generation is superior to the old—at the worst, not inferior. Nations and civilizations may perish, but not as the inevitable result of any transcendental biological law. It is due to causes, probably in the main outside the field of biology, that future generations will increasingly comprehend, and will increasingly have the power, if they have the will, to banish from the earth.

The second thesis to which I would direct your attention is that ultimate hereditary differences, perhaps those of the greatest importance to us as human beings, can only be expressed in a favourable environment. Before it is possible, therefore, for the highest form of selection to operate, either naturally or as the result of conscious choice, it is necessary to provide a suitable environment.

We hear a great deal about natural selection and the probable effects of this process, or rather of its absence, in the case of man. The doctrine of natural selection has proved one of the most fruitful conceptions in biology. It has been adapted continually to advances in knowledge and to-day is stimulating brilliant researches, but there can be few phrases that are used so loosely to cover up facile and fantastic deductions in relation to human affairs. We may grant that as regards man's physical characteristics, at least, there is an element of truth in the conception of the elimination of the less worthy under conditions of danger, stress and difficulty, but there is a limit beyond which this conception becomes almost ludicrous. Those who deplore the passing of natural selection in its more violent forms cer-

tainly do not push their arguments to a logical conclusion. They do not advocate more maternal mortality, a higher death rate for infants, the abolition of hospitals, and the repeal of all those laws that protect the individual from himself. If we turn to mental characteristics, the argument becomes thinner still. Could we seriously suppose that the best way of discovering a philosopher would be to set a test in which the candidate was required to master a few abstruse propositions in a room in which five drums were being banged and five typewriters were doing their worst, while five people tried to talk to him all at once? It is unlikely that education will become a process associated with deadly physical peril, cunning attacks on sanity and insidious moral temptations. Mankind will certainly evolve less violent means of encouraging the biologically worthy. It is at least safe to prophesy that future generations will not attempt to secure the advancement of mankind by turning life into a kind of crazy obstacle race.

The destructive agencies usually vaguely considered in this connection are capricious and relatively inefficient in their operation. Modern warfare certainly does not single out the weak, and we must not forget that low cunning in the face of physical danger may be biologically more successful than valour; that cowardice may have a higher survival value than courage.

Our thesis, that many hereditary differences, and perhaps the most important, can only be exhibited in a favourable environment, is in some ways the reverse side of the picture. An admirable analogy may be found in the case of many of the breeds of domesticated animals. The Shorthorn of to-day could never have been produced in infertile, undeveloped, arid, or tropical country. Only when husbandry had reached a high pitch of perfection did those differences reveal themselves which enabled the breeder by selection to secure the amazing results of to-day. One is not, of course, arguing from such animals to man. Perfection in such a case means perfection as the breeder visualized it, but the essential lesson is certainly applicable. We may anticipate that future generations will attempt to secure the most favourable environment that they can contrive, and in such greatly improved surroundings, physical and mental, man will exhibit potentialities hitherto dormant. Differences between

individuals will be accentuated, and further scope will be provided for the operation of rational selection should mankind desire it.

The third thesis is that there is a strong biological justification for toleration. We have considered momentarily the case of the improved breeds of farm livestock. There uniformity is desired, and is not an unreasonable goal because the purposes for which the animals are required are relatively very simple. Amazing progress has been achieved; for example, it can readily be shown that the resemblance between any two individuals of the Shorthorn breed chosen at random is greater on the average than the resemblance between father and son in that breed a hundred and twenty years ago. A moment's consideration will show, however, that such uniformity is not only impracticable in the case of man, but is not, from any point of view, to be desired. To consider only a single consequence: if conditions were to change radically, if, for example, civilization were to collapse, most of our highly-improved domesticated breeds of livestock would vanish from the earth as completely as the sabre-toothed tiger or the mastodon. The breeder of domesticated stock recognizes these implications and has evolved methods for securing a certain flexibility, because although the purposes for which farm animals are required are simple, the environment in which they have to live does show, in spite of all his efforts, a considerable natural variability. His method is to develop a number of breeds and strains, each especially suited to particular localities and particular conditions. There is an inevitable conflict between the simplicity of the utilization of the animals and the complexity of their environment, the former consideration leading to a desire to standardize and to reduce variability to its lowest limits, the latter to a preservation of the variability that exists. On the whole, there is a powerful body of opinion that is reluctant, and rightly so, to condemn a breed or strain until it is demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt, after giving full weight to every factor involved, that another and a more profitable one can successfully be substituted.

We may feel confident that in the human species variability will continue to be desired, and that inbreeding, the only way of securing extreme genetic uniformity, will not become the

practice of the human race. On the contrary, it may be that even the mild degrees of inbreeding now permitted in civilized communities will cease to be regarded with favour. Extreme variability, therefore, is likely to remain a feature of the human race, always provided that the boundary of the pathological is not passed. It will be recognized that it is praiseworthy and useful that individuals should differ, that races and nations should differ. The physical and mental attributes of the new-born child will still remain one of life's biggest gambles.

This consideration, however, raises a host of problems, and these of a serious kind; it is inevitable that this thesis should introduce a note of lively apprehension. Man's biological future is, after all, contingent upon his own actions, and unless solutions are found for the difficulties raised by the incorporation into practice of new scientific knowledge, the future may be one of disaster and not of progress.

Physical science has multiplied and perfected to an almost incredible extent man's capacity for interfering with his fellow-men. Awful powers have been placed in his hands, and no effort can be too great to ensure that those powers are used only after examination, patient study, and a determination dispassionately to discover how they may be utilized without injustice and for the good of the race. Before the present development of rapid means of transport and the perfection of means of communication of all kinds, it was at least possible for the rebel to escape and hide; it was possible for the persecuted minority, to a certain extent, to evade observation; distance was a reality. The triumph of Pope or Emperor was never more than partial. Can we contemplate with equanimity in any such conflict of ideas that triumph becoming complete, the lightest word of the victor being transmitted over an entire continent within a few minutes and being acted upon with ruthless and universal efficiency? It is widely held to-day that the Protestants during the reign of Queen Mary, and the Roman Catholics during the reign of Queen Elizabeth, both represented something vital and vigorous, something of permanent value to mankind. In similar circumstances to-day, would the one have been able to find a refuge in remote parts of the country or in friendly Holland, the other in Northern France? Do not let us imagine that such problems are less acute

to-day. Persecution may have assumed a less violent form—though not so in all countries—but none the less it is alive. Persecution is more efficient and minorities are more helpless than ever before. And do not let us imagine that the oppression of a minority has no biological significance. One may hesitate to believe that through persecution valuable and distinctive characteristics primarily based upon organic inheritance may be lost or heavily reduced, though even that may prove not to be impossible on occasion, but certainly all that social inheritance stands for may suffer a grievous loss. An idea may perish. The effects of rigid selection may be very rapid and, in the case of social inheritance unlike certain cases in organic inheritance, the process may proceed with ever-increasing momentum.

Here we see, in the present stage of civilization, a value in national and sub-national boundaries. A type of individual denied the opportunity of expression in a community of one type may find it in another. Such boundaries may be the best means for centuries to come of perpetuating traditions and potentialities that, in our present stage of development, would find it difficult harmoniously to co-exist.

Our own country has been notable in the past for its ready acceptance of ideas of toleration, but to-day we must deplore the fact that to a certain extent this tradition is weakening. This is not to attribute a lack of virtue to the present generation in comparison with its predecessors: it is probably more a question of fuller means of communication. Much that might have roused the prejudiced hostility of earlier generations was not brought before their notice with the vividness that we cannot escape. The lesson is rather that we should strive to recognize the fundamental conception underlying the principle of toleration and consciously to apply it.

As a concrete example, we may take the treatment of those who, for political reasons, are forced to fly from their own countries. This is one of the easiest exercises in toleration, because, while it may be difficult to view with equanimity a determined attack upon our own national institutions, it is not so difficult to take a lenient view when another country is concerned. In the past, our country enjoyed an enviable reputation for affording a secure refuge for such exiles. Even the blood-stained tyrant

of other lands, though not greeted with popular enthusiasm and acclamation, might rely upon an obscure resting-place. To-day, there is a sad change. The country that extended its hospitality to Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, and Karl Marx rejects Trotsky and expels the King of Roumania, while unpleasant sneers are not wanting that would indicate that, to a minority at least of our fellow-countrymen, the King of Spain might not be a welcome guest. Yet, there was no indication that any of these people intended to interfere in any way with our own national institutions. Is it not true that Switzerland now occupies the honoured place that once was ours? One does not necessarily ascribe a profound biological significance to single individuals, but the underlying spirit may be of fundamental biological importance.

In addition to the value of national, racial, and group differences must be added the value of individual differences. Ideas of standardisation and mass production from the sphere of industry are invading purely human fields, that of education, for example. This leads to the cult of the amateur, the conception that almost any man, perhaps after a certain amount of specialized training, perhaps without it, is fitted to undertake almost any task. In the sphere of government we hear advocated a government of business men, a government of proletarians, even, heaven forbid, a government of scientists. Few seem to regard as desirable a government of statesmen. Future generations may acquire the knowledge that will enable them to select individuals for the task of administration and to fit them by training for that end. Theirs would be the task of integrating and building up into a whole the contribution of experts of all kinds. The principles of democracy are not so popular as they were, though we in this country do not see that on the whole any alternative system now in operation is to be preferred, even if we concede that in certain special directions they may achieve useful results. Government for the people remains a generally accepted ideal, but government by the people does not command the enthusiasm of yesterday. One feels that future generations will find a solution that is essentially biological in the scientific selection and training of individuals for that duty.

But it is not only that fanaticism and passionate prejudice may deprive the race of things of value, there is another danger.

The expansion of physical science, the industrial revolution, the opening up of new lands, raised problems that had a direct influence on the outbreak of wars, wars democratic and therefore peculiarly pitiless, wars in which were utilized, for greater destruction, all the resources of that science. It cannot be denied that in the causation of those wars economic factors and ultimately factors associated with the growth of scientific knowledge were closely involved. One may reasonably hold that view without subscribing to the somewhat esoteric theory that the late war was really fought about mineral oil. To-day there is a growing sentiment that such wars are foolish, that peaceful solutions are not impossible, that the continents are wide enough, the oceans broad enough, and that it will not always transcend the wit of man to discover means that will render it unnecessary for coffee to be burnt in Brazil or the acreage of wheat to be reduced in Canada while considerable sections of the population of the world would be rather glad to have those commodities.

If it is true that we are indeed on the eve of an era of biological discovery, it may well be that a generation will arise in the near future that will think in biological terms as readily as we think in terms of mechanism. To such a generation the problems raised by those discoveries will appeal with especial vividness. The peaceful solution of economic and mechanical difficulties will not ensure a similar solution of biological difficulties. It may well be that to that generation the differences of opinion that will be revealed as discovery proceeds will appear so important, raise issues so vital, that any hope of compromise will be faint indeed. International conflict and civil disturbance will be based on causes more human, more intimate, far more likely to rouse fanaticism, a sense of injustice, of passionate anger, than could be the case when economic difficulties were primarily involved. It is not pleasant to think that mankind may have to wade through another century or more of blood before reasonable agreement is reached, always provided, of course, that civilization does not collapse in the process. Need we adopt a fatalistic attitude and regard it as inevitable that before incorporating a new body of knowledge into the practice of daily life, the whole round must be completed once again, that before reaching the pleasant slopes we must plunge through the dark valley?

The responsibility for ensuring that new powers are used for the good of the race and not to its detriment does not rest with the scientist. There is an ethical neutrality in the methods and findings of science, and the biologist will be no more responsible if his work brings disaster than was the physicist when his discoveries were utilized for destruction. The responsibility rests with the whole people. The effects of a particular course of action are particularly the province of the scientist, its merits lie altogether outside his field, and with that latter aspect he is not more concerned, and upon it is no more fitted to pronounce an opinion, than any other man or woman.

Toleration, therefore, seems to me to acquire a special importance, not the toleration of passivity, but toleration combined with the most earnest study to discover the best means of incorporating the new knowledge into practice with the greatest benefit to the race.

To sum up, I would urge that in the first place there is justification in biological science for optimism in the sense that man's biological future lies within his own conscious control, and that blind obscure forces will not stultify his efforts. In the second place, that the philanthropist and the humanitarian need not feel unduly depressed by the views of those who would assert that their efforts are leading to race degeneration. On the contrary, it is likely that those efforts will receive increasing recognition as a vital factor in the advance of man. In the last place I would suggest that we should strive to recognize that differences are valuable. Toleration, accepting that word in its wider significance, an active toleration, is not only a social virtue but an instrument of biological progress.

THE EVIDENCE FOR HUMANITY'S SURVIVAL OF PHYSICAL DEATH

TREATED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH

By SIR OLIVER LODGE, F.R.S.

PART I.

THE subject of my paper is 'The Evidence for Humanity's Survival of Physical Death: treated from the point of view of Psychical Research.' The natural and first suggestion is that I recount a number of incidents in which information is given by dead people about some incident known only to themselves and subsequently verified. There are a fair number of episodes of this kind embedded in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research*, and some of them to a student of the subject are certainly striking and of considerable interest. But, in order to be effective, the communications must deal with very trivial incidents personally connected with the deceased person, and not likely to be known to anyone else. Historical events, or occurrences of national importance, are much more likely to be known to living people, and would thus be rendered nearly useless as evidence of individual survival. But a trivial episode, say the narration of some action secretly performed by the deceased person while still in the flesh, and not known by any of his surviving relatives or indeed by any other person, would be much more suitable for a crucial posthumous test. It cannot be easy to think of information that is not or may not have been known by some surviving mind; while anything like public events that have appeared in the newspapers are obviously possibly known to a lot of people, and are thereby ruled out of account, and have to be ignored by any stringent critic, because the hypothesis of telepathy from the living person who was aware of the facts must be pressed to the uttermost before the critic can pass the evidence as entirely crucial and satisfactory.

This circumstance, the discovery that telepathy or mind reading can occur between one living individual and another

—though itself discovered in the course of our researches, and not yet universally admitted by all students of science—has become a curious obstacle or bugbear to those who wish to establish individual survival. Communications purporting to come from deceased people are, as must now be known, exceedingly numerous; but for the most part these communications, though often specially characteristic of the person supposed to send them, and often very satisfying to relatives and intimate friends, are not in themselves entirely demonstrative to the scientific critic and to outsiders. A great mass of evidence of this kind has now accumulated, and much of it is of a kind that is superficially conclusive. Affectionate and family messages giving names and other details about the family are very common, and are naturally taken to represent what would be expected of the personality concerned. They show distinct signs of surviving personality, memory, and affection; but mainly they all refer to matters well known to the recipient of the communication, and accordingly are open to the accusation of mind-reading, or to the hypothesis that the information contained, though entirely unknown to the medium employed as the means of transmitting the messages, can be supposed extracted from the mind of the sitter by some process of mind-reading unconsciously exercised by the medium: so that, though at first bowled over by the naturalness of the conversation held through a medium with the deceased person, the relative or sitter who is aware of the discovery of telepathy is subsequently afflicted with doubts as to whether the messages really came from the person ostensibly represented as sending them.

I think myself that this hypothesis of a widespread power of telepathy is very much exaggerated, and that most of the communications indicative of the surviving memory and natural affection of the deceased communicator, when they come through a good medium, are really what they purport to be. Certainly if the same kind of messages were received through a telephone from, say, a lost but living relative at a distance, the clue to his identity would be recognized as complete, and no question about his genuineness would be entertained. When the tones of the voice are reproduced, when the memories are

characteristic of the person, and when the incidents recalled are sufficiently trivial to be known to only one or two people, then the proof of identity is for all ordinary purposes accepted, and no further doubt need harass the recipient of such a telephone message. But when, as frequently happens, a message with the same strongly marked characteristics is received from one who is known to be dead, the fact to be established is so extraordinary that scepticism is bound to be pressed to extremes, and every normal possibility exaggerated, before the evidence can be considered sufficient to establish the fact beyond all doubt.

Occasionally, however, as will be seen after a study of the records of the S.P.R., it happens that a deceased communicator is so anxious to establish his identity that he has arranged before death to do some trivial thing in private—to hide, for instance, some object in a specified place—and then that he takes pains afterwards to give information about his action to some survivor, in order that it may be verified. I will give one instance of this kind of occurrence merely as a sample. It is an experiment which few people take the trouble to make, but which might be made by more if their attention was directed to the reasonableness of achieving such a proof.

CASE OF THE HALF-BRICK.

A small but significant episode is reported, after first-hand enquiries, by Dr. Richard Hodgson, well known as an emissary of the English S.P.R. in America, in the Proceedings of the S.P.R., Vol. VIII, pp. 249—251. It had been narrated in the *Religio-Philosophical Journal* for 31st January, 1891, but Dr. Hodgson made enquiries and got into correspondence with the sister of the deceased communicator, a Mrs. Finney, who wrote to him as follows:—

‘ ROCKLAND, MASS.,
19 April, 1891.

‘ For weeks and months before my brother [died] we conversed freely on the subject of spirit communion and such matters, and one morning he requested me to bring him a small piece of brick, also pen and ink; he then made two marks on one side and one on the other with the ink, then, breaking the brick in two, gave me one piece, telling me at the time to take care of it, and some day he would hide the other piece away where no one but himself would know, and after leaving the form, if possible, would return in some way and tell me

where it was. I could then compare them together, and it would be a test that he could return and communicate, and *my mind* could not have any influence over it, as I did not know where he put it.

‘After he left the form our anxiety was *very great* to hear and learn all we could of communicating with spirits, and for months we got nothing satisfactory.

‘We then commenced sitting at the table at home (mother and myself), which we did for some little time; at last it commenced tipping, and by calling the alphabet spelled out where we could find the piece of brick that he put away—that was the way we got the test.’

In a later letter she adds, under date 3rd May, 1891 :—

[The message we received was] “‘You will find that piece of brick in the cabinet under the tomahawk.” I went to that room and took the key, unlocked the cabinet, which had not been touched by anyone after he locked it and put away the key. There I found that piece of brick just as it had spelled out, and it corresponded with the piece I had retained, fitting on exactly where he broke it off the piece I had. It was wrapped in a bit of paper and tucked into a shell, and placed in the bottom of the cabinet *exactly under* the tomahawk, as was spelled out by the alphabet.’

And then, in response to further questions, she adds on May 11th :—

‘The piece of brick was entirely concealed in the shell, so that it could not be seen from outside of cabinet. It was wrapped in a piece of paper stuck together with mucilage and tucked into the end of the shell, then a piece of paper gummed over that, so that nothing was visible from the shell. The shell was on the lower shelf of the cabinet, and only the top of the shell was visible outside the cabinet.’

And later again :—

‘I send you by express a box containing the letter and shell with the piece of brick. I have placed one piece in the shell just as it was when I found it, so you can see how nicely it was concealed in the shell. The papers that were around it then are worn out. You can retain them if you like, as I do not care for them now. To me it is a positive truth that he did communicate to us, and our minds could have nothing to do with it. . . .

‘The shell was placed on the same shelf with the tomahawk and no other shells on that shelf. It was placed with the open side down, and the tomahawk stood directly over it. I cannot say why he did not tell us to look inside of the shell. We started to look as soon as he told us. It was in the cabinet under the tomahawk. We did not wait for any more to be said.’

To this Dr. Hodgson adds :—

‘The shell is a large Triton, about ten inches long. The piece of brick was wrapped in folds of soft paper and tucked deeply into the recess. Another piece of paper was then gummed around the sides of the shell in the interior, so as absolutely to prevent the piece of brick from falling out. When I received the shell from Mrs. Finney and looked into the interior and shook the shell violently, there was

nothing to indicate that the shell contained anything but the piece of gummed paper.

'The piece of brick in the shell weighs about one and a half ounces, and the piece of brick retained by Mrs. Finney weighs about two and a quarter ounces. The shell with the piece of brick and paper wrapping weighs about eleven and a half ounces.

'Mrs. Finney also forwarded me the letter written by her brother. The shell and the pieces of brick and the letter are now all in my possession.'

The 'letter' last referred to by Mrs. Finney is a sentence which the deceased had deposited with his sister, sealed, in order later to be posthumously deciphered; the sentence is so trite and commonplace as not to be much evidence, though to the sister it was likewise conclusive, since he gave through the table the very words written in the sealed envelope.

The incident is narrated thus:—

'One more little incident I will mention, for to me it is as valuable as the other. He wrote me a letter (about the time he gave me the piece of brick) and sealed it, saying at the time it was not to be answered, but the contents of the letter to be told. I got that in the same way as I did the other, by calling the alphabet and the table tipping. It was these words:

"Julia! do right and be happy.—Benja."

'That was correct. Just the contents of my letter. I have no particular objection as to giving my name, for I have stated nothing but the truth.

(Signed) JULIA A. FINNEY.'

Another instance of a somewhat similar kind is described by Mr. E. F. Benson under the guise of fiction, for which, however, I have reason to believe that there is some substantial foundation, near the end of his book called *Up and Down*, where the deceased communicator, a young man killed in the War, had hidden in what he called a 'cache' three distinct objects, and then after death told his friend what they were, so that he could verify the statement.

An authentic case is narrated in full by Mrs. Sidgwick in the 'Proceedings' of the S.P.R., Vol. XXXI, pages 253—257, but this statement I must greatly abbreviate. Its date is 1917, and the information was obtained through the mediumship of Mrs. Leonard and her control 'Feda' by a lady (Mrs. Hugh Talbot) who was a complete novice at the subject, and who treated it at first as an absurdity not worth following up. The communicator was her deceased husband, who was anxious to convince her of his identity; so he tried to tell her of an old

note- or scrap-book of his, about which she knew nothing, but which after a hunt she succeeded in finding at the back of a dusty shelf. The statement of the communicator was that she would know the book when she found it by finding in it a diagram of Aryan and Semitic languages, with lines branching out and connecting the different entries. A number of details were given with much reiteration and signs of anxiety lest his wife should not understand and not take the trouble to verify. The communicator also asked her to read page 12 or 13 of this book, as it contained something that interested him now very much. She did not at first take the steps necessary to find the book; but ultimately she was urged by a niece to do so, and reports as follows:—

‘I wanted to wait till the next day, saying I knew it was all nonsense. However, in the end I went to the bookshelf, and after some time, right at the back of the top shelf I found one or two old note-books belonging to my husband, which I had never felt I cared to open. One, a shabby black leather, corresponded in size to the description given, and I absent-mindedly opened it, wondering in my mind whether the one I was looking for had been destroyed or only sent away. To my utter astonishment, my eyes fell on the words, “Table of Semitic or Syro-Arabian Languages,” and, pulling out the leaf, which was a long folded piece of paper pasted in, I saw on the other side “General Table of the Aryan and Indo-European Languages.” It was the diagram of which Feda had spoken. I was so taken aback, I forgot for some minutes to look for the extract. When I did I found it on page thirteen. I have copied it out exactly.’

On page 13 there is an extract representing the feelings of a person at the point of death, or rather the sensations of a man passing through death, and seeing the faces of people whom he knew had already gone over. It is an extract from an anonymous book called *Post Mortem*, published by Blackwood in 1881.

The lady adds:—

‘I do not attempt to reproduce the diagram of languages, which is complicated, but Feda’s description of it as having lines going out from a centre is correct; this branching out from points and from lines happens repeatedly.’

She says:—

‘I cannot account now for my stupidity in not attaching more importance to what Feda was trying to say about the book . . . [but] it was only my second sitting. I knew nothing of mediums and the descriptions seemed so endless and tedious.’

There are other cases of the same general character, which can be looked up in the 'Proceedings' of the S.P.R. :—

Vol. VIII, page 200 and page 248;

Vol. XVII, pages 181—182;

Vol. XXXV, page 511;

Vol. XXXVI, pages 303—5; and then the strange and well evidenced finding of a will on page 517, which I have narrated in my book called *Why I Believe in Personal Immortality* (Cassell).

This last is a sample of the kind of episode when the object to be found is regarded, at least by the survivor, as of some value, and therefore stays in the memory, and can be used afterwards as a test when the opportunity occurs for giving posthumous information about it.

Such episodes have been known for generations. Some of them, occurring in the life of Swedenborg, were recorded by the philosopher Kant, when comparatively a young man, though subsequently he seems to have taken a dislike to the subject, and did not adhere to his first enthusiasm, so that he spoiled his little book, *Traüme der Geisterseher*, by a kind of hedging appropriate to the incredulity of those times.

But now I apprehend that I ought not to take up the time of this august body by narratives which, whatever their significance may be, have a superficial air of triviality. I just want to insist that the triviality is part of their merit, and to say that, if I myself find an opportunity of communicating, I shall try to establish my identity by detailing a perfectly preposterous and absurdly childish peculiarity, which I have already taken the trouble to record with some care in a sealed document deposited in the custody of the English S.P.R. I hope to remember the details of this document, and relate them in unmistakable fashion. The value of the communication will not consist in the substance of what is communicated, but in the fact that I have never mentioned it to a living soul, and no one has any idea what it contains. People of sense will not take its absurd triviality as anything but helpful in contributing to the proof of the survival of personal identity.

What I want now to do is to tackle the question of the theory of survival from a theoretical point of view, as an outcome of my lifelong study of physics; for I expect that it is as a physicist that I have been invited to speak to you.

There are a number of evidences for survival accumulated by the S.P.R., much studied by the leaders of that body, and more favourably regarded by them than these sporadic instances of communications about family affairs. They are of a different character, and consist of evidences of scholarship, given through comparatively uneducated mediums, and the whole ingenious system of cross-correspondences which originated from some of our deceased members on the other side who were acquainted with the difficulty raised by telepathy and took special steps to overcome it. These communications are remarkably interesting and cogent when studied, but to make these clear as evidence would require a considerable time to be given to each of them, so I have limited myself to the simplest kind of evidential communications.

PART II.

When we consider the question of Survival from the physical point of view we are up against the ancient problem of the connexion between mind and body. The body is certainly made of matter, but matter is inert, it never does anything, it is completely controlled by the forces acting upon it, which forces exist in the empty space surrounding the atoms. Left to itself, matter merely continues in whatever state it was last made to accept. If it was spinning it continues to spin with constant angular momentum. It has no power of changing its state or of stopping. If it was in a state of locomotion, that motion also continues unaltered. This is called the law of inertia, and to it all material atoms are absolutely obedient, whether they form part of an engine or of a clockwork mechanism or of an animated body. There is no exception. All matter is inert.

If any change is observed in atomic or material behaviour, it is a sign of some activity, some energy apart from matter demonstrating its existence by acting upon matter and causing some acceleration or retardation proportionate to the force exerted. This is called the second law of motion. Motion results

from the expenditure of energy: *i.e.* by the transmission of energy from one body to another. No energy is lost or destroyed, it is merely transferred. What the ether loses the material body gains, and vice versa. Furthermore, every kind of energy known to us exists in the empty space between the atoms and exerts equal force upon the boundary atoms at either end of that space, so that every action is accompanied by an equal opposite reaction. This is called the third law of motion, or it might be called the law of energy. Energy only makes itself manifest by its effect on material bodies, but its main existence is in space. We have no sense organ for perceiving energy itself, our senses tell us of nothing but matter. We can see the results of energy as expended upon matter, but we have no direct apprehension of the energy. We are not acquainted with anything in the universe save by its effect upon matter, and that is the origin of our tendency to philosophic materialism; we are liable to doubt whether things not apparent to the senses can have a real existence, though there is no justification for such a doubt.

The physical universe does not consist of matter alone. If it did it would be absolutely inert, no change would ever occur. Experience shows us constant change, constant activity; and when analysed the source of this activity is always found in the field or space between the atoms. That is where the energy exists, that is where it is stored; and we can gradually realize that it is through interaction between the void and the material particles that every change or activity is accomplished. A field of force always exists in what we call vacuum or ether, what the Ancients called void; never does it exist in matter. Yet force is only made manifest by matter. It is only by observing the behaviour of material bodies that we can become aware of the existence of a field of force or of a seat of energy. Energy is constant in amount, but it takes various forms. The form with which we are best acquainted is the form of motion, and that is the only form ever associated with matter. All the other forms are hidden and make no impression upon us, save when they encounter material particles and thus display their existence. No one, for instance, could experience a magnetic field without a bit of iron to test it with. No one has any knowledge of the broadcast waves which now surround us unless they have a suit-

able detecting apparatus in the form of a wireless set and a telephone. And strange to say we can only appreciate light when it impinges upon some piece of matter and thence is deflected into the eyes. When we see a lighthouse or searchlight beam tracking its way across space, it is not the beam that we observe, but the dust particles which are illuminated by it. We only see material objects: we have no sense for radiation itself, nor for an electric current, only for its activity in affecting various kinds of matter. We only know of an electric current by the deflexion of a compass needle, or by some thermal or chemical effect which it produces. These are only specific instances of a quite general law.

We cannot understand the activity of the material universe without taking energy into account, and this energy exists in the space between the particles. Matter is discontinuous, consisting of isolated particles; they are connected only through space. But inasmuch as this space is impregnated with energy, it must be something more than mere emptiness. It makes no impression on our senses, and yet it is full of energy, and is the reservoir of all activity; hence we have agreed to call it the Ether. A magnetic field exists wholly in the Ether, iron filings are only used to demonstrate it and map it out. An electric, a gravitational, field are in the same predicament. Cohesion too, and indeed every action between material particles is an affair of the ether. In no other way can one piece of matter act on another. Every kind of physical action is really transmitted across space—that is through the ether—just as really, though not so obviously, as electric and magnetic attraction, gravitation, and light. Atoms and their constituents are never in contact. Ether forces or ether strains have to be appealed to, when we try really to understand the most ordinary activities in daily life. Even a simple push is exerted through an infinitesimal layer of ether. Every variety of potential energy exists in the ether: matter has no mercy except kinetic; and recently an etherial explanation of even that kind of energy shows signs of emerging from the theory of relativity.

Animated matter differs in no respect from every other kind of matter, except that it is subject to animation. So when we say that life only exists in a material organism we ought to say that life only manifests itself in association with such an organism,

and that when it is dissociated from matter we know nothing of its existence. We have no right to say that it is extinct. All that we know is that it is no longer manifest, it has gone out of our ken. But the same may be said of every form of energy : in itself it has no power of becoming known to us but by its effect on material bodies. A body under the action of life can do many things, can initiate spontaneous movements, can build up an organism, can operate on the physical universe, and leave structures behind it of interest and beauty, but it is not the material body that does these things ; they are due to the life or animation of the body.

If then we can adduce any evidence that life or mental activity exists in space, and only sporadically makes itself evident by some material activity, the state of our present knowledge of physics renders our acceptance of the fact entirely harmonious. We have to do no violence to our physical conceptions if we admit the fact of survival. Life and mind never were functions of the material body, they only displayed themselves by means of the material organism. The organism was not essential to their existence, but only to their display, that is to our apprehension of them. If they ever find means of operating in a novel or unusual manner on a physical organism, then they may still manifest their continued existence ; and that is exactly what they do. Why should we decline to receive the evidence ?

Telepathy shows that mind can act on mind without the use of any bodily organs, hence certain people may have a faculty of apprehending a spiritual world direct ; and this may account for genius and inspiration. This has been well argued by F. W. H. Myers, and I shall not labour it now.

If you have evidence of the existence of a spiritual world, a world of help and guidance and sympathy, then you can hold to it in face of every denial of the materials, who can only base their denial on the absence of any sensory stimulus to their material organism. Such a world may exist all round us, and yet can only be spiritually discerned. The faculty of discernment does exist in some people, and their positive evidence overweighs a wilderness of negation from people whose perceptions are limited to the bodily senses. One of the most elementary forms of discernment is (rather absurdly) called psychometry. An ob-

ject put into their hands may convey more information than the senses can give. A psychometrist can tell something of its history, something of its association, something of its possessor. By special faculty they can tell far more than could be arrived at by chemical tests. They can tell, for instance, that a bit of stone has formed part of a pyramid, or that a ring has taken part in a scene of slaughter, or that a piece of writing or a drawing has been done by a certain person normally quite unknown to them, and can even tell what the circumstances of that person were at the time, and what they were doing. The faculty of psychometry is apparently unknown to or disbelieved in by my friend the Bishop of Birmingham. If he took it into consideration he might modify—not his main doctrine, but some of his expressions concerning the beliefs of others.

The existence of a spiritual world throughout the depths of space is becoming to me a great and fundamental, even a physical, reality. The manifestation of that world in connexion with material organism on one or other of the planets is a comparatively trifling and temporary episode, of great importance doubtless in the history of evolutionary development, but our real existence is not dependent on a material organism. Our spiritual and real home is in the ether of space.

Chemists and biochemists are liable to limit themselves unduly to the purely material aspect of things. A chemist's business is to deal with matter in its various forms : that is his job, and he need not be expected to go beyond it. A physicist takes into account the ether as well, though he may for a time prefer to call it space. He is not limited to material particles, but studies the fields of force which connect them and make them active. The psychologist goes further still, and studies the action of mind. I would I could say that the biologist is a student of life, but at present the tendency is for him only to study animated organisms and their behaviour, limiting his attention to what is manifested by the material processes brought about by life, and not thinking that life has any existence apart from its instrument of manifestation. We shall never understand the universe by attending to matter alone and ignoring everything which makes it active and interesting. We cannot even understand the bending of a steel spring nor the fall of a raised weight without implicitly taking

the ether into account. We are continually making experiments on the ether and realizing the consequences of its abundant qualities. If we make the assumption that it is a physical vehicle for life and mind too we are only extending our generalization in the same direction.

A supplementary and semi-physical treatment of Survival is now becoming possible; a treatment which is well calculated to replace the old materialistic view that man had only a material body, and that when that body died and decayed, the animation, the personality, and the individual, necessarily ceased to exist. It is also well calculated to replace the popular idealistic notion that any spirit which survives the death of the material body must survive in an entirely disembodied condition and be out of relationship with the physical universe. Many people suppose that it then belongs to another order of existence, or, as some would say, of non-existence; that it is likely to be free from any relationship even with Space and Time, and must have departed entirely out of our ken; so that communication or intercourse is no longer possible, until perhaps at some future day when the material body shall have been somehow resuscitated and restored to its old function, in glorified form, so that the spirit can resume its active control. That this superstitious idea has been prevalent is testified to by popular modes of expression, such as :

‘ On the resurrection morning all their dead the graves restore :
 Father, mother, sister, brother meet once more.’

This depressing notion of future existence—if it can be called existence in the interim—is not a scientific or psychological view at all; but it has been the religious view through mediaeval times, hymns and liturgies are saturated with it, and it continues to this day the chief representation of what by strictly orthodox people is meant by Survival.

A modern theory which seeks to provide the emancipated spirit with any kind of organism related to the physical world, might thus be ranked as a return to a modified form of materialism. For though, when properly understood, the view I advocate ought to emancipate us from materialistic bugbears, and although it wholly condemns the idea that flesh and blood or any particles of terrestrial matter are revived and inherit Eternal Life, yet

popular ignorance of what is meant by the Ether, and of the certain fact that the Ether is a part of the physical universe and has definite properties which can be experimented on and ascertained, may well suggest all manner of difficulties in understanding the hypothesis I am trying to expound. Wherefore it will probably be considered unsatisfactory, both by the scientific materialist and by the theologian; possibly also by some spiritualists.

The necessity for some kind of organ or instrument or habitation for an emancipated spirit has been intuitively felt by many inspired writers. The most ancient classical idea was that of a condition rather melancholy—homeless, wistful, shadowy and sad—but this notion was improved upon even in later classical times. ‘Not unclothed but clothed upon,’ ‘God giveth it a body,’ are modes of expression very familiar to readers of St. Paul’s epistles.

The existence of a spiritual body is an idea, in one form or another, at least as old as St. Paul. It has been upheld by some of the Greek Fathers of the Church; it has been vaguely in the mind of many modern investigators; sundry obscure and supernormal facts seem to lend it strong support. And recently an etheric version of such a body has been approved—and, if not inculcated, at any rate regarded as a step in the right direction—by some of the more thoughtful and philosophically minded communicators ‘on the other side.’

What they know by experience is that, though discarnate, they are certainly not disembodied: they feel no more disembodied than we do. They tell us that they still have substantial instruments of manifestation which serve for intercourse among each other, and that it is through this permanent instrument that they are able, occasionally and under certain conditions, to operate indirectly, through our organisms, on the matter of this planet. They operate with more difficulty than in the old days, partly because they have to make use of other people’s mechanism; but still, subject to many restrictions, they exert influence in a somewhat similar way, and thereby are able occasionally to know what we are doing; and they claim sometimes to succeed in helping and stimulating us, not only mentally but physically.

Now, although the departed may not understand fully and completely of what their present body is composed, or how they operate on it so as to produce the results they design and aim at, they are still only in the same predicament as they were when here, and as we are now. For we do not know how we control our bodies of matter, nor what the nature of the connexion between mind and matter is. We know that we have muscles and nerves and brain-centres. We can dissect and describe this part of the mechanism. But how a physiological instrument—how any kind of mechanism—can think and feel and plan and will and remember and hope and love, we certainly cannot explain. And probably we never shall be able to explain how such a thing can happen; for the thing to be explained does not happen, it is only imagined to happen through a misapprehension. The truth is that it is we ourselves who really do all the psychical things: we employ our bodies only as instruments for recording transmitting our thoughts and for exercising muscular action on matter. The body itself neither thinks nor wills nor sees nor feels. It is an instrument, a channel, a medium.

Although full explanations about our method of controlling a body are not yet forthcoming—either on this side or on that—yet those ‘on the other side’ are quite willing to accept the suggestion that their bodies, which to them feel so substantial, and all the surroundings in which they exist, are related to the thing which we here call the Ether, very much in the same way as they used to be related to the familiar thing known as Matter.

That ether is a very substantial entity, far denser than any form of matter, has been gradually becoming clear to physicists. At first we only said that it must be denser than lead or gold or platinum, but now we find that it must be out of all proportion denser. I have made an estimate of its density, in the light of electromagnetic theory, and it comes out inevitably huge. Every cubic millimetre contains as much substance as what, if it were matter, we should call a thousand tons. As the ether is not matter in the ordinary sense of the term, our ordinary units of measurement are inappropriate; but, on the analogy of matter, the ether is of the order a million million times as dense

as water. All its properties are of supernormal magnitude. Its rate of vibration which enables us to see any ordinary object is five hundred million million per second, a number so great that to try to conceive such a number of vibrations per second simply dizzies us. The number of seconds which have passed since ancient geological periods of twenty million years ago is about this number. Yet we familiarly make use of these vibrations. Our wonderful organ the eye is constructed so as to cope with them in the easiest possible manner. And most people are ignorant—as ignorant as are the animals—of the strange etherial environment amid which we all live, and of which the vibrations convey to us so much information, and awaken so keenly our sense of beauty.

Until instructed, we can hardly help thinking of matter as dense, and of ether as tenuous, but that is a poetic illusion associated with the term 'ethereal.' It is an illusion based on the testimony of our senses, which, as so often happens, have to be corrected by deeper insight into the real nature of things. Matter appeals to us so strongly, not because it is anything but a gossamer-like or milky-way existence in the vast continuity of ether, but because our obvious bodies are made of matter, and because our animal sense organs are specially adapted to existence in association with matter, and give us information about nothing else. Even light, which we *know* is an ether vibration, tells us nothing about itself without study; what it tells us familiarly is—not about light, but—about the material objects which have emitted or scattered or differentially absorbed it. We get this information by life-long, indeed age-long, inherited and instinctive experience. We interpret the luminous indications without difficulty, and we forget the strangely complex nature of the processes which underlie all our channels of information; we only find their true nature out when phenomena are fundamentally analysed and seriously cross-questioned. When we have pursued this line of investigation for many years, we find that the important thing in the physical universe is ether, and that matter is trivial in comparison. Yet we can freely admit that matter takes such splendid and beautiful forms that it is worthy of the continued study of generations of scientific men; and we

need not wonder that they become so enthusiastic over its properties that they are able to imagine it the sole reality in existence.

CONCLUSION.

The revolution in physical science which has been going on all through this century has had the effect of directing our main attention away from material bodies and concentrating it on the multifarious happenings in space. In my belief this process will go further, for that is where our real existence lies, and there is our spiritual home.

I sympathize with the broad-minded efforts of Modern Churchmen to attain spiritual truth, and so far as I can offer any contribution, it is to say that in the interaction of ether and matter the problems of psychology must find their solution, that our existence is essentially independent of this material organism that we have constructed and use for a time, that matter only serves as an index or pointer demonstrating the unseen activity all around, and that chief among the unseen activities are all the marvellous achievements of a Spiritual World.

IMMORTALITY AND ETERNAL LIFE

By the Rev. J. S. BEZZANT, M.A., Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford,
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DISCUSSION of immortality has been likened to a depreciation of the currency: the more there is of it the less it is worth. Perhaps it is that we remember how, in the presence of death, the strife of tongues passes from our ears, and that it is natural to us to lay our hand upon our mouth, as we realize that faith is not knowledge, and speculation is neither. Certain it is that, of all questions, that of existence beyond death can the least profitably be discussed in isolation; the answers we give are predetermined by what we believe about God, the world, and man. Multitudes who have no definite beliefs on these subjects are strangely content with a vague feeling that death is not the end, though the feeling never attains to a life-directing conviction. When this is true of otherwise thoughtful people the reason is probably that given by Dr. Broad,¹ namely, that all experience of myself is of myself as conscious and active, and the practical needs of daily life force me to think of myself as going to exist in the future. It is hard to break with the habits of a lifetime and to imagine my non-existence. But a little reflection shows that even knowledge of survival after death would be without value: certainly in itself it could not decide those questions of God, the world and man, the answers to which determine our faith, indifference or unbelief about immortality. For there are no independent reasons why existence should not be trivial, wretched or evil in two or ten lives as in one. Knowledge of the bare fact that "death is not the end" might disclose to us a terrible prospect while removing the hope of escaping it. Unless reasonable faith in immortality and eternal life are justified by what we can know in this life, and by events which have happened and do happen in this world, those who knew the mere fact that life was continued after death might be of all men most miserable; they

¹ *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 524.

would need to know of that life more than they know of this before the prospect of immortality could afford any consolation that they should desire it. The only vital interest in immortality is whether or no death ends all that is best in personal life. What is at stake is the permanence of the highest that we know and the best of which we wish we were capable. That is eternal life, our supreme value.

Nevertheless in the title of my paper eternal life is rightly linked with immortality. For we know of values only in relation to persons; valuation is a personal activity. To talk of "the reality of eternal values," while ignoring or leaving open the question whether there are immortal bearers of them, is to indulge in meaningless speech. Truth is a value; but truth is not in bare fact, but in the correspondence of mind with fact. 'Value,' apart from concrete values which are 'values *for*' a Person or persons, is an abstraction without actuality, and not to be distinguished from nonentity. The non-existent is valueless unless, as the result of illusion or self-deception, it assumes a fictitious value which is really vain deceit.

But this truth is not reversible. From the fact that certain ideals have value, even supreme value, there is no direct passage to the assertion that they are constitutive of any reality beyond ourselves. The only judgment of fact which by themselves they can authorize is the judgment that they have value for us. They may be and are outraged; and from the fact that they are values for us, we certainly cannot assert that they and their present bearers, or any others, will be preserved for ever. Groundless faith or credulity may give gallant confidence or even private certitude that they will be, but reasonable faith must discern other grounds for its certitude that they are more than values for us. For us it is intolerable that persons should be burnt for erroneous religious opinions, but from that valuation we may not infer that human bodies are incombustible.²

The upshot of this is that, if it stands alone, there is no force in what is often regarded as the strongest argument for immortality, namely, the moral argument. Indeed, no such argument is purely moral. In the course of the statement of nearly all forms of it, there are introduced elements which are not

² The illustration is Dr. Tennant's.

purely moral,—elements which assume that existence is also purposeful. In the resulting combination, the moral considerations gain a new significance which in their own nature they cannot have, for they thus become the culmination of a teleological argument. It therefore seems to me that the necessary presupposition of any discussion of immortality as more than a groundless hope depends on the reasonableness of a belief about the world, and of the status of mind and personal life within it, of which ethical Theism is the most reasonable account; or else, in some way I see not, ethical Theism must be known to be true in direct experience³ in such wise as to obliterate the natural inferences against it.

We have heard much to the effect that man, as a phenomenal creature, belongs to Nature. His body and the moulding of his mentality are 'of a piece with' or 'organic to' Nature: man is 'the child of Nature.' We must therefore avoid the common error which arises when, having admitted all this, men proceed to interpret Nature in terms which are not true of man, and are only partially adequate if man is left out of Nature. Thus to ignore Nature's maternity renders the account "scientifically partial and philosophically insignificant." All that we know of Nature's continuity and man's vital connexions therewith is against the opinion that man is the result of an unintentional accident. It may be that every stage in the advance from the amoeba to man, if taken separately, can be explained in naturalistic terms without resort to teleological design or causation. But this procedure is apt to ignore the *meaning* of the essential part played by the environment, both physical and organic. When its significance is taken into account, non-teleological explanation is far less plausible. Whatever meaning we attach to 'selection' when used of apparently non-self-conscious organisms, there can be no possibility of conspiracy between them and an unconscious environment. If 'selection' possibly determines the variations which arise, the environment certainly determines which shall remain: its is the larger part. Nothing in the organism is of itself decisive. If terms like 'unconscious purpose' are not entirely without meaning, they imply a tend-

³ The phrase here includes Revelation, for unintelligible Revelation is not to be distinguished from nonsense.

ency or an 'urge' in Nature as a whole towards what men, as valuing subjects, estimate as progress from lower to higher. Now concerted human scheming often entirely fails, and would be more frequently disastrous but for the correction which conscious and reflecting intelligence supplies. Yet, if purpose and teleological causation are ruled out, we must ascribe to 'Nature' (apart from man) an 'urge' which has gone to the mark in the essentials on all critical occasions. If so, in the words of Dr. Tennant :

"Nature's 'unconscious wisdom' must vastly exceed the sapience and foresight of humanity. . . . In fact, the theory requires us to believe that Nature keeps her head, which *ex hypothesi* is brainless, through all the changes and chances of cosmic history." ⁴

We divide and sub-divide Nature for purposes of detailed departmental study. Each of the sciences abstracts its data from Nature's totality; by a further process of abstraction these sections are reduced to formulae and 'conceptions,' and when conclusions about Nature as a whole are offered, it is often taken for granted that what has been left out really is not there. It is the 'togetherness' of the various fields of science which is our primary datum, and which is the most marvellous thing about them. The distinct science-data are not really separate because they are separable, but are parts of a whole wondrously continuous and interconnected, and utterly interdependent. When a sufficient ground and explanation is sought (it may be that the impression produced in a mind is not rationally accountable), but for myself I can but say that design is suggested more strongly than in the days when 'the argument from design' had not fallen into the contempt which has since become its lot. To demonstrate the marvellous complexities of Nature is but to declare the fact which demands explanation; if man is 'of a piece with Nature,' Nature herself has raised that demand. If all was predetermined by the original cosmic elements, still nothing ultimate is explained. We cannot say "Nature wisely arranged it," because Nature has no wisdom. If she reveals it, it is Another's.⁵ That something should exist, and not just no-

⁴ F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. 2, p. 108, to which this paragraph owes much. See also Prof. A. E. Taylor's *Essay in Essays Catholic and Critical*.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

thing, is the last mystery. It is beyond resolution whether the final mystery be God or an ultimate pluralism, and in addition the latter hypothesis entirely fails to explain why the ultimate many should have arranged themselves so as to be even partially intelligible, while belief in an intelligent Creator reduces the mystery inasmuch as a possible and sufficient reason is suggested. And it is *that* in which explanation consists, not in the narrower logically rational coherence of a series of abstractions which are demonstrably man-made.⁶ The necessity of the broader sort of explanation is thrust upon us by the world itself, and action upon it is essential to intelligent life. Without it, more abstractive intellection could never have arisen. Processes which are necessary to worthy existence may have deeper roots than the flimsy arguments by which immaturity attempts to justify or to refute them. Nature which is "as fatalistic as mechanism, and yet as value-realizing as man," is not self-explicable. If teleology and its indication of Theistic purposive direction are rejected,

"the only alternative is to regard the self-subsistent entities, of which the world is constituted, as comparable with letters of type which have shuffled themselves not only into a book or a literature but also into a reader commanding the particular tongue in which the book utters its unintentional meaning."⁷

If a man's mind can rest in such an 'explanation' there is no more to be said. Let us not accuse him of lack of faith, and let him accuse no one of credulity. For such a man the ground has been cut away from any appeal which otherwise may legitimately be made to and from the facts of the moral life. On a teleological basis, but not without it, the significance of the moral and other values is that we are forced to advance from thinking of existence as ingeniously constructed to recognize that it exists for a purpose, and to see something of what that purpose includes, though they do not declare to us the whole counsel of God. Our ignorance is vast, and its reduction will doubtless improve our attempts at understanding. But if theology has often yielded to the temptation to build upon ignor-

⁶ An 'explanation,' after all, is a solution in which the human mind can rest, and it is not necessarily affected by further examination of the separate units which are explained as a whole. Faith, by its very nature, does not demand that its sufficient reasonable grounds should be logically coercive.

⁷ *Philosophical Theology*, II, p. 111.

ance, criticism of theology has also proceeded as though our ignorance could be used to invalidate what we do know, and to pour scorn upon reasonable inferences from our knowledge, such as are not baseless speculations. Out of ignorance no one can extract anything but ignorance, and blessed are those who are content to call it by its name.⁸

There is another presupposition, — (I do not think it is a *supposition*), — closely connected with the one we have already discussed, without which the hope of an immortal eternal life is, in my judgment, vain. It is the reality and fundamental activity of the soul, which is quite distinct from the old idea of soul-substance or soul-stuff. I am aware that to believe in the existence of the soul is out of date; it is even held in benign contempt by some of the theologians who are learned in what used to be called the 'new' psychology, and whom only the strictest would accuse of heresy. Even our theology has become so departmentalized that denial in one sphere can easily overlook its consequences in another. That analytical psychology can dispense with the conception of the soul does not prove that it is not real, or that theology can safely deny it. The arguments which are deemed destructive of the actuality of the soul seem to me equally destructive of the actuality of God. The issue must be stated rather than argued. The case for the reality of the soul, or ego, is that our consciousness involves a subject thereof which is *aware* of consciousness. If there be no continuant active in the simplest sensation of new-born life, no explanation is forthcoming of why our manifold and discrete sensations ever achieve the unity of mental life which demonstrably exists; and inasmuch as no hard and fast line can be drawn between perception and conception, still less is there any explanation of how our haphazard sensations and perceptions give rise to developed conceptions. Of the soul, there is no direct or 'pure' experience: it is known inferentially, and only at the level of

⁸ We need not anxiously anticipate future advances of science. 'Life' is an ultimate which we just have to accept. Suppose it were some day produced experimentally: what would be observed would be a certain type of behaviour, from which the presence of life would be inferred. That success will only have been achieved at a very high level of intelligence, and it will remain quite as unreasonable as it is now that it was originally produced in Nature on so vast a scale by any lower intelligence.

awareness of consciousness. But it is none the less active in all consciousness, for there are no perceivings that are not acts or states of a subject, known as an actuality because it acts. The soul can be immeasurably enriched and developed into a personal self through and in its experiences; but to hold that it is constituted in being out of non-existence by its experiences, like a string of pearls without the string, is to make the unity of mental life, its temporal continuity, its character and its increasing purposiveness, inexplicable, just as the self-constitution of an ordered cosmos out of an *ultimate* pluralism is inexplicable; for there is then no reason why a person should not be 'a legion of incompatibles.' Instead of an abiding soul, it is often maintained that the manifold experiences of a personal life are connected and unified by their own nature.⁹ This assumes not only imaginary and causal laws, but also that they are known without the previous activity of the permanent subject. The tail wags the dog. The activity implied in consciousness is confused with its results. If we hold that the body, and in particular the brain, is the only synthesizing agent, I can see no reason why we should suppose that personal life, or moral and other values, survive the dissolution of the body, which manifestly has no permanent distinction from its environment. On the other hand, we may reject materialism and its consequent epiphenomenalism, and satisfy ourselves, in spite of all the difficulties, that the

⁹ The difficulties which arise are well illustrated in *The Idea of Immortality*, by the late Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison. Hume is criticized for taking 'perceptions' as "independently existing facts without any principle of organic connexion between them," yet there is 'relative truth' in Hume's statement that "they are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind," if the words are taken "simply as a negative criticism of the traditional doctrine of the simple identical self." It is the "idea of system or of the unity in multiplicity which characterizes a state or an organism" which "supplies just what was lacking in Hume's original account of the soul." "If we must indulge our imagination with some picture of some bearer of the conscious life, let us be satisfied with the body." At the same time, the mind is not to be thought of "as no more than detached consciousness floating off from the body at intervals." There is "an individual centre" which is "defined or determined at the outset by the bodily organism." What is the 'individual centre' if it is not an active actuality? How does the 'system' or 'unity in multiplicity' arise without an active subject which *lives through* all the multiplicity? If it is the body which not only determines but, as Prof. Pringle-Pattison does not suggest, *constitutes* the mind, is not epiphenomenalism the inference which makes a minimum of assumptions?

continuity of conscious mental life requires no spiritual actuality to account for it other than the inherent power of experiences to form themselves into a conscious continuing subject. But if so, there seem to me to be no *conceivable* facts which can conduct to the probability of Theism, as distinct from an evolving Pantheism, which offers no ground for belief in *personal* immortality. By these sentences, I do not suppose myself to be proving anything, but only to be stating the issues, and pointing out that our belief about immortality will be largely determined by our choice between them. It does not yet appear what we shall be, but there is no sense in discussing it except on the basis of what we are, or have good grounds for thinking ourselves, and God, to be. The soul or ego is not known except through what it does: the same is true of our knowledge of God. Nor may the soul be stigmatized as a logical abstraction because it cannot be known to exist apart from its activities. It indicates the ground or sufficient reason of conscious continuing personality, such as reasonableness cannot do without. It is parallel to the reality of God as the sufficient reason and ground of *all* existence. If there are considerations or evidence which render the one superfluous, they do no less for the other. However we may decide the issue, there is neither spirituality nor morality in shirking it and contenting ourselves with hazy verbiage and pietistic opining incubated into life in an atmosphere of emotion.

Belief that the soul exists can tell us nothing of its pre-existence or its intrinsic immortality, its whence or its whither. Creationism, and the association of the newly-created soul with a physical organism doomed to produce insanity, or to fail as a medium of full personality, only accentuates the problem of evil. Traducianism avoids this, but goes beyond the facts. Heredity of mental and personal characteristics can be otherwise accounted for, and traducianism does not account for the much more striking variations and peculiarities. The entrance into the world of a new and finite centre of conscious life cannot be identified with any special element in the cell from which it is developed. If upon the union of elements from two parents there supervenes a spiritual existence non-existent while the elements are in separation, this is the mystery in all epigenesis. Speculation as to how the soul arises or becomes embodied may

be fascinating, but it is uncontrolled by experience or any known facts, and is therefore futile. Thus, as Dr. Broad says,

“We are not really in a position to say that the *complete* conditions of so singular an event as the manifestation of a new mind through a new body are contained in the material world.”¹⁰

If man is an embodied soul, and the world in which human personality is something like a culmination is most reasonably interpreted by Theism, immortality is not proved, but all grounds for negation are removed. It can still be urged that we ought not to assume more reasonableness in the universe than we actually find, and that we do not know that it is perfectly reasonable. But if the facts do not preclude, but rather suggest, ethical Theism as the most reasonable interpretation, the interpretation may involve more than the facts themselves. On this basis the moral argument for immortality becomes the strongest, and inclusive of the others. The moral life, which at the highest is love, the best of men recognize as their own ideal without which life would become a terrible retrogression : it must therefore be dominant in the Divine purpose, though not the whole of it. If so, a world in which the ideals derived from God can only be realized in the meagre degree alone possible for multitudes of hampered and short-lived human creatures, can only be a part of the Divine purpose. As Dr. Rashdall used to say, if life in this world were all, would any of us care to be responsible for it as it is? It is not that we rebel because good cannot be had without pain and evil, but that, without immortality, the good that is, though still good, is not worth the cost. It is too transitory, and in the valuation of good we cannot ignore its duration. The goodness of Jesus alive after death is a better good than that same goodness destroyed by death. If the only good is transitory for all persons except God, His goodness is less than love. It is but abstraction to talk of ‘permanent good’ without the continuance of sharers in it.

Nor is it satisfactory to forswear the hope of immortality, and to transfer our hope to a more glorious earthly Jerusalem which it is our privilege to share in building for those that come after, and which will constitute the good which the evolutionary process is tending to produce. No high morality can exist

¹⁰ *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 527.

except on the recognition of the worth of the individual personality: some of the serious difficulties in the way of Theistic belief are due to the fact that God never forces Himself upon the personality, but respects the work of His hands. If it be not so, He cannot be good. For if our personality could possibly be made except in our commerce with the world as it is, if personality can ever *rightly* be over-ridden by God, then our weakness and sin, and lack of good, are the easiest of all things for God to remove, and the most senseless ever to permit.¹¹ The dignity of personality is that each person is an end in himself, though not *for* himself,—not a mere stage towards the hypothetical perfecting of others no more immortal than himself. Those who would enjoy the future perfection would enter upon it as entirely unearned inheritance,¹² and in that there would be no moral value: the moral worth would still be in the toils of the preceding untold generations who “received not the promise,” and without them the inheritors could never “be made perfect.” Final bliss would be attained for some at the cost of moral personalities greater than themselves. If personality is the highest achievement, then the highest good can never be realized if goodness and true happiness are separated in different persons. The apparent haphazard distribution of all that we can recognize as good seems to bear little relation to fault or virtue. This can only be defended if it is inevitable in an evolutionary cosmos which is the necessary factory of the highest attainable good, in which the remedying of apparent unfairness is an essential activity in the growth of moral personality. But without immortality it is neither possible to justify the initial positings which have led to such terrible inequalities of capability and opportunity, nor to believe that there is any predominance of good. If personality is even one end of a God-directed process, it becomes legitimate to argue from known unrealized capacities to the actuality of an environment in which the felicity attainable in the short span of earthly life will not fail of fruition. It is the best in us which desires this, and in a moral

¹¹ For the far-reaching implications of this consideration, see *Grace and Personality*, by Dr. John Oman—an invaluable little book.

¹² The argument is developed in Prof. A. E. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist*, Vol. I, ch. vii.

world there is no need to be ashamed of it. The criticism that it is but looking for reward, unknown to the highest morality, should be fairly met. The promise of reward is prominent in the teaching of Jesus, who also often sets aside human conceptions of merit in the Divine apportionment of reward. Criticism is apt to overlook the fact that Jesus constantly promised reward only to those who would follow from some other motive. His followers were neither to make reward their goal nor to be morally offended at the idea of it.¹³ And this is sound. The conscious pursuit of disinterestedness can be as self-centred, though not as immoral, as the deliberate pursuit of reward, and the ideal of Christian morality is not self-centredness in any form, but self-forgetfulness. Contempt of the hope of immortality as seeking a reward is an easy way to a self-satisfied moral grandeur which leads astray, and complacent contemplation of extinction, not only of self but of all others, is no indication of high morality. On examination of our own lives with the inevitable recognition of evil done and opportunities wasted, we can in no wise charge God with immorality if He does not preserve such lives in immortality. But there are those the lachet of whose shoes we are not worthy to unloose. The spiritual value of the immortal hope depends entirely on its nature. We do not ask that virtue shall be rewarded with other things. The paradox is the insistence on the supreme value of personality and an equal insistence that merely individual aspirations are without value here and now, and therefore incredible as constitutive of eternal life. To be truly moral and worth preserving personal life must be so involved in other lives and tasks that, if these were lost, all the best in the individual person would perish with them. In the last resort the Christian hope of immortality lies in the faith in the supremacy of that love which is the most potent creator of good in this world. If such be the character of God, He sets a value on those finite spirits whom He enables to grow in His image, a value which finds no adequate realization in this life. In as far as our desires are purified of selfishness, the hope of immortality springs from what is most Divine in us, and we have no other knowledge which can invalidate that hope. It is

¹³ See the admirable and full discussion in Dr. K. E. Kirk's Bampton Lectures on *The Vision of God*, pp. 140-146, and pp. 451-472, 552-558.

not groundless, and if it be vain, the best in us does but deceive us. Just because the intolerableness of that judgment has so little to do with merely individual hopes and fears, we can feel that the refusal to entertain it is not merely baseless subjective opinion but a judgment the validity of which will be honoured by existence. What is at stake is not any reward of goodness except its Actuality.

I have hitherto confined the discussion to the realm of what is called 'natural theology'; and deliberately. To try to study Christianity without presuppositions would be futile even if it were possible. The relevant question about presuppositions concerns their reasonableness. One of the reasons why the Christian revelation fails of its effect is that there is nowadays so little background of natural theology for it to illumine. We content ourselves with using isolated scraps of natural knowledge to illumine revelation. On the other side is the truth that Christianity as a way of life and a message, not only to be examined but also to be *preached*, rests upon conviction that certain events happened at a particular time in history; that these events are data whose explication must not explain them away; that they are as real as the data of science; and that while it is very necessary to express their significance as far as may be in intelligible language, it is not a serious matter for Christianity if its data will not fit in, without remainder, into any world-view formed by leaving them out.

For the Christian, Theism, and an estimate of this world as "an adventure of divine love," which are possible as reasonable faith, are confirmed and enriched by the fact that he finds God in Christ made manifest. He accepts Christ's principle, that as the background of all human striving there is the Eternal Love, most wonderfully kind, believing in men even when they no longer believe in themselves. Again, the probability of immortality rests, for the Christian, upon his acceptance of nothing less secure than the experience of a fact. Whether those who cannot affirm as fact the alleged manifestations of Christ's victory over death are Christians may be left to such as irreverently suppose themselves competent to decide it; but the conviction, based on His subsequent appearances, that Jesus did not suffer defeat in death, that on this occasion 'the heavens were not

silent,' and that He is 'alive for evermore,' is so central to historic Christianity that the denial of it is not compatible with real continuity. The story of the empty tomb is less secure, and of less importance. In forming our judgment about it, we cannot but be influenced by the fact that we no longer conceive the soul to remain disembodied until a "general resurrection in the last day."¹⁴ The religious value in Jewish Apocalyptic does not include useful information about such matters; the idea has not Jesus' support, and those who believe in immortality at all, believe the departed to be fully alive though their bodies lie in the grave from which they will not emerge. The crux of the question of the alleged emptiness of our Lord's tomb lies in the words "the third day." Unless the disciples were then convinced that Jesus was alive, it is difficult to imagine the origin of the belief.¹⁵ On the other hand, the disciples probably already shared the general Jewish belief in a future life, and there can be no reasonable doubt that their own ideas about it have influenced the Gospel accounts. We cannot tell where such influence begins and ends. The alleged emptiness of the tomb may have been an inference from the fact of the appearances. This, and the waiting until Pentecost for the first public announcement of the Resurrection, are the weakest points in the case for the empty tomb. We cannot make use of that alleged fact in framing our ideas of immortality. We must confine ourselves to the crowning revelation of God in Christ, and to the fact that He survived bodily death.

The weakening of belief in immortality is, I think, due less to the spread of materialism than to the incredibility of the old imagery of heaven and hell with which life after death was formerly so powerfully associated. Conceivable visual imagery is immensely important: it clothes spiritual realities in forms hardly dispensable to embodied life. The difficulty of visualiz-

¹⁴ The phrase may stand for the faith that the Divine purposes for the present world will be completed, and that those who are gone before cannot reach their true blessedness apart from the whole family of God.

¹⁵ I cannot think the phrase in Hosea vi, 2, or the story of Jonah, can have suggested it. They are so incongruous that, while they might have been fastened upon, in the absence of any clearer O.T. parallel or prediction, when it was felt that the greatest of all events must have been foreshadowed or foretold, they require the *fact* to have been otherwise established to account for their recognition.

ing life after death often renders immortality unreal, even when there is no reasoned belief against it, and perhaps much in its favour. The natural reaction from earlier crudities has itself done harm. We rightly see no reason to believe in the resurrection of the body in 'the plain and natural' sense of the words, but we do wrong if we are not careful to guard the truths for which it stands. It was these that St. Paul cared about, for he declared roundly that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God," nor corruption incorruption. The precise dangers he contended against are not real to-day. The form of dualism which regarded matter as essentially evil is not for us a live issue, and all our knowledge forbids the idea that what is done in the body is of any less than paramount importance to the whole man. The relation of soul and body is mysterious, but it is immensely more intimate than one of mere association. Self-consciousness never reveals pure mind, only embodied mind, and we know nothing of the self except as embodied self. The actuality of the soul in the sense of the necessary ground and sufficient reason of the unity and continuity of mental life, does not imply that the slowly built up personal self is able to persist apart from *any* kind of embodiment. That idea, as Prof. Stout says, "is really unintelligible to the common sense of mankind in all stages of human culture."¹⁶ The only self-consciousness of which we have any knowledge has been arrived at in relation to and awareness of external objects, and I doubt if we can conceive of an existence shorn of all bodily sensations and responses, which condition all our experience, as being the continuance of personal identity at all. The doctrine of the resurrection of the body was an advance on the older belief in the persistence of a helpless ghost, and it was also more reasonable than the thought of the survival of only the abstract contemplative intellect. Personality must feel and act as well as contemplate, and we cannot imagine the soul's recognition of other selves without some 'localized' centre for it and them. A body as more than a symbol seems essential. Modern researches do not (as some suppose), and future researches are not likely to (as some hope), abolish the distinction between matter and spirit: that they are both aspects of some ultimate which is neither

¹⁶ *Mind and Matter*, p. 160.

seems to me an entirely futile speculation. St. Paul's contrast between a body adapted to the life of the *psyche* — that life of sentience which man shares with animals — 'the natural body,' as he calls it, and the body adapted to the life of the *pneuma*, or spirit (but not necessarily made from spirit), is as far as we can safely go, perhaps further. The modern ultimate concept of the body is that of complex *organized* energy; and there is nothing impossible in the idea of another body as the organ of the spirit's immortal activity, the change being necessitated by a new environment from which, like the present body from its present environment, the spiritual body may derive its being, its character being determined by the true worth of the personal self at the death of this body. I do not like illustrations drawn from insects and applied to man, and I do not use the following as in any sense an analogy. But that a grub should become a butterfly, and leave the refuse-heap for the atmosphere, would be hard to credit if we did not know it to be a fact. For the spiritual body to be truly our own, there is no need of the notion of any material identity with the existing body, a speculation for which there is no evidence. We know that the present body, by some characteristic, is often an indication of the quality and intensity of the spiritual life it embodies, and the soul may even now be 'building' its spiritual body, or death may be the moment of its birth. This also is speculation. But if it is difficult to attach any straight-forward meaning to the word 'resurrection,' the idea of embodiment is essential if life after death is to be more than an empty abstraction. It represents the conservation of the highest personal values which is not otherwise imaginable.

All our thought about immortality and eternal life must be conditioned by the nature of God and His known methods of dealing with us in this world. Nothing inconsistent with these fundamentals can be maintained on the basis of doubtful interpretations of irrelevant and isolated Biblical texts. These principles enable us to say something definite about the question whether a blessed immortality is the destiny of all alike, or whether heaven and hell represent realities. I assume that it is no longer necessary to argue against the traditional popular ideas of hell; the ordinary movement of all human minds not in

chains has removed them beyond the range of even the wildest credulity. But the idea of hell arose as the result of moralizing Sheol, in which good and bad alike were out of remembrance and cut away from God's hand. The not uncommon belief that justice is no Divine attribute is patently baseless; transcend all human conceptions as it may, there is a Divine justice inseparable from the moral love of moral persons, as distinct from non-moral sentiment. I accept as valid the contention that the same reasoning which eliminates justice from the attributes of God is equally potent for the elimination of righteousness and love, and that it leaves us with a God of Whom we can predicate nothing. This, for practical purposes, is not to be distinguished from non-existence. Justice is inseparable from morality and retribution from justice. In this one world of God of which alone we can have knowledge, sin and the failure to act in accordance with the highest that we know are inescapably tracked by consequences of loss and disaster. Not necessarily of course by material loss, for material gain is dangerously compatible with moral and spiritual loss. The spiritually awakened man is aware that loss is tied to sin, and if we mistake the Divine mind upon it we are without excuse. The inevitable consequences of wrong are by no means to be bought off, though there is always the gracious possibility of repentance; and a consequent power to rise above both the consequences and the sins. The knowledge that our actions have inevitable issues which, if immortality be a fact, we have no reason to think are other than eternal issues, inspires with a fear which no sane man can wish to repudiate; it has nothing in common with the cowering fear formerly inspired by the thought of hell, which now does but rightly incite to mockery. Like as we are compelled by Christian Theism to the faith that no real personal values will be lost, so are we forbidden by morality to entertain the debilitating sentiment that good and evil can ever be as though they were not. We can set no limit to the power of the love of God, ever "broader than the measures of man's mind," to evoke, here or hereafter, the response that leadeth unto life, except the limit which God Himself has set in the creation of moral persons. But to deny that human spirits may possibly remain for ever impervious to all Divine influences is to ignore that limit, and to assert what,

if true, is itself destructive of moral personality. What then? The nature of God absolutely rules out any suggestion that He can maintain spirits in unending existence for the infliction of unending pain destitute of all remedial effect; and if man is made in the image of God, it does *not* follow that immortality is an attribute of man's nature rather than a reward of his virtue. The whole tenour of New Testament teaching is that immortality is not "of ourselves," but is the gift of God. If the only moral and spiritual life that can have value comes from free response to the love of God, final persistence in refusal cannot be ruled out. Then, as Dr. Temple said, "there is nothing left that Almighty Love can do with such a soul except to bring it to an end."¹⁷ We need only add that it is not necessary to think of this as a special act of God. Personalities with all their values are made, not born: we know to what lengths dissolution can go in this life, and we have every reason to believe that a life in persistent self-assertive conflict with what is Real must inevitably lead to the destruction of the self.¹⁸

Conversely, eternal life consists, as von Hügel says, "in the most real of relations with the most real of realities" — the human spirit and God. Our true blessedness, as Spinoza said of happiness, "resides alone in the quality of the object to which we adhere by love." Eternal life is thus a qualitative life which can be experienced here and now. "Eternal life in the midst of time" is a famous definition of Christianity. Such life "has no right to be a wish unless it has previously been a task." We cannot complete it beyond unless we begin it here, where but a small range of its possibilities is attainable within our allotted span of earthly life. Eternal life is, as the Fourth Gospel says, "knowing God," and there is no knowing God without doing His will. It has to be realized, like all else that is good, through our commerce with the world of actual duty. "In this, as in everything else, the greater and ultimate has to awake and to grow within us in and through the lesser and (ultimately) secondary."

¹⁷ *Christus Veritas*, p. 208.

¹⁸ Such a result implies no failure of God except such as is inseparable from His own purpose to fashion moral personalities and not automata. It is failure only if we conceive Omnipotence to be unconditioned by any other attributes, and that idea of Omnipotence is without religious significance, and even without meaning.

About the difficult questions concerning the relation of eternal life to time, much could be said but little affirmed. I can but state some essential points to be borne in mind. Eternity is not shown to be timeless, because in ecstasy or in rapt attention we already have experience without consciousness of the passage of time. In such states we are merely unaware of the temporal elements in our experience, and unawareness can tell us nothing about the reality or unreality of time. We must not confuse the standpoint of experience with the standpoint of reflection upon it, and only the latter can pass any judgment. Change involves succession, and not to be able to differentiate within our experience is indistinguishable from having no experience at all. For us, phrases such as "transcending time and space" have no meaning; and what may be true of God is not necessarily true of us, unless we try the impossible task of conceiving eternal life as a merging of the soul in an 'universal consciousness'—another meaningless abstraction. Our perception of space and time may not be simply the result of our embodiment; it may be an inexpugnable condition of all finite perception.¹⁹ We cannot know an experience which is out of time, and spiritual realities are not to be constructed out of unintelligibles. Duration, of course, is distinguishable from clock-time, as everyone knows who has spent half-an-hour in a dentist's waiting-room and compared it with the passage of the same length of clock-time spent in rapt attention. If in eternal life there is no longer the painful consciousness that a good which we enjoy may soon be 'no longer,' and there is no anxiety about the good that is 'not yet,' the alleged oppressiveness of eternity vanishes. But if our experience of succession, and of succession in duration, has no counterpart in Reality, but is mere appearance, then our lives and all in them, including our knowledge of God, of sin and of morality, are appearances also.

¹⁹ If it is the case, as some think, that Einstein has shown that time and space are a single complex which only thought divides, we have no reason to suppose that one is destroyed while the other remains, and then there is no meaning in the common phrase that heaven is a state and not a place. But Dr. Tennant points out that the theory of space-time takes no account of individual experience, for which points in space, *e.g.* left to right, are arbitrary, depending on how we choose to stand. By turning round, what was the one can become the other. But in time, human experience of what is 'before and after' is not thus reversible.

Eternal life, such as we can know, is not itself timeless, but is indifferent alike to time and to timelessness. What matters is that we should live it, not that we should be able to conceive its conditions on the other side of death. We may hope that with growth in eternal life will come some insight into its nature, and a deepening of its certainty. But, in the words of a distinguished philosopher who has so recently died :

“ He who has tasted eternal life is not wont to be troubled in heart about the question of his personal survival; for such survival would mean nothing to him if he were separated from the object in which he has found his true life.” In that union his immortality consists.²⁰

If a man reflects only upon certain aspects of life by which he is oppressed, and especially if he is sensitive to the suffering, frustration and evil of life, nothing is easier than to feel that, just as he had no existence fifty years ago, so it is no more strange if he has none fifty years hence. But if a man reflects upon his place and duties in a world which, whatever else it is, is a cosmic scene of the growth and development of moral and spiritual life, he may more reasonably confess with a typical representative of ‘the age of reason’ :

“ I trouble not myself about the manner of future existence. I content myself with believing, even to positive conviction, that the power that gave me existence is able to continue it, . . . and it appears more probable to me that I shall continue to exist hereafter than that I should have had existence, as I now have, before that existence began.”²¹

How much more when of “the power” we can say, “Thy Nature and Thy Name is Love”!

²⁰ Prof. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 147.

²¹ Thomas Paine in *The Age of Reason* (edited by M. D. Conway), p. 83.

MAN AND HIS OWN NATURE

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I N this extempore address on 'Man and his own Nature' I shall probably best do justice to my subject if I attempt to give you a general impression of the science of psychology as it is at the present day, giving, as far as possible, an unbiased impression and allowing due weight to every line of investigation.

I. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY.

I may begin by emphasizing the importance of a branch of psychology that does not, as a rule, contribute anything to the problem of religion, namely, experimental psychology. There can be no doubt that it was the advent of experimental psychology under the aegis of Professor Wilhelm Wundt of Leipzig, in the seventies of the last century, that set psychology on its feet as a solid natural science, to a certain extent independent of special philosophical presuppositions. This branch of science gives its own satisfaction to the mind in that it moves along the paths stamped out by more fundamental sciences, relying on the processes of observation, experimentation and verification, and it is producing a very solid body of facts and a certain amount of theoretical generalization.

In the domain of intelligence very definite discoveries have been made along experimental lines through the use of mathematics in researches in which I myself took part some years ago, and to which I am now returning, using the statistical method of correlation. Along these lines Professor C. Spearman has claimed to have proved, and I think rightly, that there is one central factor in all forms of intellectual activity—a factor which he calls 'g.' In addition to this central factor which manifests itself in different degrees in various forms of mental tests, there are specific factors different for each mental test, if the tests are not too closely similar. This common or central intellectual

factor has been proved by Professor Spearman to embrace three distinct forms of mental activity, *viz.* (1) the process of sensory discrimination and observation, (2) the process of eduction of relations, and (3) the eduction of correlates, these three processes being subsumed under the general term 'noegenesis.'

Thus the intellect, as verified by experiment, observation and the use of number and mathematics, has as its central core a process of cognizing the outer world, observing and discriminating; secondly, eliciting or educing relations between one observed fact or relation and another; and, thirdly, the process of working out a second relation which is analogous to an observed relation.

II. BEHAVIOURISM.

A second branch of psychology to which we must refer for an up-to-date impression of the science is that known as Behaviourism, which took its rise in the work of Professor Pavlov in Russia, and his work on conditioned reflexes. People frequently refer to conditioned reflexes without showing an adequate knowledge of what they mean, and draw unwarranted conclusions from them, but Pavlov's work is of fundamental importance and of great significance, although perhaps not so significant as he himself and his followers would have us believe.

The general importance of the theory of conditioned reflexes to psychology is that it claims to be synthetic and not merely analytic. It purports to be a scientific process of building up what appears to be, on the surface, an intellectual spontaneous mental activity by starting from simple or unconditioned reflex activities and synthetically producing more and more complicated conditioned reflexes. Pavlov has been able to take dogs and monkeys and elicit from them more and more complex reactions which, if looked at by themselves, would seem to be extremely intelligent actions, but which from the nature of their formation are known to be the final product of material reactions of the organism to certain physical stimuli. It is this *synthetic* character of the experimental work which constitutes its theoretical importance.

In criticism of this fundamentally materialistic position we may point out that the production of conditioned reflexes under laboratory conditions would be impossible except with animals

that already have a prospective attitude towards life, and show behaviour in the sense of spontaneous yet purposive reactions, and the fundamental rule in the production of conditioned reflexes that 'the conditioned stimulus should begin to operate *before* the unconditioned stimulus comes into action,' which Pavlov himself states as a fact which he cannot explain, is easily understood if we assume that the animal is consciously purposive, or is in a state of mental expectancy or at least of mental striving; so that for all the impression of scientific accuracy given by this work and the impressiveness in the production of results, we must emphasize that it fails of its purpose.¹ It explains the more mechanical aspects of life and shows how far-reaching are such mechanical aspects, and yet there is something left over from the beginning, and that something is the germ of a spontaneous urge up towards the light and higher things, which shows itself later on in the development of intellect, artistic appreciation, and moral volition.

The same remarks apply to a very great deal of the work in the experimental laboratory to which I have already referred, the work with mental tests. In addition to all these verified experiments you have this element of spontaneity which seems to escape experimental investigation, or up to now has done so. The experimentalists will not admit ultimate failure, and they believe that just as they have grappled with the intellectual functions by mental tests and the accurate measurement of the performances of individuals, so they will be able to measure what they call the orective side of the mind by special forms of mental tests. But the results hitherto obtained in this direction are not so convincing.

III. DEEP MENTAL ANALYSIS.

Having cleared my scientific conscience in regard to the experimental aspects of psychology, I can now turn with greater zest to another method altogether which I have used for many years, the general method of deep mental analysis. You all know how it began with Freud's work on psycho-analysis. Like Saul, who set out to look for his father's asses and found a kingdom, Freud started out to explain the symptoms of hysteria and

¹ See my *Science and Personality*, Oxford University Press, pp. 54, 55.

obsessional neurosis in terms of infantile sexual experiences, and with the further development of his investigations he arrived at the general method, and also the general theory, of psycho-analysis, and ultimately at an all-embracing (or almost all-embracing) theory of human mental activity, both normal and abnormal.

Different schools of analytic psychology have developed from that day. The Freudian *method* of psycho-analysis includes the use of the device of so-called 'free association,' and other methods of overcoming 'resistances,' in probing the mind to its depths. The *theory* of psycho-analysis is one which becomes more complex as time goes on, and needs a whole system of new terminology for its adequate expression. As theory, it involves inferences from observed facts, and it is against the validity of many of these inferences that criticism is in place.

C. G. Jung broke away from Freud because of the limitation of Freud's outlook on the sexual side, which did not give an explanation adequate to mental activities. In one of his latest books Jung says that psycho-analysis is really sexual analysis, and he himself has adopted the term 'analytical psychology' for his method of probing into the depths of the mind by a similar process.

Another point of view is occupied by Alfred Adler, who also was one of the original Freudians, and who now calls his system that of Individual Psychology. He explains the fundamental activities of mind to a great extent in terms of the instinct of self-assertion, rather than that of sex, and indeed he says that mental manifestations which seem superficially to be explicable in terms of sexual activity often have their fundamental meaning in the instinct of self-assertion, the will to power, in its many indirect manifestations.

As against this I would put emphasis upon another instinctive activity, which goes far to explain a good deal of mental illness, and in fact goes far to explain many normal mental activities also, and that is the instinct of self-preservation, with its emotion of fear. During the War we saw great numbers of cases of functional nerve illness which could not be explained as being caused by disturbance of the sexual instinct, in however wide a sense understood, *i.e.* could not have any Freudian ex-

planation, and certainly could not be adequately explained in terms of the will to power (Adler), but were easily understood in terms of the instinct of self-preservation. In my own view, based upon many years of experience in the deep analysis of cases, using various methods which I have gradually worked out, and helped and inspired by the writings of Freud, Jung, Adler and others, I have come to the conclusion that one cannot reduce the causes of psycho-neurosis or functional nervous disorder to the working of one single instinct. Sometimes the sexual instinct is involved, sometimes the instinct of self-assertion; but often it is the instinct of self-preservation which may get thwarted and show itself indirectly in the form of symptoms. The gregarious instinct, among others, may also play an important part.

IV. THE ETERNAL VALUES.

But I must not let my lecture degenerate into a talk on psycho-pathology. My subject is the psychology of the normal mind, and I must keep in clear view the fundamental distinction between the normal and the abnormal. So much additional psychological knowledge has been obtained by the observation of psycho-pathological cases that there arises the danger of attempting to explain the normal in terms of the abnormal. This tendency is apparent in the writings of psycho-pathologists themselves. Some of them seem to have no clear conception of normal psychology, and do not start from that point of view, and although they have a lot of facts to go upon in the observed phenomena of physical and mental illness, they generalize from those facts and apply their conclusions too readily to the normal mind. In thus attempting to explain the normal in terms of the abnormal they put the cart before the horse, much as if they were trying to explain truth in terms of error, or beauty by various degrees of ugliness, or again moral goodness in terms of various forms of vice.

Besides the temporal processes of the mind, which can be dealt with most adequately by science through observation and experimentation, by hypothesis, generalization, and the verification of results, — besides that, there is in the human mind an *eternal* element. It is only through this eternal element that the mind can be conscious of itself and of its past; otherwise the

mind would be merely a sequence of moments, one moment falling outside the next, just as one form of physical activity falls outside the next. What we find in the mind from direct observation is this, that in the sequence of one thing after another there is something identical running through all. These identical aspects or spiritual aspects of existence are to be seen perfectly clearly, by anyone who will open his eyes to see, in the so-called eternal values of truth, goodness and beauty. Just as we cannot explain truth as a mere generalization of facts, or beauty in terms of its temporal conditions, or goodness in terms of merely temporal conditions, so it seems to me that ultimately we cannot explain the totality of things as one all-inclusive value in terms of science alone.

Starting from science, we are ultimately forced to a new point of view, and find that a merely scientific point of view is not sufficient. Besides the scientific point of view, there is the point of view of the *value* of existence, and the value of existence is the eternal aspect as contrasted with the merely temporal. Value in general is not of course independent of time, but it does in some sense transcend time. A general philosophy of value is required to supplement and give meaning to the general system of scientific explanation of cosmic process. In other words, science needs to be supplemented by philosophy and religion.

V. MENTAL ANALYSIS AND RELIGION.

Turning now from these wide generalizations to the details of mental analysis, what one finds in analysing patients, going deeply into their past and encouraging them to talk out their lives more and more fully, is that in practically all cases they need a philosophy of existence. Whilst they need help in regard to individual problems of their lives, they need also to be shown that life is worth while, and shown what its worth is or may be. Sooner or later in the course of the analysis the patient brings up the question of religion, and my impression from my psychotherapeutic work is that religion is deep-seated in every mind—true religion and not that superstitious mixture of selfishness, credulity and cowardice miscalled by so many religion²—a true

² See e.g. Freud: *The Future of an Illusion*, Hogarth Press, 1928.

reaching out towards the highest and the best in love and adoration.

Everyone is at heart religious, but the feeling of religion may be repressed in all sorts of ways and for all sorts of reasons. A scientist may repress it because he fears it may lead him astray in his search for absolute truth, and the artist may check it because he thinks it may cramp his style and disturb his inspiration; but it is there in everyone, and the question is whether psychology has anything to say in this matter—what contribution it has to make.

Ultimately it seems to me that psychology must fall short as a science in dealing with the problem of religion, because religion has to do with the eternal, and psychology as a science has to do with the temporal, and the psychologist rightly protests that he must not mix up the categories—mix up philosophical considerations in his scientific problems—and that is the reason why one finds so many psychological books unsatisfying from this point of view.

I admit that two of my own books³ have been written from the philosophical point of view as well as from the scientific point of view, but this does not mean that I approve of the mixing up of these two types of categories. They are distinct, and need to be kept distinct. All I contend is that scientific investigation inevitably leads one on to the other point of view, and makes it more outstanding, because the scientist is trying to get satisfying knowledge, and what he does get is a working hypothesis, but beyond that he is seeking a better insight into the nature of reality. In that search and along that path he comes right into metaphysics and up against the problems of logic, ethics, and aesthetics—problems from which he cannot escape. Every psychologist must eventually become a philosopher, but his philosophy is not the same as his psychology. In practice as well as in theory that is bound to occur, and so in the practice of psychotherapy, which is the application of psychological science to the improvement of mental functioning, one cannot escape the philosophical aspect. One can help to disentangle things in a patient's mind—help him to see himself more clearly and to realize how many of his motives are unworthy of him, and how

³ *Mind and Personality*, and *Science and Personality*.

unconscious mental processes are working in a repressed state in his mind, and throwing up substitution-forms in his conscious mind. One can show him the contrast between the conscious and sub-conscious mind, between his conscious and his sub-conscious motives, and the more the psychologist does that the more successful he is, and then the more urgent it becomes for him to help solve the greatest problem of all and to help the patient to a working hypothesis as to the meaning of existence and what he is in the world for. Eventually the patient may come, as many of us have come, to the conclusion that the Christian religion, the Christian doctrine, the gospel of Jesus, is the only adequately satisfying explanation, and offers the only complete satisfaction for his craving for God.

VI. SUGGESTION AND FAITH.

I have hitherto spoken of mental analysis in general terms, and call my method deep mental analysis, in token of avoidance of any exclusive adherence to special schools of thought and the extremism connected therewith. In deep mental analysis one gets behind appearances in the mind. Just as in physics one gets behind physical appearance and thinks in terms of non-divisible entities, so in psychology one has to learn to think in terms of non-conscious mental activities, which are of fundamental importance, and help to explain those pathological symptoms which do not explain themselves. But besides that form of investigation and treatment, there is also a form of mental treatment—the well-known method of suggestion treatment—which is of the utmost value in psycho-therapy, and which cannot be neglected. It is a short and rapid method that can produce pronounced and permanent results in selected cases, after some preliminary mental analysis. Suggestion may be defined as a successful appeal to the sub-conscious mind, to the background of the mind. In suggestion treatment you ask the patient to recline on a couch with his eyes closed and his muscles relaxed. You ask him to think of sleep and to breathe slowly, deeply and regularly, pointing out to him that as he breathes out his muscles will relax more and more, enabling his mind to become more and more passive and receptive. Then you proceed to give him suggestions—suggestions addressed to his sub-conscious mind

with a view to a rectification of his mental functions. You tell him that he will sleep well, that he will wake up with a good appetite for his meals, that he will be regular in all his physical functions, and you give various other suggestions that may be needed, to neutralize bad forms of mental functioning. Later you can encourage him to use self-suggestion night and morning in continuation of his treatment.

This method has been successfully used by many people, by Bernheim, Coué and many others, in the treatment of functional nervous diseases. The question is, how are the results to be explained? A superficial explanation would attribute a good deal of illness to bad self-suggestion, through the working of fear, anxiety and so forth. The patient sub-consciously accepts bad suggestions, which get hold of the mind and develop, and in suggestion treatment those bad suggestions are neutralized by good ones. But besides that, there is a further factor to consider. Suggestion as such is a relatively passive process. The patient is relatively passive in accepting bad suggestions, and he may be equally passive in accepting good suggestions. Something more than that is necessary for cure. His mind must pass from the passive to the active stage, and so for successful suggestive treatment one must rouse a special form of self-activity in the patient, *viz.* an attitude of faith, by which we mean in psychology an active belief that a result is probable because it is good (when there are no reasons against it), and because it seems to be in harmony with our highest impersonal aspirations.

This is really the ultimate explanation of success in suggestive treatment. It depends upon the arousal of faith—faith in a friendly Universe and in ‘a Power not ourselves which makes for righteousness.’

THE CHALLENGE OF LIFE

By the Reverend J. C. HARDWICK, M.A., B.Sc.

SO long as we are alive, life continues to present us with problems, most of them of a practical kind. We have to provide ourselves and our dependents with food, drink, clothes, and shelter. Such is the challenge with which life confronts us; and the majority of people find that it occupies the greater part of their attention.

At the same time, even if all our material needs were satisfied, the challenge of life would not have been fully met, because there are other needs besides the material ones. In fact, there is some reason for thinking that it is when our material needs have been satisfied that our troubles begin.

To satisfy his material needs, primitive man made use of magic. Modern man, for the same end, uses science. The scientific expert is the modern equivalent of the old-time magician, and is held in similar estimation. To make his crops grow, modern man does not perform a ritual dance; he uses nitrates provided by the chemist. The fact is that the satisfaction of his material needs ought no longer to be a problem for modern man. His resources are already so great that it is over-production, and not under-production, which is his difficulty. Science has enabled the human race to produce goods faster than it can consume them, save by organizing a destructive war every ten or twenty years.

But although science is well able to satisfy all our material needs, it cannot satisfy what we may call our psychic needs. One of such needs is the need for distraction and amusement. As an answer to such needs modern man supplies himself with cinemas, wireless, and inexpensive literature. But although it is true that without applied science such things would be impossible, yet at the same time it is obvious that science cannot supply us with scenarios, vaudeville shows, and detective novels. It is not science but art which provides us with these things, without which the most elaborate and perfect cinemas and wireless sets would be useless. Art, in order to satisfy our psychic needs, can

utilize science; but science by itself could never satisfy those needs. Thus Mr. Edgar Wallace and Mr. C. B. Cochran are as indispensable to the modern world as the scientific expert. They help to satisfy our psychic needs.

It is important to recognize this fact that science, though it can satisfy our material needs, can never, by itself, satisfy our psychic needs. Now that the prestige of science is so high we shall do well to realize that there are limits to the contribution that science is able to make.

The desire for distraction and amusement, which I have mentioned as being the characteristic psychic needs of the modern world, are not, as a matter of fact, the deepest psychic needs which we experience, though they may be the deepest needs of which we are conscious—a very different thing. He would be a wise man who could say what were the deepest psychic needs of the modern world; what is increasingly clear is that those needs do exist, and our failure to satisfy them is the cause of a widespread unrest, which betrays itself in many neurotic symptoms easily recognized as such by anyone with an elementary knowledge of psychology.

The modern European and Asiatic is fractious and quarrelsome, not primarily for economic reasons (as is usually supposed), but because he is subconsciously suffering from some inner conflict with its accompanying restlessness and malaise. His aggressiveness, his pugnacity, his perpetual activity are all morbid symptoms. Where the introvert, if suffering from some psychic maladjustment, becomes a neurotic, the extrovert becomes a revolutionary, a militarist, or a philanthropist. The European is busy because he is unhappy, his external activity is a compensation for inner unrest. He strives, by making a noise, to escape from himself. He is full of activity and vitality—just as were the Gadarene swine; but, like them, he is the victim of a neurosis. His frustrated soul erupts in senseless activity.

It has become almost a platitude that our civilization, unless it can get its deepest psychic needs satisfied, and so find peace, will perish in convulsions. Science, though it cannot satisfy our psychic needs, has placed in our hands means of mutual extermination which for efficiency surpass anything which has

hitherto been dreamt of. Science, though it cannot cure our malady, has supplied means of swift suicide, of which the delirious European will soon avail himself. Political and economic devices will not avail to prevent this finale. They only treat symptoms, and seek to cure our fever by bathing our temples in cold water. The trouble to-day is not economic or political, but psychic, and science can only aggravate it by placing in the hands of our fevered neurotics the means of destruction.

This is only what we should naturally expect. How should the science which deals with external nature help us to solve problems which originate in the psychic world of inner experience? Science is helpless in the face of such problems.

The psychic trouble which afflicts modern man consists in an exaggerated self-consciousness, which in its turn springs from more than one cause. In the first place there is what Thomas Hardy has called 'the self-consciousness engendered by interference with spontaneity.' Civilized man is subject to so many inhibitions that he rarely feels free and happy, but must be always on his guard lest he offend against the code. He is repressed and uneasy, and overconscious of himself. The most conspicuous example of this is the Public School Englishman, as Dr. Renier has pointed out, in his book, *The English, are they Human?*

In the next place his exaggerated self-consciousness is due to his feeling of isolation, both from Nature and from his own fellows. The external world has become a machine existing independently of and regardless of man. There is a clash between the individual and the whole, for, as Mr. McDowall has pointed out in his recent book on Hardy, a universe which is not for us is against us. Thus modern man feels all the time that he is coping with hostile forces which will get the better of him if he lets them. He feels isolated, too, from his fellow men, whom he has come to regard as competitors in the relentless scramble for a living. Social divisions, class and international rivalries, mutual suspicion and distrust between neighbours—of all these things modern man is the victim.

To be thus isolated and self-conscious is to be cut off from the deeper sources of life. Modern man struggles to re-establish contact, but falls back frustrated. Circumstances are too much

for him. There is a barrier between him and nature, a barrier between him and his fellow men, a barrier between him and his true spontaneous self. He is imprisoned in a cage, against the bars of which he flings himself in neurotic desperation. What can he do? He can only compensate himself for his imprisonment by distractions and drugs and sexual stimulation; or, if he remains moral, by business enterprise, sport, truculent chauvinism, and so on. To some extent the modern man attains the compensations which he needs by constructing powerful machines. The aeroplane and the high-powered car are artificial extensions of personality and personal strength; pent inhibitions are eased by a burst of speed. It is through a strange Nemesis that modern man's destruction will come through these machines which he created to provide himself with a wider life.

Thus modern man, auto-intoxicated and restless, has lost something which he strives to regain by seeking out many inventions. He has been deprived of a sense of unity with the sources of life; the restoration of this unity is his most pressing need. But a psychic need of this sort is beyond the power of science to satisfy. Science, moreover, is based upon that very view of Nature which has aggravated our trouble. It is because Nature has become an external machine that we feel isolated and cut off from her. It is science, too, which, by its theory of natural selection, has endorsed the view that life is a competitive struggle—a view which cuts us off from our fellow men. Thus science only increases our fatal isolations. It is science which has created the impasse at which we have arrived.

Thus we need not look to science for help. For the easing of its spiritual strains the modern world is looking more and more to art, and art naturally varies in quality according to the tastes and perceptions of the various sections of a modern community. Literature and music, perhaps, do most for the more cultivated sections of society. But every section of society strives to derive from art the satisfactions which it does not discover in life. Thus the demand for art, whether genuine or meretricious, is universal, because it seems to be the most obvious and most easily attained compensation for the maladjustments of life. It is highly significant that during the last quarter of a century more than one entirely new artistic medium

has come into existence—the screen and wireless. Both these have become vehicles of popular art. That these two novel media should have developed, and new and elaborate techniques been evolved to exploit their possibilities, is the clearest of proofs, if any were needed, of the extent of the present demand for art. These two arts, besides sport, newspapers and popular literature, do much to ease the strains of a modern industrial population. This art has of course been commercialised, as also has the other compensation—sport. It is, too, unduly individual—and where it is not that, ministers to a crude mob emotion. But sport, too, where it is not commercialised, is individual. The two games most popular with the middle classes to-day—golf and tennis—are individualistic, nay selfish, games. In fact, some interesting parallels between the present state of art and sport respectively could be drawn. Still, debased as they often are, art and sport remain the means whereby the modern man seeks to escape from himself and to forget his diseased isolation.

As a means of satisfying the psychic needs of the modern European, religion comes as a very bad third to art and sport. These latter are very much alive, but religion is moribund. Even those who do try the religious method of satisfying their psychic needs are careful to supplement their efforts by devotion to art or sport. Indeed, where religion is taken with apparent seriousness, as by many Churchmen, the game interest, or the aesthetic interest, is prominent. An interest in ritual is indistinguishable often from interest in a rather fascinating game, which has aesthetic elements—candles, chasubles, choir-boys, and so on. And where religious practice is not merely aesthetic (witness the arts and crafts side of several of our up-to-date cathedrals) it is purely conventional (witness the usual type of suburban church). In such cases religious profession and practice are a mere badge of respectability, *i.e.* something which increases the fatal sense of isolation and self-consciousness, which it should be the business of religion to cure.

To what are we to attribute this state of affairs? Why this singular ineffectiveness of modern religion? The modern man has his faults, but his psychic needs, as we have seen, are not

only real, but realized by him. That is to say, he knows he is miserable, and will take any means to cure himself which may seem likely to prove effective. As we have seen, he turns hungrily to art and to sport. Why does he not think it worth while to turn to religion for the satisfaction of his psychic needs?

In the first place the approach to religion is beset by artificial barriers, whereas the approach to art and to sport is free. A little expenditure is no doubt necessary, but the pecuniary cost of art and sport to the modern citizen has been reduced to a minimum—though, of course, there is no limit to the sums which can be spent on either if the devotee so desires. The point is that the would-be devotee of art can hold any theory or none about the nature of art: he can go to a picture gallery, or a cinema, or a concert hall, or turn on the loud-speaker, without having to subscribe to any beliefs about the nature of beauty or the nature of art itself. He may even believe that all art is mere imagination and fantasy. So long as he wants art, and enjoys it, and so long as it does him good, he is free to take as much of it as he wants. No one will say him nay. So long as he does not damage the exhibits, he can spend all his time in the National Gallery, or the Wallace Collection—or anywhere else where art can be had for the asking. He can even paint pictures himself, or carve statues, or play the trombone, or do anything he wishes. The whole world of art is open to him, whether to practice himself or merely to appreciate. If he is fortunate enough to invent a new technique or introduce a new idea (provided it is not too far ahead of public comprehension) he will be hailed as a benefactor of mankind and loaded with cheques and honours.

In the sphere of sport the situation is more or less the same.

But in the sphere of religion a very different state of affairs exists. The seeker after religion finds that this activity has been taken over by certain institutions and is practically monopolised by them. These institutions will only impart religion to the would-be devotee upon their own terms, which are strict. He must accept certain beliefs and opinions about religion. He is not allowed to approach it as an experimentalist, somewhat doubtful whether there is anything in it, but hoping perhaps

that there may be. He must believe the right things, and be prepared to accept, with all due humility, the tales which are told him by the religious practitioners who run the business. Great emphasis is laid upon faith, which means believing, without evidence, things you suspect to be untrue. In short, the only apparent means of getting what you want is to accept a great deal of stuff which you have no use for. The pearl of great price is buried in a heap of oyster shells, which embarrasses the treasure-seeker.

But worse than this. If the bread were good, it would not matter much if the crust were thick. But the seeker finds that what is offered him, beneath all this paraphernalia, is stones, and by no means calculated to meet his needs. What he wants to get rid of is his isolation—his separation both from the sources of life and from his fellow-creatures; not to speak of his lack of inner freedom and spontaneity.

But what does he find when he examines what is offered him by the religious monopolists?

In the first place Nature and the external world are represented as being as alien to humanity as science had caused them to be. Far more so, in fact, for Science has established our kinship with the brutes, with the whole of life, and even with inanimate Nature. But for the Church there is a gulf between man and the rest of Nature. To seek identification with Nature as the source of life is condemned as 'pantheism' and heresy. Nor is this all. Nature and the external world are represented not only as alien to man, but as alien to God, for God is revealed not in natural but in supernatural happenings. True, God 'created' the world, but this is only a theological device to account for the division between God and the world.

This separation of man from Nature, and of God from both, would not so much matter if the Church could supply man with a sense of union with his fellow-creatures—this would serve him as well as or better than a sense of union with Nature and the sources of life. But the religious devotee is instructed to develop a sense of superiority which separates him from his fellow-men—who are either heathen or heretics or immoral. The devotee of monopolist religion is encouraged to concentrate upon the salvation of his own soul.

Thus the vice of individualism, of isolation, comes creeping in again through the religious door. Self-consciousness, that disease which afflicts the modern man, will not be cured by monopolist religion. On the contrary, this will aggravate the evil. It will cut men off from Nature, from their fellows, and so from the sources of life. It cannot give men what they so much need—that sense of identity with the whole. It separates and isolates them.

At present the challenge of life presents itself to the modern European in the shape of a deep if subconscious psychic need which science cannot satisfy. The need displays itself in a widespread unrest and malaise with symptoms in action consisting of pointless activity or revolutionary ardour. The result if the need is not satisfied will be convulsions followed by collapse.

The modern European turns at present to sport and to art for the satisfaction of his psychic needs, but neglects religion. He does so partly because religion is surrounded with monopolist barriers, partly because the type of religion offered by religious institutions and their practitioners seems to aggravate rather than to satisfy his needs. He cannot derive from it the catharsis for which he yearns.

What the modern European needs, whether he is fully conscious of the need or not, is to be rid of his isolation, his pathological self-consciousness, and his contempt for Nature. He desires to be brought in contact once more with the sources of life, and to break down his isolation by forgetting himself. Can religion help him to do this, and so to satisfy his deepest needs?

Primitive Christianity was able in an extraordinary degree to achieve for those whom it influenced, something of this kind. Primitive Christianity appeared in a world which for malaise and restless uneasiness resembled our own. This unique religious movement enabled its devotees to forget themselves in the life of the small group to which they as individuals belonged, and in which they lost themselves only to find themselves. This vivid sense of unity, expressed sacramentally in the Agape, led to a sense of unity with a wider reality—with the source of life. The theory and practice of primitive Christianity is expressed in the words, 'We have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren.' The groups were small but their life was vivid,

and those who formed them were able to satisfy their psychic needs. Beginning with love, they experienced joy, and found peace. The religion which can thus bring peace—the annihilation of the individual, the breaking down of his isolation, the resolving of his self-consciousness—satisfies the deepest psychic needs of mankind. A religion of this sort would bring peace to the distraught European heading for the precipice.

Thus the challenge of life presents itself to-day in the form of a demand for religion. This religion will not exist merely to make us moral, or to stave off Bolshevism and birth-control, and to give people a respect for the rights of property and the conventions. The day of a policeman religion is past. The younger generation will have nothing to do with it, and they are right. Neither will the coming religion be a form of fire-insurance. We do not desire deliverance from hell or from death, but from *life*. The life, that is to say, of the fully self-conscious, individualistic, cerebral, isolated, too-civilized European, with its inhibitions, its artificialities, its loneliness, its futility. Religion must deliver us not from immorality, or damnation, but from *ourselves*. It will be an escape, not from reality, but *into* reality. Away from the narrow, futile, partial, starved, selfish life we live, into a fuller, more abundant life here and now, springing out of a more intense sense of union with our fellows, and a fuller perception of our union with the whole of life.

Modern Churchmen would like to believe that the Church of England may enable our countrymen at least to find this kind of salvation. But, like the soul in Francis Thompson's poem, our Church seems to be running away. It is preoccupied with antiquarian trifles, with administrative machinery, with theological finesse, with orthodox prestige, with finance, with success, with making the world safe for itself. And all the while the challenge sounds louder and louder till it rises into a terrific crescendo like the trump of doom. Surely the Church *must* hear—unless, dreadful possibility, the call falls upon the unresponsive ears of a corpse!